The semantics of the word 'fairy' in English between 1320 and 1829. by Williams, Noel
THE SEMANTICS OF THE WORD "FAIRY" IN ENGLISH BETWEEN 1520 AND 1829
by Noel Williams B.A., M.A.
Submitted for the degree of Ph.D
The Department of English Language, 
University of Sheffield.
September 1983
A cknowledgemen ts
Thanks are due to the staff of The Bodleian Library, Oxford,
The British Library and Sheffield University Library for 
locating some quite inaccessible sources; to Carrol for extensive 
administration and support; to Professor Norman Blake for an 
acutely critical eye; and particular thanks are due to my 
supervisor, Professor John Widdowson, for exactly the right 
balance of commentary, criticism and encouragement.
iii
ABSTRACT
The study examines the problems of the meaning of words used with 
fictional reference. It takes one particular class of such words, those 
used to denote or refer to the supernatural, as a peculiarly problematic 
set, and one example of these, fairy, as a key example. The study explores 
all the features of that word's meaning, including denotational, 
referential, stylistic, emotive and idiosyncratic aspects as well as 
sense relations and other linguistic relations.* It argues that 
understanding such words occurs through understanding cotextual 
collocations, and that the meaning of a word such as fairy can only be 
known, described and explained by examination of such cotext.
By computational analysis of a large corpus of texts using fairy 
a semantic model is built up which on the one hand describes the semantic 
frame by which fairy is made meaningful and on the other hand the 
underlying processes and decisions employed by writers (and speakers) 
in using the word meaningfully. At the same time the study seeks to 
evaluate the usefulness of rigorous formal approaches to a body of 
material as complex as that represented by the corpus.
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1CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Background to the Study
The province of this study can be stated simply. It is the ' 
meaning of the single word fairy in English in the period between 
1520 (the approximate date of its first recorded occurrence) and 1829 
(two years after the death of William Blake, a poet whose complexity 
initially prompted this study). That statement, however, though simple, 
is vague. In part the vagueness is inherent in the word meaning. One 
of the purposes of this study has thus been to specify as closely as 
possible all the multiple aspects of meaning that a single word can 
enter into, for there seems to have been no such extensive study of the 
particularities of the semantics of an individual lexical item. But 
vagueness also follows from use of the word province - what areas of 
meaning are to be examined here, in what ways, to what extent and for 
what purpose? This introductory chapter provides outlines of the 
answers to these questions and the background to how that province was 
determined and how subsequent chapters explore it.
Broadly speaking there is only one question native speakers 
normally ask about the meaning of a word, namely "What is it?". This 
question, "What does the word fairy mean?" first became an important 
one for me in examining the work of William Blake. Initially there 
were other similar words in Blake's writings whose meaning perplexed me, 
largely words for supernatural entities, particularly fairy, elf, nymph, 
gnome and genii. ^  They were frequently used by him in a manner which
1. For some particularly opaque contexts see Milton: Book the Second: 
lines 17-26, Keynes (1966) pp.519-520; Jerusalem: Chapter 3: Plate 
6 :^ lines 13—15. Keynes (1966) p.697, Jerusalem: Plate 3, Keynes 
(I966) P.620; Jerasalem; Plate 13: lines 26-29, Keynes (1966) p.633.
2though related to other systems in. his work' ' seemed particularly
( 2 )difficult to explain in any language other than Blake's own.' '
In linguistic terms whilst a sense could be assigned to those words
(i.e. a meaning within the text) no clear denotation or reference could
(3)be suggested'".
Initially I believed this was an idiosyncrasy of Blake's work. 
Accordingly I began to examine other texts, both literary and non- 
literary, for comparison with his usage. It rapidly became clear that 
within any substantial corpus of texts involving such words (i.e. words 
connected with the supernatural in some way) not only was this problem 
of the imprecision or absence of referents and denotata widespread but 
also the sense relations of the words seemed confused, haphazard or 
overlapping to such an extent that it seemed impossible to regard any 
of these words as having consistent or precise meanings.' '
Imperceptibly therefore my concern shifted from the question "What does 
fairy mean?" to "How does fairy mean?"; beyond that to "How can a word 
naming any supernatural entity mean?"; and beyond that to "How can any 
word mean something which does not exist?". In other words what initially 
appeared to be a simple question about the meaning of a particular 
word in specific contexts gradually revealed itself to be a question . 
about the ways of meaning of a whole class of words. The problem of the
(1}
1. A somewhat extreme example of the systematic correspondences that 
can be extracted from Blake's work can be found in Frye (1947) 
pp.277-8, where correspondences across twenty-nine sets of four 
elements, including genii, fairies, nymphs and gnomes are detailed.
In fairness to Frye he does not pretend that this is more than a 
guide to some of the correspondences that obtain in the poetry.
2. For a full account of these difficulties see Appendix 2.
3. The terms denotation, reference and sense are discussed in Chapter 2. 
For a concise account which is the basis of that followed in this 
study see Lyons (1977a) pp.174-229.
4* Of course it may be true that any or all of other possible groups 
of words possess a similar overlapping or imprecision. I am 
inclined to believe that for many such groups this would be so, their 
imprecision increasing with the increasing abstraction of the words 
involved. Insofar as the group under discussion here is not unique 
it might be possible to extend the argument as valid for certain 
classes of words, e.g. those with fictional referents.
3meaning of fairy in a specific poem by Blake is necessarily a problem 
concerning the nature of meaningfulness for words which do not point 
to real entities. The nature of this problem is outlined below in 
section 1.2.
Thus the vagueness of the statement with which this chapter began 
can be reduced as it is clear that province can be considered to apply 
at four different levels of specificity, namely:
1. The problem of fictional reference
2. The problem of the semantics of supernatural n a m e s ^
3. The problem of the semantics of fairy
4. The problem of Blake's use of fairy in particular writings.
Level 3 is the focus of this study for the following reasons.
Firstly, fairy seemed to be the key word in the problematic network of 
supernatural names encountered in Blake's work. Secondly it is a 
common word and thus could be expected to provide a substantial data 
base for study as a significant example of levels 1 and 2. Thirdly it 
is a word which preliminary research revealed to be semantically 
interesting from the point of view of several different disciplines, 
notably philosophy, folkloristics and literary studies.
Level 4 was the starting point for the study and also the terminal 
point in that the difficulties initially encountered are returned to in 
Appendix 2 in the light of the main discussion. It also provided the 
parameters for the data base insofar as it was decided that the primary 
axis of study should be the historical development of the chosen word 
culminating in Blake's usage.
Levels 1 and 2 are the theoretical background on which study of 
level 3 depends, and which are entailed by observations made at that 
level. Thus, because discussion of level 3 necessarily involves
1. A definition of supernatural name can be found in the glossary and 
on p . 11.
4discussion of levels 1 and 2, the latter two mast be established prior
to investigation of the former; and, because generalisations can be
made concerning the semantics of one example of a supernatural name
which is also a word with fictional reference, inferences can be made
about those two levels from that single example.
Accordingly the overarching scheme for this study is one of
increasing specificity:
Chapter 1 (i) background to the study
(ii} the nature of the problem 
(iii) the parameters of study
«
How can fairy 
mean?
Levels t and 2
-
1> What does fairy 
I mean?J Level 3
Level 4
Throughout the study the central object remains the same, namely 
the lexeme fairy in the period 1320-1829, but the focus changes. The 
two primary aims demand this shift of focus, i.e.: A, the aim to 
explore the meaning of a word as thoroughly as possible, and B, the aim 
to state the particular semantics of a problematic word as rigorously 
as possible. The motivation behind these aims involved a desire to 
determine if such a detailed study could actually be achieved, and, if 
not, to illustrate the problems of handling lexical semantics which 
require solution before such achievement can be reached, and also a 
desire to control the many variables inherent in such a task by 
exploring the possibilities of exhaustive and rigorous methodology and
Chapter 2 - theoretical ground work
Chapter % - methodology
Chapter 4 - the object of study;
semantic roots and 
phonological shape
Chapters 5» - the meanings of fairy
6 and 7
Chapter 8 - Conclusion 
Appendix 1 - The corpus 
Appendix 2 - Blake and fairy
5formal description. There was also felt to be a need for a rigorous, 
formal methodology not only to test the approach (a rather abstract 
justification for such a study) but also, if successful, to provide 
a description which could be of use not only to linguists but also to 
scholars in the fields from which the data was drawn, notably folklorists 
and literary scholars.
The shift of focus across the four different problematic levels 
permits a number of differing perspectives on the structure. From the 
point of view of level 4 the entire investigation is preliminary 
groundwork defining the conceptual network within which Blake was 
working. From the point of view of levels 1 and 2 the key section is 
Chapter 2 and, to a lesser extent, the resultant methodology in Chapter 
3. Chapters 5» 6 and 7 become exploration of a particular example, of 
which some aspects bear directly on level 1 and some on level 2 but 
many are specific to the history and usage of that chosen example. 
However the structure is established primarily with respect to level 3 
from whose point of view Chapters 4, 5» 6 and 7 are central, for which 
previous chapters are the necessary groundwork and Appendix 2 simply 
an interesting but peripheral micro-study.
Accordingly the remainder of this chapter briefly establishes the 
nature of the problems to be examined, demonstrates the need for both a 
malti-level and a rigorous approach and describes the boundaries within 
whose those problems are to be examined.
61.2 The Nature of the Problem
Whilst it is possible in literature, particularly in poetry, to 
allow that a word has no more than a connotational, emotive or 
symbolic function which may induce a different response in every 
reader, such an allowance creates problems for philosophy, linguistics, 
and folkloristics. Those problems are interrelated and a productive 
discussion must necessarily take account of all three.
The philosophical question has been highlighted most acutely by
the schools of logical positivism and logical atomism^. Although
such theories did not hold that the meaning of a word or statement is
( 2 )equivalent to the sensory datav y to which that word is connected they 
held in general that meaningfulness is dependent on sensory data 
(together with propositions) and therefore that any word or statement 
which lacks a clear sensory equivalent is meaningless. The most 
convenient and popular formulation of these notions can be found in the 
work of A. J. Ayer:
I require of an empirical hypothesis, not indeed 
that it should be conclusively verifiable, but 
some possible sense-experience should be relevant 
to the determination of its truth or falsehood. If 
a putative proposition fails to satisfy this 
principle, and is not a tautology, then I hold that 
it is metaphysical, and that, being metaphysical, , v 
it is neither true or false but literally senseless. 12
1. The key philosophers in these movements were Bertrand Russell and 
Ludwig Wittgenstein in his early work. See in particular Russell 
(1918) and Wittgenstein (1961).
2. I use the slightly clumsy phrase sensory data rather than the more 
usual sense data in order to avoid confusion with the use of the 
word sense in the present study. Sensory data are the unorganised 
impulses of light, sound etc. at the moment they reach a receiving 
organism but before that organism has interpreted them. (Sense
is used to refer to intra-linguistic meaning).
3« A. J. Ayer (1975) P*41» It should be noted that if Ayer is taken 
at face value in this statement, he is only creating a tautology 
namely that if a proposition lacks 'sense—experience' then it is 
sense—less (= lacking in sense experience). Thus he requires that 
we understand senseless both 'literally', as 'sense-less', and 
normally, as 'meaning-less'. His argument to some extent depends 
on systematic exploitation of this ambiguity.
7Or again:
For we shall maintain that no statement which 
refers to a 'reality' transcending the limits of 
all possible sense-experience can possibly have 
any literal significance. (1)
Such statements make it clear that this interpretation of meaning
is dependent on regarding the truth value of sentences as primary.
(o)Truth values'- 1 strictly speaking apply to propositions rather than 
sentences. However in discussing natural language it is possible to 
regard some sentences as propositions. A proposition or sentence may 
have one of two truth values. If it is true it has a value usually 
represented as Tf if it is false it has a value represented as F. The 
truth value of any particular sentence will depend-on certain conditions 
known as truth conditions. If those conditions are met (i.e. if a 
particular state of affairs exists) the sentence is T, if not then it 
is F. If however there are no relevant truth conditions, i.e. if there 
can be no actual state of affairs sufficient to determine T or F for 
a particular sentence, then no truth value can be assigned to that 
sentence. Thus Ayer says that those sentences which lack sensory 
equivalents because they lack truth conditions, hence truth values, 
are meaningless. The most convincing and most influential statement 
of the equation of meaning and truth-value is to be found in Russell’s 
theory of descriptions^. By such a theory we are bound to regard 
statements concerning the supernatural as meaningless. The difficulties 
of Blake's vocabulary would be attributed to their metaphysical nature,
i.e. they would be regarded as inherently meaningless.
So the basic question is: do words or statements referring to the 
supernatural have any meaning whatsoever? Following from this come
1. Ayer (1975) P»46.
2. For an account of truth value semantics see Lyons (1977) pp.141-7. 
Somewhat different approaches can be found in Davidson (1967); 
Strawson (1971). Kempson (1977).
3. See in particular Russell (1905).
8questions which are more obviously linguistic. If such words are 
meaningful, how can that meaning be known, how can it be expressed, 
can tests be devised to detect or determine that meaning, and what 
truth value, if any, do such statements have?
However as linguists begin with the premise that all words used 
in normal language are in some sense meaningful, they are committed to 
regarding words used to refer to the supernatural as meaningful. In 
other words linguistics does not seek to answer the central philosophy 
ical question outlined above concerning the nature of meaningfulness 
but sidesteps it in upholding its concern with natural language. 
Essentially the linguistic problem is more specific than the philo­
sophical. Given that any word referring to the supernatural is meaning­
ful , linguistics wishes to know what precisely that meaning is in each 
case, how the different meanings are related to each other, how those 
meanings relate to the way(s) the words are used, and if it is possible 
to state the meanings of all words in such a way that 'correct* and 
'incorrect* usage will be specifiable. In other words semantic 
linguistics is primarily concerned with assigning correct and unambig­
uous lexical entries for each item. An examination of the entries for 
such words in conventional dictionaries yields a peculiarly vague and 
unsatisfactory set of definitions, which largely are circular in a 
manner somewhat reminiscent of Blake's mutually defining entries^ \
Insofar as such linguistic problems depend on determining the
( 2 )a-pplicabilityv ' of each word linguists are interested in the same 
kinds of relations as philosophers.
Thus linguistics is only concerned with the question "How does x 12
1. For example the Oxford English Dictionary (Murray 1933) defines a 
bugbear as a hobgoblin, a hobgoblin as a bogy, a bogy as a bogle 
and a bogle as a bugbear. See Chapter 2 for more elaborate examples 
of circularity in definition and use.
2. The notion of applicability is taken from Lyons (1977^) p.2l3ff 
and is also discussed in Chapter 2 of this study.
9
%mean?" when more practical or specific questions depend upon it. Where 
the applicability of x is clear or/undisputed, such a question thus 
does not arise, but in the case of fictional reference, where the 
meaning of x cannot be related to an entity in the real world, then 
that dependence can be crucial.
Folklorists also are concerned with textual description. Indeed
many of the early advances in folklore were the result of imaginative
philological vork^1\  However the primary interest of folklorists is
not with texts as such, but with the nature and status of the phenomena
described, the relations between those phenomena, and in particular the
origins of those phenomena (in the psychological, sociological and
(2}historical sense of origin)v '. Folklorists are more concerned with 
systems of belief and their modes of expression than with the truth 
value of those expressions or their objective validity. They are 
concerned to understand and describe the system of cultural belief 
of which each text is an expression rather than to study the precise 
manner in which that system is realised. In consequence language tends
1. The archetype of cross-fertilisation between interests in language 
and folk culture is Grimm's Teutonic Mythology (1883). As early as 
1807 mythologists were advancing strong theses on philological 
grounds. See, for exanple, Bryant (1807)» And the strength of the 
arguments of the solar mythologists depended very much on questions 
of language evolution and use, e.g. the works of Max Müller. More 
recently and more pertinent to the present enquiry several 
philologists have become interested in the peculiar interrelation­
ships of meaning and origin that exist between words referring to 
the supernatural; see for exanple: Scott (1895), Kittredge (1900), 
Clarke (1935), Allen (1935 and 1936), Dickins (1941), Dickins (1942), 
Spitzer (1944), Henry (1959), Conversely many folklorists have 
sought to understand the system of belief \mderlying supernatural 
creatures by examination of linguistic affinities, see: Allies 
(1846), Serjeantson (1936), Wasson (1957), Hand (1977). For a 
linguistic approach to the supernatural in literature see Saleski 
(1939). For a popular approach to etymology and the supernatural 
see Edwards (1974),
2. A useful brief account of various theories of supernatural origin 
is Ward (1977), Other work on origins pertinent to this study can 
be found in Keightley (1900), Coote (1879), Harland (1891), Nutt 
(1897), Leuba (1912), Chambers (n.d.), Sayce (1934), Spence (1946), 
Nutt (1975), Winberry (1976).
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to be for folklorists a superstructure rather than an infrastructure 
and there is relatively little concern to establish any fixed or 
absolute relation between descriptions and reality except in particular 
cases for particular cultures. The discriminatory concern of folklor­
ists is thus to classify beliefs rather than expressions.
Linguistic.semantics therefore finds itself as a bridge between 
the more abstract concerns of philosophy and the particular interests 
of folkloristics and related social sciences. Insofar as the denotata 
in which it is interested are real it must be concerned with the 
ontological status of the supernatural; insofar as those denotata are 
culturally determined it must be interested in the sociology and 
psychology of folk belief. This point, which is the central unifying 
principle of this investigation, cannot be overstated. Too few 
semanticists have acted upon this principle, though many recognise, 
with Paul Ziff, that:
It is difficult to separate language and culture 
areas or to discriminate cultural features/^ 
without attention to linguistic features. ' '
Whilst it is easy to recognise that cultural relativity is an important
feature of a semantic system, it is difficult to state in any precise
way how the unique features of a particular culture are encoded in its
system of meaning. Yet the attempt must be made, for whilst formal or
abstract semantics may go some way towards characterising intralinguis-
tic sense relations such as synonymy or entailment, neither such
relations nor their study can exist in vacuo. Natural language is not
a formal, abstract system, and it exists in purposive relation with
reality. Meaning is as much dependent onLthe world and belief about
the world as it is on intralinguistic relations. In the words of 1
1. Ziff (1960) p.3
11
Donald Davidson:
We do not know what someone means unless we know 
what he believes. We do not know what someone 
believes unless we know what he means. (1)
Nevertheless the central concern of linguistics and therefore of the
present work must be with the intra-language relations, specifically
between words denoting the supernatural and other words, and within the
set of such words itself.
I propose to refer to these words by the shorthand expression 
supernatural names which is throughout the study to be understood as: 
tokens used in a language either to refer to or to denote the 
supernatural';. Thus the problem with which this work is concerned, 
though an immense one, can be stated reasonably succinctly: presuming 
that a supernatural name has meaning, how can that meaning be charac­
terised such that (a) it is related to the real world, (b) it is related 
to the world of the culture of which it is part and (c) it is 
distinguished from other similar words? All three of these questions 
have the dual components of the how and what of meaning, since the 
characterisation of particular relations between word and world, word 
and culture and word and word depend on knowing what kinds of relations 
these can be. Thus answers to those questions in respect of names for 
non-existent entities may need peripheral support from psychology, and 
from the anthropology and sociology of perception of belief and of 
culture. As will be shown in Chapters 5»'-6-and 7 input from these areas 
may be crucial.
1. Davidson (1967) p - 513
12
1,3.1 The Parameters of Study
This investigation is thus concerned to apply the above questions 
to a limited set of data, namely the lexeme fairy^  ^ as it was used in 
English from 1320 to 1829. Necessarily some general or speculative 
material concerned with wider aspects of fictional reference or the 
semantics of the supernatural has been omitted or relegated to paren­
thetical remarks. Others remain in the body of the work as pertinent 
to complete exploration of level 3. The study is conceived as a 
conceptual scheme for the semantics of supernatural names (level 2) and 
thus for some aspects at least of fictional reference (level 1) in the 
manner suggested by Grimes as controlled variation of a defined data 
set.<* 2>
One such controlled variation promoted by the number of super­
natural names in the period and instigated by concern with level 4 
was to determine if there was any systematic variation with style or 
if there was any semantic constant in the meaning of the chosen 
supernatural name across all styles or periods. Under the simplest 
possible solution to problems (a), (b) and (c) above, (p.3), in which 
'real world' and 'cultural world' are identical and given form by a 
particular language one would expect (i) that there was such a 
semantic constant and (ii) that any variation in meaning would be 
systematic either with date (indicating a synchronic state of meaning) 
or style (style being, on this interpretation, an expression of a 
particular subcultural viewpoint). However as this solution seemed
T. In what follows the form {’fairy ^  will be used as the citation form 
of the lexeme fairy in all its variant spellings and also the 
lexeme fay which, for the puipose of this study is not regarded 
as a distinct lexeme. For a list of the /various spellings and 
variant forms encountered see below, p.159.
2. Grimes (1975) pp.157-8: "the way to confront the encyclopedia 
; problem is not to duck around it and talk only about those aspects 
of language for which we do not need to know everything about 
everything but to develop a conceptual scheme that contains 
generalisations powerful enough to permit us to manage a semantic 
system that embraces everything".
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highly improbable, in such a simple form at least, this concern 
required a more general formulation. Supplementary to the problems
(a), (b) and (c) therefore were the related questions: (d) does a 
supernatural name have one meaning, several, or a continuum of meaning; 
and (e) if that meaning is multiple is that multiplicity systematic in 
any way?
The aim was thus to collect as many examples of use of the word 
fairy in extant English texts in the specified period as possible, and, 
treating the collected corpus as representative of the whole period, 
endeavour to characterise the constants and variations in that use.
No claim can of course be made that all the recorded uses of the 
word have been located. There are certainly some uses which I know of 
but to which I have been unable to obtain access, and others for which 
I have texts which are too unreliable to base such an enquiry upon.
There must also be some texts I have not encountered, particularly in 
the periods 1590-1620 and 1800-1829 in which fairy is used frequently.
A large range and number of texts were sampled in a search for examples 
of the word fairy which took over two years. It was obviously impossible 
to search all texts produced in the period under study. However three 
overlapping strategies were used in order to locate as many and varied 
examples of use of fairy as possible. Firstly dictionaries, 
concordances, and comprehensive surveys on works on or about super­
natural beings were u s e d , ^  and the source texts located and consulted. *I
1. The major dictionaries used to obtain references were the Oxford 
English Dictionary (Murray (1933))» Wright's English Dialect 
Dictionary (1893-1908) and Kurath's Middle English Dictionary 
TV?&T- For all the poets and playwrights of the period for whom
I was able to obtain a concordance I recovered all occurrences of 
fairy from their works. In other works collection of occurrences 
was made by thorough reading of likely areas, more cursory searches 
in less likely areas, perusal of glossaries of all works published 
in the Early English Text Series, and by consulting references in 
other works particularly De Lattre (1912), Latham 0930), Briggs 
(1959)» Paton (i960), Briggs (1977), Briggs (1976).
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Secondly those types of text of vhich these source texts were examples 
were surveyed. Several criteria were used here in an attempt to cover 
as many potential sources as possible. These included examining other 
works by an author who had used the word in at least one text; searching 
varieties of text which had provided examples of rich sources, such as 
religious tracts, chapbooks, medieval romances, philological treatises, 
and many other varieties of text; examining cataloguing systems and 
sections within which a source text had been found; consulting texts 
which have been regarded as the sources of texts which were themselves 
source texts for this collection; and, where possible, examining lists 
of texts which were 'accidental1 collections, on the assumption that 
such lists might have thematic unity, such lists including lists of 
publications produced by particular organisations which had included 
a known source, or catalogues such as auction lists or private library 
collections. Where valid and possible each avenue would be explored 
for every new source which became available. Thirdly types of text 
or source material which were intuitively regarded as potentially rich 
sources were examined as exhaustively as possible. For example as it 
was assumed that fairy would occur frequently in Middle English romance, 
every such romance and every glossary to every Middle English text 
published by the Early English Text society was searched.^
It is thus unlikely that there is a substantial body of relevant 
material that I have not encountered, although the physical difficulties 
imposed by the necessity of such a methodology (such as, for example, 
the idiosyncrasies of a cataloguing system or mistakes in attribution 
of a source text) may mean that some of the judgements made in the 
course of this study which depend on low frequencies for occurrence of 
a particular feature in the corpus may possess a slight bias due to 1
1. Amplification of some of the search techniques can be found in 
Chapter 3» under discussion of methodology.
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insufficient evidence.
It is also possible that the study as a whole contains a certain 
stylistic bias in that the material of primary interest and that most 
easily obtained was what may broadly be called imaginative literature. 
However it would seem that this itself is due to a certain stylistic 
restriction on use of the word fairy itself. Those texts for which 
single-word references may most easily be obtained also tend to be 
literary, particularly poetry.
For those periods in which there appeared to be a relative 
paucity of material, particularly the period 1320-1550 the search was 
more intensive. A reasonable estimate of the percentage of occurrences 
discovered would be 95% for "the period 1300-1550 and roughly 80% for 
1550-1829.
It would thus not be unreasonable to claim that the judgements
produced are in large part based on a thorough sample of the available
records. Whilst it is possible that some observations possible from a
fuller collection are not made here, those justifiable observations
(1)made from the collected corpus should be substantially valid. 1
1. For a fu ll account of the collecting and recording procedures se° 
below, Chapter 3.
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1.3«2 .Summary of the Parameters of Study
This section summarises the aims and problems outlined in the 
preceding sections of this chapter to provide a convenient reference 
point for subsequent chapters. At various points in what follows 
reference will be made to aim (X), problem (N), question (i), or 
question (x) in this format. These should always be read as 
referring to the appropriate item summarised here. Additionally this 
section lists the chapters to follow and outlines how they relate to 
the aims, problems and questions which form the study's framework.
To summarise - the general aims of the study are:
(A) to examine the semantics of one word as comprehensively 
and as thoroughly as possible.
(B) to provide a semantic description of the chosen word 
by applying theory and method which is as rigorous as 
possible.
These aims are to be achieved for the object-word fairy in the 
period 1320-1829 with regard to problems at four levels of specificity:
(1) the problem of fictional reference
(2) the problem of the meaning of supernatural names
(3) the problem of the meaning of fairy
(4) the problem of Blake's use of fairy
which can broadly be summarised as two interdependent questions:
(i) how does fairy mean?
(ii) what does fairy mean?
These questions can be reformulated in the light of philosophic, 
linguistic and folkloristic orientations as five questions which need 
to be answered in order to achieve objectives (a ) and (b ). These are:
(a) how can the meaning of a supernatural name be character­
ised such that it is related to the real world?
(b) how can the meaning of a supernatural name be
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characterised such that it is related to the culture 
of which it is part?
(c) how can the meaning of a supernatural name be 
characterised such that it is distinguished from other 
similar words?
(d) does a supernatural name have one meaning, several, or 
a continuimi of meaning?
(e) if one of the latter two cases in (d), is that 
multifariousness systematic in any way?
To achieve these aims by answering these questions with regard to 
the appropriate levels of specificity, the following structure has 
been adopted:
Chapter 1 provides: 1.1 the background to the study
1.2 an outline of the problems
1.3 an overview of the approach
Chapters 2 and 3 are oriented towards levels 1 and 2. Chapter 
2 elaborates a view of meaning sensitive to the problems 
outlined in 1.2 and develops a consequent terminology with 
sections oriented towards the five questions (a)-(e):
2.1(i) expands 1.2 and 1.3 
2.l(ii) meets some of the requirements of 
(B) in outlining a terminology
2.2 relates to (b) and (e) in outlining 
the notion of associative meaning
2.3 relates to (a), outlining the notion 
of applicability
2.4 relates to (c) and (d), outlining 
the notion of sense.
Chapter 3 details the methodology designed to implement the
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view established in Chapter 2, meeting (b ).
Chapter 4 represents a shift of viewpoint in turning from 
levels 1 and 2 to level 3 by describing the object word 
(in view of objective (B) and certain semantic complexes 
which obtained immediately prior to the first occurrence of 
fairy in English (in view of objective (A)).
Chapters 5» 6 and 7 form the central focus of the study for 
together they elaborate the results of application of the 
method to the database in respect of level 3» each in turn 
exploring one of the semantic areas established in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 5 is concerned with purely linguistic aspects of 
meaning, primarily sense relations, related to 2.4 and thus 
to (c) and (d).
Chapter 6 is concerned with associative meaning, related to 
section 2.2, hence (b) and (e).
Chapter 7.is concerned with applicability, related to section
2.3, hence (a).
Chapter 8 draws together those conclusions which can be made 
about the meaning of fairy in the period, relates them to 
levels 1 and 2 where relevant, and also evaluates the success 
of the approach in respect of aims (A) and (B), the overall 
theoretical standpoint and the methodology. In particular it 
is concerned with evaluation of these four areas, as well as 
linking the discussion of Chapters 5* 6 and 7 into one model 
which is evaluated in respect of levels 1 to 4 .
19
CHAPTER TWO: SEMANTICS AND SUPERNATURAL NAMES
2.1.1 Introduc tory
Investigation of levels 1 and 2 must necessarily be highly 
theoretical as these levels are both abstract and of debatable ontology. 
However with respect to the examination of actual texts such as the 
body of material discussed below (hereafter referred to as the corpus) 
that theory must be tempered by pragmatic concerns. That is, not only 
should the theory meet the aims, problems and levels of specificity 
outlined in the previous chapter it must do so in a way which can be 
applied to particular texts. This chapter attempts to do this by 
describing as clearly as possible (aim B) as many as possible of the 
aspects of meaning that may contribute to the meaning of fairy (aim A) 
in such a way that fairy can be taken as a fair example of levels 1 and 
2, that all the questions (a) to (e) are taken account of, and actual 
texts can be analysed to yield those aspects of meaning.
Although this might seem an impossible task (and the reader 
should bear in mind that one of the auxiliary purposes of this 
investigation is to test the very possibility of such an examination) 
the pragmatics^ of textual analysis effectively narrow the theoretical 
horizon rather than widen it. The theory outlined below is designed 
with levels 3 and 4 in mind. Essentially therefore the multiple 
aspects of meaning outlined in sections 2.2, 2 .3 and 2 .4 are all 
theoretical justification for a collocational approach to lexemic 
semantics whereby the meaning of a word in a text is not necessarily 
held to reside in the collocations it has in a given corpus, but is 
held to be deducible from those collocations by analysis. The 
viewpoint adopted is that an analyst is very much in the same position 
as a reader/hearer. He is a processor of textual information, and the
1. Pragmatic is used throughout the study in its non-technical sense. 
Lingui s ti c/philo s ophi cal pragmatics, though relevant to the 
material examined here, is nowhere explicitly introduced.
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entirety of the knowledge he has about the associative meaning 
(stylistic -and emotive), applicability (denotation and reference), and 
sense of a word in a text is derived from the surrounding words in that 
text and the way in. which he, the reader/hearer, processes it. As will 
become clear in Chapter 3» the methods adopted are essentially 
collocational, though presented and conducted differently, and are 
intended to characterise in accord with aims (A) and (b ) the meanings 
available to a reader/hearer, duplicating his behaviour and/or knowledge 
in a form cruder than that of actual human text processing but 
conversely more amenable to examination and formalisation.
This chapter proceeds in the following manner. Section 2.1.2 
establishes a broad frame for the theoretical approach of the whole 
study, arguing that a linguistic approach is necessarily central, in 
examining levels 1 and 2, but must also depend on material from at 
least ten other disciplines; section 2.1 ,3 establishes some termino­
logical and typographical conventions adopted; section 2 .2 defines the 
two areas called here associative meaning and discusses the extent to 
which fairy may possess such meaning, attempting to frame answers to 
questions (b) and (e); 2 .3 outlines applicability in the same way, 
directed towards question (a) and the particular problem of level 1; ^
2 .4  discusses sense and questions (c) and (d), and introduces the key 
semantic concept of the cluster. Finally section 2.5 provides the 
bridge between theory and method by justifying the collocational 
approach.
1. For a more developed approach to this problem see Williams (1981)
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2.1.2 Theoretical Frame
Because there is no defined academic discipline solely concerned 
with the supernatural, for aspects of the supernatural manifest 
themselves in many fields including literature, anthropology, mythology, 
folklore, psychology, demonology, theology, parapsychology and the 
so-called 'occult sciences', the need to provide a theoretical frame­
work within which to place this investigation necessitates attempting 
an integrated approach which is valid in most, if not all, of those 
fields. An approximate indication of the various overlapping interests 
pertinent to this study can be shown by the following graphic 
representation:
Linguistic 
Semantics - 
Philosophy
The theory need not be concerned with each of these disciplines 
in the same degree of detail but it seems that to be of value in any of 
them this investigation must be cognisant of some aspects of all. The 
theory must be sensitive to all these disciplines and must provide a 
systematic terminology which relates supernatural phenomena to each 
individually as well as to 'social science' as a whole.
Few of these disciplines are concerned with the supernatural as a 
phenomenon with its own independent reality. Only theologians and some 
mythologists^ might adopt this view and even these tend to see their 
primary task as textual, in refining, editing and elucidating textual
Literature
-Language —
IPsychology.
Folklore- -Mythology
Sociology—  Anthropology
-Theology
1. For example, Bvans-Wentz (1977) p.491 concludes: "We must also 
cease to think of the Fairy-Faith as being no more than a fabric 
of groundless beliefs. In short, the ordinary non-Celtic mind 
must readjust itself to a new set of phenomena which through 
ignorance on its part it has been content to disregard, and to 
treat with ridicule and contempt as so much outworn 'superstition'".
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descriptions of the supernatural. As it is virtually impossible to 
study the supernatural at first hand, what must almost invariably be 
studied are such descriptions. For convenience this can be stated as 
an axiom: the invariable objects of study for an investigation of the 
supernatural are descriptions of phenomena in which use is made of 
supernatural appellation. One can, of course, find exceptions to 
this axiom, particularly in the field of parapsychology. However even 
in the so-called occult sciences much of the learning and experience 
involved is verbal and depends on methods of interpreting the descrip­
tions of others. For example, the common practice of participants in 
ouija seances (whether they involve the supernatural or not) is not to 
discuss the phenomenon, but the text they are producing. Similarly in 
a number of seances I attended held by the Cambridge Psychic Society in 
1972 in which hypnosis was used, all the observers and participants were 
interested in the text - the words produced by the hypnotised subject(s) 
but none were concerned with, his subsequent account of why he said 
what he did. In general it would appear that many who study or believe 
in the supernatural place a higher value on text than in many cases it 
warrants, often to the point of neglecting or rejecting mundane 
explanations of the phenomenon as phenomenon in favour of explanations 
which account for the text in its own terms, without reference to the 
circumstances of its production.
Similarly one finds that a great deal of the history of magical 
thought and belief in the supernatural is bound to texts of one kind or 
another. Many religious rituals have a verbal component, such as a 
chant, liturgy, prayer, hymn, threnody etc.^; many magical or
1. Obviously the Christian Church is as good an example as any more 
exotic religion. The inviolable nature of biblical authority and 
of the Prayer Book, the ceremonial adherence to traditions of 
fixed verbal form, and the adoption of a stylised form of language 
in sermons all indicate the importance of text in Christian 
religion.
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superstitious practices involve verbal formulae such as curses, 
blessings, charms, and dites concerning the supernatural^^; many of 
the developments of magic are based on misinterpretations or 
reinterpretation of texts from other cultures as in the magical 
systems of the Jewish Kabbalah and the 'sciences' of alchemy, magic
( 2)and astrology derived from it' '; or the uses of garbled foreign
formulae in early English charmsinterweavings of texts from
disparate sources which produced numerous secret societies^^; and there
would seem to be a general, almost superstitious, reverence for words
(Oheld by many cultures, particularly in respect of names'".
All these factors suggest that text is of paramount importance as 
evidence of magical thought or supernatural belief. However the main 
reason why such an investigation as this must be primarily linguistic 
is the axiomatic one stated above, that almost all the evidence for 
the supernatural is verbal. A linguistic study thus has a double 12345
1. Any collection of folk sayings will include many of these, and most 
people even in modern western society will know some of them.
Good examples can be found in Addy (1973) pp.73ff» Rudkin (1973) 
passim; Blakeborough (1973) pp.126-153» Hawke (1975) passim. One 
can also note the reverse formulation, that many formulaic 
utterances, particularly those which are context sensitive, are 
regarded as sacrosanct by many users, and may be used and adhered 
to with a traditional fervour akin to religious or superstitious 
belief.
2. The best account of the Kabbalah and its influence on magic is 
Ponce (1974)*
3. For example Storms says: "The Anglo-Saxons borrowed from diverse 
sources, Greek, Irish, Hebrew and especially Latin, and a number 
of charm formulas evidently owe their effect to the mystification 
of a foreign tongue". Storms (1948) p.2. For other examples see 
Cockayne (1864); Grattan and Singer (1952); Euhler (1964).
4 . Many magical societies seem to have originated in the sixteenth 
century as a result of the rediscovery and eclectic interweaving of 
learned texts in that period, including many mystical movements 
such as the Rosicrucian Society. More recent examples are The 
Order of The Golden Dawn, and the various groups organised by 
Aleister Crowley. A work which deals with many of their early 
traditions is Raine (19^9).
5. A more detailed discussion of naming and word magic can be found 
in section 8.2 . That names have magical properties with respect 
to the things they stand for is an ancient concept. Even today the 
device of euphemism and its constant change in the language 
indicate that people do not believe all words to be arbitrarily 
connected to things. See Cload (1920).
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value. In the first place linguistics is, or ought to be, the best
tool for analysing descriptions. Secondly it should be able to
provide a terminology which is neither uncritically credulous^ ^ nor
( 2)sceptically hostile' '. Consequently the first requirement of any 
study must be a neutral metalanguage' ' with which to discuss the 
descriptions encountered. It is to be hoped that any such 
metalanguage provided by the present work will create a useful basis 
for future work in similar areas.
1. Credulity towards the supernatural seems to have been common 
throughout the history of man. It might be supposed, however, 
that twentieth-century Britain has finally purged itself of any 
belief in fairies. That this is not the case can be seen, for 
example, in Kodson (1925)*. Hodson (1927)* Evans-Wentz (1977)* the 
continued popular interest in the Cottingley fairies, see
Conan Doyle (1920), Conan Doyle (1922), Gardner (1945)* and, as 
evidence of contemporary popular interest, Reader's Digest (197"5), 
Sanderson (1975), Masters (1974), Arrowsmith (1978), Doughty (1978). 
Both the School of Scottish Studies and the Department of Irish 
Folklore at University College, Dublin have recently collected 
stories from living informants. See, for example, Tocher No. 28 
(1978)* Other sources indicate that partial belief in fairies 
still exists, e.g. some of the tales in Tongue (1970) such as 
"Whistling Jimmy" p .119 or "Call up the Chimney" p .157» and 
Fielding (1979)« There is, of course, ample evidence from the 
popular presses that interest in the supernatural is still widespread: 
e.g. the journals Fate and Fortune and Prediction. I have a small 
collection of news cuttings about ghosts reported recently in:
Oxford Journal, 1978; The Star (Sheffield) 14 February 1978,
15 February 1978, 16 April 1978; Morning Telegraph (Sheffield)
8 February 1978.
2. Scepticism and critical hostility towards belief in the supernatural 
and particularly belief in fairies seems to have begun at. about the 
time of the witch trials in England, with Scot's Discoverie of 
Witchcraft of 1584 (Scot (1975)) being the most well known of early 
sceptical accounts. However the idea that fairies are no longer 
believed in or that they have moved away because of contemporary 
beliefs, often coupled with the notion that such belief was the 
result of adherence to an earlier inferior religion, is common from 
Chaucer to the present day, almost to the extent of being a folk 
motif itself. Briggs frequently mentions this, e.g. Briggs (1977) 
p.3: "English fairy beliefs, which from Chaucer’s time onwards 
have been supposed to belong to the last generation and to be lost 
to the present one". See Groome (1880) p .7 ; Courtney (1887) p .182; 
Dendy (1896) p.598; Nutt (1897) P.55; Palmer (1975) p .104;
McNeil (1977) p.101; Briggs (1978) p.50. Also in the study corpus
1400/ 01/ 10 , 1620/0 2 .
3. Metalanguage here is to be understood in a broad sense as any 
defined language which can be used for discussion of a particular 
object-language, i.e. a theoretically definable corpus. See 
Lyons (1977a) pp.10-13.
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Although such a metalanguage may he neutral in respect of belief
in the phenomena described, it may not be neutral in respect of the
linguistic attitude it embodies. Insofar as it must involve some
(1}notion of the Applicability' of language it may well restrict the
possible forms of description available to a speaker and may therefore
introduce a classification of the phenomena described despite its
declared neutrality. The psychological and philosophical grounds for
( 2 )such a metalanguage are therefore crucial' Accordingly I will first 
sketch some of the philosophical and psychological problems and suggest 
an approach which allows the possibility of a useful metalanguage.
Being linguistic this study must put aside the question: 'Do 
supernatural names'^' mean anything?*, initially at least, and ask 
instead: 'Given that supernatural names are meaningful, of what does 
that meaning consist?'. For it.is an axiom of the study of natural 
language that all words felt to be meaningful by native speakers are 
meaningful. Three broad areas of meaningfulness can be described, 
each or all of which may contribute to the intuition of meaning 
attached to supernatural names. They .may broadly be termed association, 
applicability, and sense. If it could be shown that a particular word 
has no value in any of these areas, one could conclude that the only 
kind of meaning it may possess is syntactic, the result of its 
grammatical function, and that it is therefore a form word rather than 123
1. Applicability is used to characterise any semantic connection
between language and the world. See below, section 2.3.1 . Also 
Lyons (1977a) p.?1J. *
2. The dependence of linguistics upon philosophy is frequently 
remarked upon, but is of particular importance in the realm of 
semantics. See for example Ullmann (1951)» preface. It is both 
unproductive and futile in many semantic problems to attempt to 
decide if they are problems properly belonging to linguistic 
philosophy or to the philosophy of language.
3. The phrase supernatural name is employed throughout the discussion 
to refer to any noun or adjective used to indicate that a 
particular phenomenon is supernatural. See p .11.
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a full w o r d ^ *  If fairy is no more than such a word, in any or all
of its uses, its syntactic function would seem to be a modifier of
some kind, perhaps with a form of deixis indicating 'elsewhere' or
'otherness'. Even if one were to deny that all supernatural names
were meaningful in the areas of association, applicability and sense,
it would be impossible to deny that some uses of supernatural names at
least possess this kind of deixis. One might view it as a pseudo-
deixis, a false analogy made with truly deictic words such as that
and there, but it would be impossible to describe this 'true deixis'
in such a way that it could be distinguished from 'pseudo-deixis' since
the intuition of users, ultimate arbiter in debates over natural
language, does not seem able to distinguish between the feeling of
otherness which is attached to a non-supernatural entity, and the
feeling attached to a supernatural entity, nor to distinguish the
feeling of location associated with a 'real' entity from that
( 2)associated with an 'unreal' onev '. 12
1. 'Full' words are meaningful in addition to their grammatical 
function, 'form' words only have grammatical meaning. See
: Ullmann (1967) p.44, Palmer (1977) pp.37-38.
2. These judgements are made from personal experience both through 
experience of phenomena which can only be named as supernatural 
(although I believe that the objective occurrences which gave me 
those experiences were perfectly natural phenomena) and through 
conversation with others who hold strong belief in the supernatural 
at the Cambridge University Psychic Society and elsewhere. For „ 
further discussion of the notion of location see below, section 7 .3.
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2.1.3 Terminology
Before continuing with a discussion of the various aspects of 
meaning it is necessary to introduce a number of terminological 
conventions which will be adhered to throughout the study. For 
convenience all of the terms used technically in this work are 
collected into a glossary at the e n d ^ .  Most of these emerge from the 
argument as it progresses. However this section serves to establish 
those terms which are adopted conventionally, thus encoding assumptions 
rather than generating terms from a logical or semantic argument.
The prime difficulty of a study concerned with reality and
unreality or, from a different point of view, different levels of
reality is the lack of an accepted vocabulary of epistemology and 
ontology in which to express its particular concerns. A bewildering 
proliferation of terms is available, but all of them are either 
functional only within a limited philosophical or psychological context, 
or else so ambiguous as to be virtually useless. The following set 
of terms is designed to encode certain aspects of reality from 
different points of view, in order that the phrase different levels of 
reality can be regarded as meaningful and yield insights into those 
areas in which supernatural names can be regarded as meaningful.
From the point of yiew of an observer reality is a continuous 
series of sensory impressions made up of separable sensory data. From 
the psychological point of view there is no meaning or organisation in 
the physical phenomena which consitute those data, such as air waves, 
changes in pressure, the movement of light etc., and those phenomena 
can only be regarded as meaningful when recognised by an observer.
This continuous bombardment of disorganised light, sound, smell etc. 
will be referred to as Buzz, following William James. That term will 
be adopted here for random, unorganised physical phenomena. The 
moment Buzz becomes Sensory Data, i?e. the moment any portion of the 
Buzz is perceived by an observer it becomes organised and, by virtue 
of that organisation, meaningful. In the first place the mere fact of 
perception^ i.e. selecting from an infinite random field of Buzz, is 
organisation, but much more complex neurological and physiological
1. See Appendix 3
28
processes also operate on the Buzz to organise it:
"between the projection of this visual pattern on 
the brain, and our full consciousness of the 
world of objects, a series of elaborate mental 
processes takes place which converts the visual 
.pattern into the perception of the world as we 
know it. Some of these processes occur 
spontaneously."(1)
Many of these processes are complex and interact with each other, 
but in respect of the supernatural four aspects can be distinguished. 
Firstly one can distinguish one pattern or group of Sensory Data which 
is regarded by the perceiver as unified, i.e. possessing identity. 
Whether that individuality and unity is a feature of the Buzz, the 
Sensory Data, or the neurophysiological organisation is unstated. This 
process, the discrimination of identity, results in what may be called 
a Rem (from Latin res = thing), a psychological but not necessarily 
objective, thing'-in-itself.
(2)Secondly one can distinguish an Entity, which is a Rem.regarded' 7 
as having existence, i.e. not only an identified individual, but one 
regarded as existing. Entities can be regarded as of two kinds, either 
substantial or essential (to preserve a traditional and somewhat 
artificial dichotomy). The first will be referred to by the word 
Object, which will be regarded as retaining many of the normal 
connotations of tangibility, concreteness, actuality etc. The second 
will be referred to by the word Item, to characterise the fact that it 
is a member of a group of many, one item in a list, which possesses 
essential defining features (i.e. some aspect(s) of Sensory Data or 
its neurophysiological organisation which characterise it as just 
this Item and no other) but does not necessarily have independent 
substantial existence.
Thus in what follows reference to a Rem will involve no more than 
the subjective recognition of 'a something’} reference to an Entity 12
1. Vernon (1962) p.13
2. For the inplications of ’regarded’ see note to Appendix 3 .
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allows that Rem objective validity; reference to an Item allows 
the Entity an essential quality; reference to an Object allows an 
Item substantial existence. In addition to these terms the word 
Phenomenon will be used as a cover term for all of these,in those 
contexts where the precise status of reality is either unspecifiable 
or unimportant.
The relationship between these terms can be expressed graphically 
thus: «
Buzz
(organised into subjective patterns) 
Rem
(regarded as an objective pattern)
as member of an Entity-.____ as member of an
. intensional class"” -extensional set
Item- • (given substantial independence)— — K>bject
Diagram 2.1,3a Ontological Terms
It should be noted that the words Class and Set are used with 
specific meanings, following Gasking (1960) ^ .  Class signifies a 
group defined intensionally, i.e. by stating a property common to all 
members of the group and Set signifies a group defined extensionally, 
i.e. by stating all members of the group. Intension implies listing 
by properties. Thus a member of a Class may have no existence 
independent of the actual Items of which it is a property. Extensional 
definition implies the listing of actual objective individuals with 
substantial independence. Therefore a member of a Class may actually 
be an object, but this is not assumed in listing it as an Item; however 
listing in a Set does presuppose actual objective independence of the
1. See also section 2.3 .3
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Entity. Therefore Entity is  a neutral term for both Items and 
Objects, whereas Item is  more specific, and Object most specific in 
respect of the ontological status of a perceived pattern.
In addition to these terminological distinctions the following 
typographical conventions are adopted. Lexemes, their types and 
tokens are indicated by underlining thus: dragon. Concepts (which 
under the assumption made in section 2 . J .1  are the mental aspects of 
verbal forms) are represented thus: ''dragon". Groups (that i s  Classes, 
Sets or Clusters regarded as structured in some way)^1) are labelled 
by capitals, thus: DRAGON. Finally terms which have definitions 
specific to this study, and are collected in the glossary have an 
in it ia l  capital le tte r, thus: Rem.
1. See section 2.5*5
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2.2.1 Associative meaning
In explaining the deictic function of words appeal is necessarily- 
made to a speaker/hearer's feelings. The linguist's codification of 
this as 'the (thing) here' and that as 'the (thing) there' are based 
on intuitions of difference in distance, not on any fixed scale of 
measurement external to a speak er/hearer^^. Clearly it is very 
difficult, and perhaps impossible, to separate the actual function of 
a word, expression or utterance in a particular context from our 
feeling about that function. Semanticists have nevertheless tended
to characterise two opposed kinds of meaning corresponding roughly
to what a word does (or the way it is used in langue) and its personal,
emotive use (as an aspect of idiolect, located therefore in parole
(2)rather than langue)v '. This broad distinction is made in many 
different ways by many authors using several overlapping terminologies 
so that the general notion appears somewhat unclear. The terms
conceptual, cognitive and denotative are most frequently used for the
first aspect of meaning, and emotive, affective, connotative,
(3)collocational or associativev ' for the second kind. As Lyons states:
"The distinction between 'cognitive' and 'non- 
cognitive' synonymy is drawn in various ways by 
different authors. But in all cases it is 
'cognitive' synonymy which is defined first. Ko 
one ever talks of words as being 'emotively', 
but not 'cognitively synonymous'. This fact of 
itself would be sufficient to suggest that 
'emotive' or 'affective* is being used as a 
catch-all term to refer to a number of quite 
distinct factors which may influence the 
selection of synonyms on particular occasions or 
in particular contexts. (4)
1.
2.
4.
See Lyons (1975).
The distinction between langue and parole was first made bv Saussure. See Saussure (I974) p.14“ ^
Discussions of these terms can be found in Lvons t, /i/«
50.5lyons (1977a) P.175-6, leech ( 1 9 7 7 ) ££2 0977)
Lyons (19^8) p.449*
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Although he is here talking specifically of synonymy the point 
holds true for this distinction across all aspects of meaning. In 
general the semanticist is concerned with cognitive meanirg, with 
what is presumed to he a fully formed and integrated conceptual web 
running through the langue, rather than the incidental accretions 
which may be meaningful for individuals or even for subcultures 
because cognitive meaning is presumed to be objective and thus 
measurable. Consequently semanticists have a tendency to neglect the 
non-systematic aspects by cataloguing them under a secondary cover 
term such as Lyons describes.
The present investigation is, in principle, however, concerned 
with such neglected aspects of meaning since it may prove that these 
are precisely the areas in which supernatural names are functional. 
Associative will thus be used as the cover term for all aspects of 
meaning not covered by the notions of Applicability and Sense below 
(following Leech (1977) pp.20-22), and the kinds of meaning incorporated 
in the category Associative will be enumerated here. I do not, 
however, wish to make a distinction between Associative meaning and 
cognitive meaning as it will become clear from what follows that 
certain types of Associative meaning are connected with Applicability, 
and other types with Sense.
1. See the conclusions to Chapters 7 and 5 respectively
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2.2.2 Emotive Meaning
The term Associative is here used to characterise the fact that 
the meaning of a word may vary in some respects from speaker to 
speaker and from situation to situation. These two forms of variation 
could be called Bnotive and Stylistic, and both may have intentional 
and interpretative aspects. Bnotive intention would be the quality of 
an expression as felt by a speaker that he wishes to convey. For 
example a speaker may be afraid or delighted, attracted or repelled, 
worried or amused and may seek to convey the fear, delight, attraction, 
repulsion, worry or amusement he feels. To a large extent such meaning 
will be carried by paralinguistic features, or may be indicated by such^ 
utterances as "I am afraid”, ”1 think that's very funny" etc.
However a speaker may also choose words in such a way as to reveal his 
feeling and may desire, as in symbolic poetry for example, to create a 
feeling which he believes can be imparted in no other way than by those 
words in that order. Rimbaud's association of certain colours with 
certain vowels, and his desire to involve these associations in his 
poetry, would be a somewhat extreme exauple of emotive intention.
It is an essential characteristic of such meaning that a hearer 
can never be certain that he has interpreted the intention of the
speaker fully or even correctly. Emotive meaning cannot be inter?-.
* (2}subjective in the way that, say, Applicability can' 7. A hearer can 
never know i f  the feeling he obtains from a poem is  precisely the 
feeling i t  was intended he should obtain, particularly i f  i t  i s  
believed that the intended feeling i s  associated only with that 
unique expression ( i .e .  cannot be communicated in any other way). In 
fact one can never know i f  one';s own subjective feelings correspond in 12
1. E.g. in "Voyelles", Rimbaud (1966) p.171• Also see the introduction
to this edition pp.xxvi-xxviii.
2. See below section 2.3*1•
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any way to those of someone else. All one can know is that 
certain observable features of someone who says "I am in pain" 
correspond to features of one's own behaviour in situations of 
a particular types
The essential thing about private experience is 
really not that each person possesses his own 
exemplar, but that nobody knows whether other 
people also have this or something else. The 
assumption would thus be possible - though 
unverifiable - that one section of mankind had 
one sensation of red and another section 
another. (1)
Consequently, Bnotive interpretation of words, expressions or 
utterances may also be unique to an individual. One could conceive 
of associations between words and feelings which were perfectly 
arbitrary across a language, yet invariable for individuals, such 
that when one person~hears the word ar± he always has a sensation 
of what is (for him) delight, whereas another experiences a feeling 
of disgust. Furthermore it seems likely that to some extent (for 
some words for some people) this is the case. An analogy might be 
that of masochism, wherfeby a''normally' painful stimulus is experienced 
as pleasure. The stimulus, equivalent to utterance of a word, is in 
itself neutral. Pain is regarded as the normal experience only because 
it is the majority experience. But one could conceive of a masochist 
whose every experience of what I would call a painful stimulus was 
pleasure and whose every experience of what I call pleasurable was 
pain. Our experiences would be precisely contradictory yet, because 
they mapped exactly onto each other, we would use the same words for 
radically different experiences.
As Emotive meaning, as here conceived, is in part idiosyncratic, 
it would be very difficult to study or even, as the above examples 
show, to discuss. If one regards meaning only as "communicated
1. Wittgenstein (1972) para. 272.
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information"^ then one can regard failed intentions or causeless 
interpretations as not strictly meaningful. However it is difficult 
to see how one can characterise communication in normal language (as 
distinct from the stricter definitions of information theory) without 
taking into account the experience of the hearer at least. And if 
the hearer has experience of communication one cannot deny that 
communication has taken place. One can deny that the hearer's 
interpretation of the communication was correct (e.g. as indicated by 
his subsequent beliefs or actions) but not that his experience was 
incorrect. Such a denial would itself be meaningless since a 
subjective experience can be neither correct nor incorrect.
The fact that Emotive meaning can have a profound and permanent
effect on a man's life must indicate that the experience of it is
significant (in all senses of the word). The Bible has been a
relatively fixed text for many centuries, yet there have been almost
as- many responses to it as there have been readers, both to the book
as a whole and to individual passages such as "Thou shalt not suffer
(2)a witch to live"' ' or the chapters of Revelation, responses which- 
depend very much on personal interpretation and individual feeling and 
which have had enormous historical, social and cultural effects.
It is possible therefore that supernatural names are emotive 
counters of this sort characterising a kind of experience which an 
individual has, but not yielding any additional information about that 
experience. Under this interpretation we would say when someone says
( 1) "I saw-a demon” they mean "I had an experience of a kind (x)", and 
the hearer will understand "He had an experience of a kind (y)» where 
(x) and (y) are respectively types of experience with which the speaker 12
1. See for example, Cherry (1968); Leech (1o77N 2a
2. Exodus ch.22, v.18. V P * 4 *
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and hearer are familiar.
This is  the kind of account which Ayer, for example, would argue 
i s  metaphysical, hence meaningless. He would presumably reduce the 
statement ( 1 ) to: ( 2 ) I  had an experience, and, arguing that to exist 
i s  to have experiences, reduce ( 2 ) to: ( 3a) I exist or (3b) I am.
The reason that statement (1) is meaningful and cannot be reduced 
to (2) or (3) is that it mentions an experience of a particular kind.
If a speaker says (4) "I saw an egg" or (5) "I saw beauty”, he is also 
mentioning an experience of a particular kind. The difference between
(1) and (4 ) or (5) is that (presumably) the experience of an egg or 
beauty are intersubjective, i.e. there is what Quine calls a stimulus- 
meaning^^ for those utterances. Whatever the individual experiences 
of "egg" and "beauty" all are attached to a common stimulus (or set 
of stimuli), whereas the experience of a demon is not attached to a 
common stimulus (or set of stimuli) but to stimuli which would always 
appear to other observers as arbitrary. But the lack of intersubjective 
corollaries for the experience of (1) does not invalidate the fact of 
a particular experience undergone. In fact Quine's notion of stimulus­
meaning is more complex than represented here. Stimulus-meaning is 
a class of stimuli which would prompt the assent of a speaker/hearer 
to a particular utterance. Stimulus thus corresponds roughly, with 
Entity, a collection of sensory data regarded as one thing and existing. 
The intersubjective constant is the intersection of the stimulus- 
meanings for two or more individuals. Thus if we represent the stimulus 
meaning for egg for speaker/hearer x as 0  , and that for y as (y) , 
the intersubjective constant (here stimulus-meaning as used in the 
previous paragraph) can be represented as ©
in
intersection of the stimulus-meanings for the two individuals. For a
1. Quine (1964) PP.36-38.
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lin gu istic  community the cognitive meaning of a word (to revert to 
the traditional simplification) would he the intersection of a l l  
stimulus meanings of that word and the Associative meanings of a l l  
those areas which are not intersected by a l l  other simulus-meanings. 
Thus for speakers x, y . . . .n  with stimulus-meanings ^  , (g) . . . ^  
for egg, the cognitive meaning of egg would be ([a) in:
with areas 1, 2 and 3 representing areas of shared association, and 
areas B, C and D representing unshared areas, equivalent to the account 
of Bnotive (or idiosyncratic) meaning above.
Thus the use of supernatural names may well.involve a subjective 
significance which is largely undiscoverable, being areas of unshared 
meaning. It would appear, for example, that as much as a third of the 
corpus examined in this study is composed of lexemes which collocate 
with fairy less than five times in a period of five hundred years.^
In terms of frequency of occurrence therefore these must be regarded 
either as accidental concatenations (which is a somewhat peculiar 
interpretation considering that a written text is a conscious 
production) or as Emotive associations, meaningful to individuals but 
largely insignificant in respect of the total meaning of the word.
Conversely, as Szalay and Deese have demonstrated,^ Associative 
meaning can be systematic across a culture or within a cultural group. 
Although their concerns and methods differ somewhat from those of the
1. See below p.128.
2. Szalay and Deese (1978).
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present study, their general remarks on subjective meaning are 
pertinents
associations are capable of yielding significant 
information about the attitudes, beliefs and 
cognitive structures of individuals and social and 
cultural group s. (1)
They demonstrate conclusively that word associations can, in 
terms of frequency, characterise basic differences between cultural 
groups in respect of a particular concept, such as "education” or 
"war", and show that association between words is representative of 
more complex propositional relations (which may in turn be related to 
logical or denotative relations, but in many cases are not). In 
principle ..therefore although their interest was to discover 
psychological differences attached to a particular concept by free 
association with a word standing for that concept, one can describe 
their experiment in different terms. One can see the word standing 
for the concept not as a concept but as an object word, that is, a 
word whose meaning is unknown, and the single word associations made 
to that object word can be regarded as shorthand forms of the kind of 
typical propositions that word may enter into. That is to say, the 
only difference between a series of word associations to a given word, 
as a text using that word, is that the text makes, or attempts to 
make, explicit the propositions that word association leaves implicit. 
Therefore, if word association does indeed indicate subjective,
Emotive meaning, a given text may contain as many indications. It 
would be possible therefore to take a text and, regarding syntactic 
units (for words and syntactic morphemes) as propositional counters, 
remove those to leave the subjective association.
It is certainly not true that the only relations between any
1. Szalay and Deese (1978) p.23
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word, in a text and a l l  other words in that text are propositional/ 
syntactic or associative, hut i t  would seem to he the case that an 
examination of a corpus, as presented hel&w, may well expose 
significant features of meaning which are not covered hy the concepts 
of Applicability or Sense and which are therefore Associative. 
Nevertheless throughout the remainder of this study should he borne 
in mind the fact that, particularly for someone who believes in a 
supernatural phenomenon, the essential quality of i t s  name, over and 
above any objective features, may well be unapproachable. I t  may be 
possible, for exanple, to show that certain supernatural names involve 
•awe* or 'fear ' but not to show what 'awe' or ’ fear' mean to 
individuals, nor how those individuals will react to, or accommodate 
those associations.
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2.2.5 Stylistic Meaning
Leech^^ also makes a distinction "between Stylistic meaning and
what he terms affective meaning within the more general concept of
Associative meaning. However he ignores idiosyncratic Emotive meaning
as I have defined it as he argues for a notion of meaning which
involves the transference of information "but has no reference to the
minds of speaker and hearer:
a linguist may feel entitled to ignore the difference 
between the intention of a message and its effect, 
because he is interested in studying the 
communication system itself, rather than what use or 
misuse is made of it. (2)
This point will be taken up later. My present purpose is «Imply 
to suggest that his distinction between stylistic meaning and 
affective meaning is artificial. If it was possible to distinguish 
social circumstance of use from the personal feelings of the speaker, 
which are Leech's criteria for stylistic and affective meaning 
respectively, then the separation of the two would be useful. However, 
although social and individual situations produce polarities of stylistic 
meaning, both interplay in any utterance. It is notable, for example, 
that Leech's summary of the stylistic categories taken from Crystal 
and Davy (1976) includes INDIVIDUALITY (i.e. idiolect) and SINGULARITY 
(e.g. an-author's style) which are surely not social features, whereas 
"politeness”, "biting sarcasm" etc. which Leech uses as examples of 
personal^feeling are surely socially determined. Consequently 
Stylistic meaning will be used here to cover all those forms of meaning 
which are dependent on the situation of use whether social or 
individual. Thus all utterances will be regarded as possessing a 
Stylistic meaning of some kind. However Stylistic meaning is not a 
lexical feature, i.e. different Stylistic meanings are not in general
1. Leech (1977) pp.16-18
2. Ibid. p.24.
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attached to individual lexemes. Thus there is little point in 
trying to determine the 'stylistic meaning’ of any particular 
supernatural name. However it may well be that different names are 
associated with different styles, i.e. the distribution of a 
supernatural name across styles is systematic and to that extent the name 
contributes to the stylistic meaning of a passage, although we could 
not exclusively locate that meaning in that word. Therefore whilst it 
is not possible fully to determine the Bnotive aspect of Associative 
meaning, for a supernatural name it may be possible to determine most 
Stylistic aspects, and if it is possible to show that a particular 
supernatural name is systematically distributed within the Stylistic 
range it may be possible to offer a definition or description of it in 
terms of its use. Thus although the pursuit of stylistic meaning will 
not produce an absolute definition of a particular name, it may yield 
discriminatory classifications.
Indeed it has been argued, in particular by proponents of the 
nation of semantic fields, that a woord's entire meaning consists of 
its distributional restrictions.^ If, for example, there were a 
fixed and specifiable number of stylistic variations such that, in 
theory, all possible styles could be listed, it is supposed that all 
words would betray an organisation that mapped onto this list and that 
the meaning of any individual word, therefore, was a function of the. 
styles it pointed to. Although this theory is clearly too extreme to 
be valid as a complete account of meaning nevertheless it seems to 
be true 3that for some words at least their utterance expresses an 
attitude on the part of the speaker and encourages a reciprocal attitude 
in the hearer, and to the extent that a word L is attached to (used to
1. As expressed here this corresponds to no specific semantic theory, 
but those of Firth (1957) and of V. Porzig, as presented by 
Lyons (1977a) are similar in regarding meaning as contextually 
dependent. See Lyons (1977a) pp.261-6, and (1977b) pp.607-f4£
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express) such an attitude, thus excluding a number of otherwise 
synonymous words, that word could be said to be meaningful. However 
it is not clear whether that meaningfulness arises from the chosen 
word’s paradigmatic relation to the set of other possible choices or 
from the fact that it is used in a particular syntagmatic (stylistic) 
pattern. Probably it is best to conceive of a lexical choice as 
signalling a particular style by the fact of that choice, and of the 
signal being confirmed by the proximity of other similar choices (and 
by non-lexical signals). However there are only a few lexical items 
that are thoroughly restricted stylistically. Most have a substantial 
range of potential styles and many have a great deal of stylistic 
freedom. In these cases we might say that the Stylistic meaning of the 
surrounding context adds to or modifies a word's meaning in that 
context, but that outside such a determining context that additional 
meaning is lost. In the case of such words, therefore, an examination 
of stylistic distribution,'rather than indicating the meaning of a word, 
will show the kinds of meaning with which that word is con^atible or, 
from a different point of view, the kinds of meaning that it may 
assume.
Thus if a supernatural name has a restricted distribution, we 
may say that it has Stylistic meaning provided that we reoognise that 
Stylistic meaning is not something that necessarily inheres in an 
isolated lexeme. It would then be possible to give a minimum definition 
of a'particular! supernatural-'’name as: a lexeme possessing Emotive 
meaning for the utterer and used in contexts of the kind x (where x 
is a description defining the possible situations of use). One aspect 
of the'analysis mutt therefore test various hypotheses of stylistic 
distribution.
There are two aspects of context which may be restrictive in 
determining use of linguistic elements. These may be called Context
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and Cotext. The former denotes the nonlinguistic features which are 
associated with a particular choice. In principle these may be any 
features, many of which may be indeterminable, such as the knowledge, 
beliefs or intentions of a speaker/hearer; in practice the more 
limited notion of context-of-situation. which treats the immédiate 
situation in which an utterance or text occurs as defining most of the 
relevant choices, is usually adequate, given the framework provided 
by sociolinguistics of Field. Tenor and Kode^1). Field refers to the 
setting of an utterance, and the activities of the participants,
Tenor to the relationship between participants, and Mode to the channel 
of communication. Cotext denotes a l l  linguistic features occurring in 
the environment of any particular linguistic element.
As the object of study for the present work is entirely written 
text and noncontemporaneous, certain aspects of context are irrecoverable. 
However sufficient signals are available in most of the texts for a
general description of the style of each to be discernible. Each of the
texts used was given a label for Field^2\  which in many cases 
corresponds to a literary genre, and for Mode, in terms of the form' of 
the text, such as prose, blank verse, rhyming couplet etc. In most 
of the texts Tenor was regarded as identical, i.e. an author informing 
an audience, although there were certain differences. For example the 
text of a Middle English romance may have been a scribal copy of an 
original intended for a restricted audience, whereas that of a 
Renaissance tragedy may be a pirate copy of a text originally spoken
for a large and variegated audience. In most teases it seemed that the
Tenor was implied in the label used for Field,, although in any particular 
case its individual history could involve, deviations of Tenor from that
1. See Halliday (1978); Gregory and Carroll (1978}
2. For the assignation of these labels see Section 3.4.
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typical of its Field. It was not felt that such deviations would 
have a significant effect across the corpus, as with idiolectal 
features of Enotive meaning. However unlike those features, the 
method employed in the main analysis theoretically allowed the 
recovery of significant anomalies which could then be correlated with 
known differences of Tenor. Thus texts were not labelled according to 
Tenor because it was felt that differences were slight, and any of 
significance could be detected.
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2,5.1 Applicability
The notion of Applicability is crucial in the semantics of 
natural languages. It is possible to imagine a language consisting 
only of Associative meaning - a series of grunts and exclamations 
with markers signifying the role of the participants in each particular 
situation would be one such language. It is possible to construct 
languages which, apparently at least, consist only of sense relations
( i \and are not connected to a real world in any way' '. However no 
discussion of the semantics of natural language can ignore the 
fact that in the belief of speakers if not in actual fact language is 
connected to the real world, and in many different ways. Indeed it is 
difficult not to feel that if language could not have been connected to, 
and used in, the world it would never have existed. Intuitively and to 
ordinary language users language is of value because it enables us to 
speak of the Items and Objects that make up our environment.
The connections between language and the world are of several 
different types. Inrthe first place the word language itself seems to 
inçly both a speaker and a hearer. Secondly a real language has a • 
physical manifestation i.e. substance, and will be affected by the 
character of its speakers and hearers. But historical, phonetic,'and 
physiological considerations are not covered by the term Applicability. 
It is used only to cover semantic connection between word and Entity, 
that is, the ways in which aspects of the actual world may be 
symbolised. Broadly speaking there are three areas in which such 
symbolising occurs. They are the syntactic, the Referential and the 
Denotational. The precise nature of the syntactic connection is a
1. See below section 2.4.1
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question of dispute amongst linguists and for this and other re a so n s^  
I shall largely ignore this area in the remainder of the study. The 
only major syntactic categories which figure largely in the later  
chapters of the study are those of the preposition, and a discussion 
of the relation(s) between noun and adjective. Accordingly the 
notion of Applicability will be restricted to the twin concepts of 
Reference and Denotation,
Applicability implies that language is  in some sense a bridge 
between mind and world, but this implication i s  the source of many 
philosophical and psychological problems. Those problems can be 
summarised as four questions:
( i)  What i s  the.mental status of meaning? (Does i t  have a 
physiological basis? Is there such a thing as mind? etc .)
( i i )  What i s  the connection between 'mental meaning' and 
i t s  verbal expression? (Do we have concepts independent of their 
expression? Are words associated with mental images? etc.)
( i i i )  What i s  the connection between 'mental meaning' and 
the actual world? (Do we have 'concepts' of 'ob jects'? Are 
perceptions made up of discrete elements? What i s  the mental status 
of a 'thing*? etc.)
(iv) What i s  the connection between verbal expression and 
the actual world? (Do words name things? Is  predication a >- 
representation of inherent reality? etc .)
Í-. No particular grammatical theory i s  adopted in this study, as none 
has yet proved adequate for a description of the whole language 
and no particular theory i s  peculiarly suited to the approach 
adopted here. Being primarily a discussion of lexical semantics 
rather than syntactic semantics the refusal to debate rival theories 
seems ju stifiab le . Furthermore if t th is  study can provide u se fS  
judgements independent of any specific grammatical theory ttio sf  
judgements should be the more valuable (and * L
extent, v a c a te d )  by the tact of S i V S Ü S ï ï ' J ^ t l »in any grammatical system. »u^uuuuouaxion
47
The most convenient and well-known summary of these relationships 
i s  the triangle of signification of Ogden and R ic h a rd s\  There have 
been many revisions and modifications of this triangle' most 
philosophers and semanticists have their own theories on one or more 
of the relationships. However there are some approaches which axe 
clearly inadequate, although they are equally clearly correct in some 
measure. Four such types of theory are commonly held and i t  would 
seem a mistake wholly to reject any of them. F irstly  there are 
theories of naming under which words, sentences or expressions name 
either mental versions of real Entities, or the Entities them selves^. 
There are theories under which words, sentences or expressions are 
representations of mental Rem (images or concepts) which are only 
p artia lly  dependent on the real w o rld ^ . There are theories under 
which a word's meaning is  held to be a function of i t s  u se ^ )#
Finally there are theories under which natural language is  a means of 
expressing logical relationships and/or truth values and is  in greater 1
1. Ogden and Richards (1969) P.14«
2. E.g. Lyons (1968) p.104; Palmer (1977) p.26.
3. This is probably the simplest and the commonsense view. The
most respectable versions are those maintained by the philosophical 
schools of logical atomism and phenomenalism, which replace 
Objects by sense-data or particulars (irreducible experiences of 
the actual world). See Russell (1918); Wittgenstein (1961)5 
Ayer (1975)* Insofar as Applicability inplies a real world, there 
must be a sense in which words name that world.
4 . Such theories are generally allied to idealist philosophies and 
thus go back to Plato. The theory outlined by Ogden and Richards 
(1969) is essentially conceptualist. It would seem that if 
techniques such as the semantic differential truly measure meaning, 
they must be measuring a mental phenomenon as the same measurements
~ cannot be applied to a physical world. See Osgood et al (1967).
5. Use theories of meaning largely follow Wittgenstein (1972). 
Independently of the philosophical validity of the use theory 
(which, however, seems well established in philosophical circles) 
stylistics and sociolinguistics would seem to validate the 
approach from a practical point of view. The developments of 
speech-act S^ilosophy also seem to support this kind of view.
See Austin (1962); Searle (1969); Brown (1974).
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or lesser degree inperfect in this expression^ 1 \  All of these 
conceive of the relationships between the world, mind and language in 
different ways, and there are good arguments in support and denial of
Probably the simplest compromise which allows the advantages of 
several apparently conflicting theories is  to regard mental as verbal, 
that i s ,  accept that meaning has a mental aspect but regard that 
aspect as inseparable from it s  verbal exp ressio n ^ . The most 
convincing arguments in favour of such a compromise treat the 
equivalence as existing at the level of sentences (or expressions) 
rather than that of words, but I shall argue that in a t least two 
respects the argument will also hold at the lexemic level.
The main counter-argument to an equation of mental and verbal 
meaning is  that i t  i s  possible to have mental events which are not 
verbal. In particular we can have visual, aural and also , presumably, 
tac tile , olfactory and gustatory images. However i t  i s  d ifficu lt to 
conceive of a mental event which i s  neither pseudo-sensation nor 
pseudo-verbal. I t  might therefore be possible to claim that mental 
events are of three kinds. F irstly  there i s  actual sensation -  that 
i s ,  neurological activity  prompted by a particular stimulus. Secondly 
* there i s  replication of that sensation, that i s ,  the capacity to 
repeat a particular neurological pattern independent of the stimulus 123
1. A recent proposal of this kind is made by Kempson (1977), Truth-* 
value semantics encounters many difficulties in talk of fictional
—■ or absent phenomena. Nevertheless without some formulation of
logical relations and truth-values many of the key lexical relations 
would be unnecessarily complicated. These problems are discussed 
in Cooper (1973)} Platts (1979).
2. Two useful discussions of the conflicting theories of meaning are 
Cooper (1973) and Kempson (1977).
3. See Cooper (1973) p.25} Wittgenstein Blue and Brown Books p .37  
(quoted in Cooper (1973) p.27). The notion of an interlocking 
net of sentences in Quine (1964) p.12 et passim expresses a 
similar idea, but does not allow simple relations of word to 'word- 
idea* except in special cases.
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that first caused it. Thirdly there is organised neurological 
activity, which has a verbal equivalent. We might call those three 
activities 'perception', 'memory' and 'conception' (or 'thought'), 
although these labels are in no sense precise. 'Conception' would be 
distinguished from other neurological activities by the subjective 
experience of organisation associated with it. We could furthermore 
say that our recognition of that organisation is equivalent to 
recognising that we can give that mental activity a verbal expression.
In other words we could define 'thought' in such a way that only 
neurological activities with verbal equivalents were included in the 
class 'conception'. Such a definition may be a description of the 
actual state of affairs or it may be seen as no more than a 
simplifying convenience. Either way it will be accepted as valid for 
the remainder of the study. In terms of the account in section 2,1.2 
we can say that the psychological process of making a Rem into an 
Item or Object also involves creating a paraverbal equivalent. By 
paraverbal is meant a linguistic form or expression which could be 
realised in actual parole, though it may never actually be so 
realised.
Of course such a simplification cannot explain how the silent 
becomes aural. But if we rewrite this difficulty as: how does 
neurological activity (x) become physiological activity (y)? we can 
conveniently ignore the difficulty as a problem for students, of brain 
mechanism rather than of language. The same problem is met in a slightly 
different form in the distinction between competence and performance 
made by Chomsky^1); but there is no need for such a distinction if the
1. Chomsky (1957).
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two simplifications outlined above are accepted, namely equating 
mental and verbal activity, and postulating that their differences 
are physiological rather than psychological. Of course the 
experiences of speaking and of thinking are subjectively different, 
but, as Wittgenstein's experiment seems to show^1  ^ the differences 
are more apparent than real. In removing (ii) by sleight of hand 
not only do we divide (i) into a problem for physiologists and a 
problem for linguists, we presume that the linguistic portion of the 
answer can be provided by examination of actual utterance and in 
particular the relations between utterance and the world, for the 
simplification also reduces (iii) and (iv) to one. Consequently the 
introduction of these simplifications throws the burden of 
meaningfulness onto the shoulders of reference and denotation^.
1.
2.
Wittgenstein Blue and Brown Books p.37» quoted in Cooper (1973) 
p . 27.
A substantial portion of this burden is in fact borne by 
Associative meaning as indicated above and as will become apparent 
in later stages of the argument. This could only be argued for 
the material covered in this study, however, whereas the 
theoretical approach as here presented must necessarily regard 
Applicability as the most important area of linguistic meaning for any language or any corpus.
5 l r
2,5.2 Reference
The study of semantics is plagued with conflicting terminology 
but the terms denotation and reference are more confusing than most.
As noted above denotation is used in contradistinction to connotation, 
the former being used to mean ’conceptual* or ’cognitive’, the latter 
'emotional' or 'affective'. In philosophy a similar distinction is 
made, following J. S. Mill, which is however much more precise.
Denotation is an extensional definition of a word, connotation its 
intensional d e f i n i t i o n ^ T h a t  is, the denotation of cow would be 
'all objects having the property of cowness'; the connotation would be 
'an object having four legs, horns, an udder, female etc.'. These 
differences will be discussed in 2.3.5. Denotation is also used, 
however, in the same sense as reference, and vice versa, and both terms 
have been replaced by, or have replaced, such terms as signification. 
symbolisation, naming etc.
The use I wish to make of the terms Denotation and Reference is 
probably that most commonly adopted, in one form or another, by linguists. 
This account takes as its starting point Lyons (1977a) pp.175-229, in 
which reference and denotation are distinguished as the property of an 
utterance and the property of a lexeme respectively.
Reference, therefore, is an intentional act on the part of a speaker, 
not a propetty of the langue as such (i.e. not coded in the system of 
language). A speaker will utter a word or expression with the intention 
of referring to a particular item or object in the universe of 
discourse and thereby call a hearer's attention to that Item/object.as, 
in part, the topic of his utterance, the thing he is talking about.
Thus, strictly speaking, one does not speak of a word’s Reference or 
its Referent, but of the Reference of a speaker, and the Referent he 1
1. The terms intension and extension are defined on p.29.
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uses the vord to Refer to. Reference is an act no t  a property. I n  
principle any word can be u s e d  to Refer to anything. If  I say of our 
dog, "There's the cat wanting to go out again", the expression will 
almost certainly be understood if we have no cat, and will p robably 
b e  understood if the hearer is aware which animal wants to b e  let out 
given that there is a choice of such animals, bu t  there is no sense 
in which "dog" can be called the referent of the word c a t .
Thus the connection between any particular sound and the Item 
i t  i s  used to Refer to i s ,  in principle, accidental^ 1 \  Any particular 
connection might only be made once in the entire history of the 
language. The Object Referred to by any particular token of a lexeme 
may alter with i t s  every utterance (for example, in the Referential 
function of the deictic pronoun I_). There need be no necessary • 
connection between Referent and Referring expression. In fact, there 
i s  no reason why utterances not in the langue, such as gibberish or 
foreign expressions, may not be used to Refer. For. example, a 
speaker says "The watchamacallit's in here", and holds up a box.
One necessary aspect of an act of Reference, however, would seem 
to be that there must be something (in the universe of discourse) for 
the speaker to refer to. I f  a speaker says "The gold cup in my hand 
i s  for the winner", i t  i s  reasonably certain that we will know the 
Referent i f  he i s  holding a gold cup. I f  he i s  holding a gold 
medallion or a silver cup, we may believe he has made an error (either 
of fact, or a slip  of the tongue) but we will s t i l l  believe i t  i s  the 
- item in his hand he is  Referring to. I f  he has nothing in his hand, 
but a gold cup is  about to be given to him, or is  on the table at his
1 In essence this i s  one of the basic principles of structural 
lin gu istics, the Saussurean principle of the arbitrariness of 
the sign. See Saussure (1974) pp.67-70.
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side, we may still understand him to be Referring to that Object. If 
he has nothing in his hands, and only a silver medallion by his side 
we may conclude either that he is a fool, or has made several errors, 
or is joking, but we may also gather that the silver medallion is the 
Referent. But if there is nothing in his hands, and nothing in the 
vicinity which resembles gold or a cup, we will probably wonder what 
he is talking about. And this literal question "What is he talking 
about?" has puzzled philosophy for many years, in particular since 
1905 and Russell's well-known essay On Denoting^1  2For how can 
someone Refer to an Entity which does not exist? This is surely one 
of the central problems of the semantics of supernatural names. For 
the large majority of utterances of supernatural names the Referents 
are either absent or non-existent. Can they thus be called Referents 
at all? And if they cannot how does a speaker/hearer understand a 
Referring expression (or psuedo-referring expression) using a 
supernatural name? For we may understand a meaningless word, 
"whatchamacallit" by applying ittto a particular situation (i.e. 
looking in the box in the above example and seeing something) but we 
cannot apply an apparent meaningless word, which a supernatural name 
would be under Ayer's dictum, to a situation which does not exist.
Problems such as this have tormented English philosophy for seventy 
years. Russell’s initial argument, adopted by many philosophers 
subsequently, ran roughly as follows: (i) A denoting p h rase^ 
denotes one thing and one thing only, (ii) Such phrases occur in 
propositions which are either true or false, (iii) if the proposition
1. Russell (1905). Also reprinted in Russell (1956)
2. Russell's use of denotation is something of an amllgem of 
reference and denotation as used in this study. Consequently I 
use has terminology here, a  proposition for Russell consists of at 
least a name or denoting expression, and a predicate. He describes 
more complex propositions in Russell (1918).
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is true, then the denoting phrase is meaningful because there is an
Entity of which the predication of the proposition is true.
(iv) If the proposition is false, the denoting phrase is meaningless,
there being no such Entity. Russell concludes that a denoting phrase
is inherently meaningless,and only acquires meaning by virtue of the
true propositions of which it may be a part.
This is a powerful logical argument and its logic is difficult
if not impossible to refute. But it will not do for natural language
largely because its premises are incorrect. As Strawson pointed out
(1}in his reply to Russellv ' it is not an expression which Refers but 
someone who uses that expression, and the failure or success of the 
act of Referring does not depend on there being one thing and one 
thing only which that expression is used to Refer to, but on the 
suitability of that expression for singling out or identifying a 
particular individual Entity within the universe of discourse. 
Furthermore the success or failure of Reference depends to a large 
extent on the beliefs and knowledge of the speaker and the hearer(s) 
and the extent to which those beliefs and knowledge are shardd^2\
The meaningfulness of a Referring expression (and names are to be 
included in this class) is dependent on the truth or falsity of the 
statement it is used to make, or even more remotely, on the speaker's 
belief about the truth of the statement which he makes. For example, 
if I say "The Prime Minister of the TJ.S.S.R. is coming to England", 
the fact that there is no such Entity as 'the Prime Minister of the 
TJ.S.S.R.' does not prevent me from believing that I have identified a 
particular Entity, nor does it prevent others from recognising the 
Entity I mean. It would be incorrect to regard such an instance as
1.
2. Strawson (1950)•The debate about fallare of Reference is ertensive in the 
ìinskyt(Ì96$l)!SefUl a0CO'mtS 00Cur in Co°»er (1975) and in
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mistaken Reference. The use of the language may he incorrect, hut it 
is meaningless to call the purpose for which it was used either correct 
or incorrect; it can only he successful or unsuccessful. One could 
also argue that there are degrees of success in Reference. If I say 
"My grandmother is coming tomorrow", and I have two grandmothers, I 
have not failed to Refer completely, hut have identified two Entities 
as possible topics of my sentence. That such an ambiguity does not 
count as full failure may he seen by the fact that the likely response 
of a hearer would not he "What (Entity) do you mean?" or "Who did you 
mean?" hut "Which one?", i.e. the hearer has successfully identified 
two possible Referents. One could imagine, furthermore, a speaker with 
two grandmothers, one of whom lived three streets away whilst the other 
lived in Australia. In this case the utterance 'Tiy grandmother is 
coming tomorrow" would almost certainly correctly identify the 
grandmother living nearby and one would expect such a speaker 
habitually to use the phrase "My grandmother", to Refer to the nearest 
and "My Australian grandmother" (or something like it) of the more 
distant relative.
The point is that a supernatural name used to Refer may produce 
different degrees or kinds of Reference on different occasions or for 
different hearers. It may identify one unique.Phenomenon for another 
individual who has experienced it. Thus the name Skriker will identify 
"that creature I heard the other night" or "the creature (or whatever 
it was) that produced a noise I have heard"^1\  Or it may identify a 
Phenomenon as "the Phenomenon associated with that place/time/activity" 
as, for example, The Hedley Row which seems to have been a cover term
1. On Skriker see Wright (1915) p. 194-5; Harland and Wilkinson (1973) 
p:.91; Briggs (1976) p.370; Briggs ( 1 §77) p.222. 1
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for any accidental Phenomenon associated with Hedley, near E bch ester^ . 
Or i t  may identify a Phenomenon as one of a class of Phenomena so that 
"the Devil" may be an expression which can be used to Refer to a 
fin ite  Class of Objects/lterns, larger than but analogous to the Class 
Referred to by the phrase "my grandmother". The important fact i s  
that a Referring expression need not specify precisely or uniquely in 
order to be used in a successful act of Reference. A phrase such as 
"The Devil took my child" may be understood perfectly well as Referring 
to one kind of Phenomenon and not another, without the need for either 
speaker or hearer to have a clear conception of the age, sex, height, 
place, abode or characteristics of the Devil. I f  in no other way, an 
expression may be used to Refer by exclusion (e .g . The Devil« not God) 
or may be used only to Refer to Emotive meaning: "There was a thing in 
the room" could be understood as meaning no more than "I had an 
experience (of a particular kind)".
In principle, therefore, from a record of any utterance i t  i s  not 
possible for an observer to determine the Refereht without at least  
being aware of the context of utterance and such an observer would need 
access to a speaker*s mind to be absolutely certain of the intended 
Referent. The fact that most acts of Referring are sufficient for 
their purpose in actual practice depends to some extent on the 
Denotation and Sense relations of the words used but also on the 
shared experience of users and their shared habits of typical Reference. 
Thus i f  we do not know the possible Reference of the lexeme g ir l in "I 12
1. See Henderson (1975) p.234ff; " i t  i s  said to have constantly 
imitated the voice of the servant-girl’ s lovers, overturned the 
kail-pot, given the cream to the cats, unravelled the knitting, or 
put the spinning wheel out of order". See also Jacobs (19^7^ P»50ff; 
Balfour (1967) pp.17-18 ; Briggs (1976) p.218; Briggs (1977) P.227.
2. See below, sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 respectively.
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went to the supermarket and after I had bought a l l  I wanted I paid 
the g ir l at the t i l l "  we are at least able to obtain an idea of the 
kind of Entity Referred to, whether or not we have encountered a 
token of the lexeme g irl before, provided the experience is  familiar 
to us. We will-understand g ir l to Refer to the kind of Entity which 
i s  fam iliar to us in that situation though, of course, we may 
habitually pay a man, an old lady, or a computer. Although we may know 
nothing about Sense-relations, the syntactic position of g ir l te lls  us 
the Referent i s  at least "the Entity to which one gives money in a 
supermarket", and, to this extent, we w ill be correct in our 
understanding of the Referent. Similarly that act of Reference will be 
successful to that extent. In an isolated utterance: "The g ir l  moved", 
we can know no more of the Referent than the fact that i t  moves, but 
the greater the extent of Cotext, the fu ller  the description of the 
situation in which the Referent occurred,• the more likely we are to be 
able to f i t  the description to our experience and guess the Referent.
I t  would probably not be too extreme to regard a l l  interpretation of 
Reference as informed guesswork. I t  i s  easy to think of even very 
short sentences which can sufficiently identify a Referent, even though 
the word used i s  gibberish. For example in "I tried to unbutton my 
coat, but the button wouldn’ t go through the glok", we are almost 
certain to identify the Referent of glok as "buttonhole" or "hole". 
Naturally we could not be certain, but i t  seems i t  i s  impossible to be 
certain about any act of Reference as there i s ,  in principle, no way 
of te llin g  i f  a_name or Referring expression i s  being used idiosyncrat- 
ic a lly  or not.
I f ,  therefore, « .  ere to regard Eeferenoe aa an aspect of Bearing 
ve mast conceive of meaningfulness as inhering in a typification of the 
kinds of Referent for which a particular word i s  normally used. That i s  
to say, for a corpus of occurrences cf a lereme 1 , i f  i t  vere possible
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to list the Referents for which tokens of the lexeme were used those 
Referents which occurred most frequently would he regarded as 
determining the meaning of L across the language. Of course it is 
not possible to list Referents, but it is possible to‘.list their 
characteristics, (or rather, the characteristics of the situations in 
which such Referents occur) and, on the assumption that such 
characteristics will reveal the nature(s) of the Referents to native 
speakers, an analysis of verbal Cotext should promote those 
intuitions. Consequently if one regards the metalanguage for 
description of a particular object-word as all words in a particular 
language save the object-word, an appropriate classification of the 
Cotexts of the object-word's occurrence ought to reveal the dominant 
features of typical Referents and thus, by inference, the nature.of the 
Referents themselves^1 \  This theoretical approach is accordingly 
given a methodology in Chapter 3«
1. For a parallel argument which outlines a truth-value semantic 
- theory based on the relations between intuitive knowledge of 
metalanguage and hypothetical ignorance of object-language, see 
Davidson (1967). It is possible to argue that any metalanguage, 
whether it is a constructed set of symbols or a strictly defined 
area of a pre-existing language, is dependent on intuitive knowledge 
for, though the object-language is defined and discussed by the 
metalanguage, the metalanguage itself is defined by a language 
which is intuitively understood, a language which is itself 
frequently the object-language.
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2.3.5 Denotation
Denotation is distinguished from Reference as being a property 
of lexemes rather than of utterances. Rather than resulting from the 
intention of a user, it exists by convention for a group of users (a 
language community) and is thus, to follow Saussure's distinction, a 
property of langue rather than parole. We can regard the Denotation 
of a lexeme L as a relation between a Set of Objects and a Set of 
sounds which is predetermined for any particular language-user (i.e. 
exists before he learns the language) and is virtually immune from 
alteration resulting from idiosyncratic or arbitrary use.^1^
The Denotatum of a lexeme is thus not like the Referent of an
utterance, for it is not an individual item but a Set, Class or Group
(2)of items'- 7. The members of the Group are socially determined but 
may be added to by individual usage. Thus we could say that the 
Denotation of the lexeme car is the Class of Objects having certain 
properties (such as fourwheeled, mechanical, vehicular etc.), or the
Set of Objects (Rover, Mini, Rolls....  etc.). An individual user,
however, is not usually given, or able to offer, a complete definition 
of the Class or enumeration of the Set in most cases. In fact he probably 
has a mixed 'definition* which is partly extensional and partly 
intensionsal.
Some linguists believe that some words lack denotation, and they 
would include supernatural names in this category^). If this is so
1t
2.
3.
- Saussure (1974) p.71ff.
Hereafter I will use Group to signify any collection of Items 
Objects, aspects, individuals, Class to signify such a Group defined 
intensionally, i.-e. by stating a property common to all members of
“S  sx* ™“> sr .“
E.g. Lyons (1977b) p.210ff Lyons' position here seems somewhat 
inconsistent however, as he claims his notion of Benotation i 7  
philosopUcally neutral with respect to extension and intension 
and then proceeds to cite  unicorn as an example of a word la c S ™  
Denotation because i t  lacks extension. vexing
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then there arises the problem of how we can know the meaning of such 
words independently of any particular Context. For it is clearly 
true that we can say, hear or read unicorn, goblin, fairy or witch in 
an isolated Context and know something about the meaning of that word. 
Yet Stylistic and Referential meaning are Context-dependent, and 
Emotive meaning is not in principle systematic, so it would seem that 
there is an additional element of meaningfulness inhering in isolated 
lexemes.
There are at least three possible approaches to this problem, 
all of which, I believe, are interrelated although their inter­
relationships do not seem to have been previously outlined. In the 
first place one could point out that such lexemes are not met in 
isolation but are always used in a particular Context, e.g. folk 
tales, and if we do meet the isolated lexeme, we.understand its 
Denotatum as a fictional creation, i;es as a reality within a 
particular Context (or, to use the philosophical jargon, in a possible 
world). We could say: these lexemes have Denotata with no extension 
in the actual world, but with extension in a fictional world, i.e, when 
they are used in their normal textual environment they Denote a Set of 
fictional entities^1). However one can object that a fictional Entity 
is not an Entity at all, that extensional definition can only apply to 
encountered Entities, i.e. these lexemes 'Denote' Rem not Entities and 
are therefore not Applicable to an objective world but expressive only 
of Associative meaning.
- • Consequently a second approach, used by Lyons(2), removes 'Entity'
one stage away from the Denotation-less lexeme, it regards that
lexeme's meaning as derived from knowledge of the sense-relations of
other lexemes which are related by the Dennta+i^ i , ,,
jr me uenoration-less lexeme, and these
1. This is the approach sketched out in Linsky (1969).
2. I$rons (1977a).
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other related lexemes do have Denotata. Thus we understand the meaning 
of unicorn as a number of Sense-relations between component lexemes 
whose Denotata we know, such as horse, horn etc. From this it is but 
a small step to a third explanation which states that, though the 
Denotatum of a supernatural name has no extension, it is made up of 
Items which do have extension (viz. horn, horse etc.) but which do not 
co-occur in actuality. It would be possible to regard the invariable 
co-occurrences of such items as the concept of ''unicorn".
Thus we have a theory which finds the meaning of unicorn in a 
relation between Items, a theory which finds that meaning in a 
relation between lexemes attached to those Items, and a theory which 
finds the meaning in the kind of Context in which such lexemes occur.
In the last analysis these theories are probably identical. For if we 
consider how such a meaning as that of unicorn might be learned, it is 
most likely that a child would be reading or hearing a .folktale, with 
a sentence such ass "She was walking through the forest when suddenly 
she came upon a great white horse with a horn in the centre of its 
forehead. A unicomi". Are we to say that a child in hearing this 
is putting together memories or images or concepts of "horn", "white", 
"horse" etc.: or understanding the sense of the words horn, white, 
horse in some way independent of the 'concepts'; or, making allowance 
for the kind of Context, suspending disbelief and accepting the 
hypothesis of a possible world? Clearly the child does not take a real 
horse and a rhino horn and paint the creature white in the living room. 
What we must say, until some convincing grounds for discrimination are 
offered, is that the Context suggests a kind of verbal/conceptual 
reality, just as other Contexts suggest different realities. Charm 
and strangeness in subatomic physics are of the same order as unicorns, 
they are verbal concepts appropriate to, and made meaningful by, a
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particular Context.
In other words the theories which hope to provide an extensional 
Denotation for a supernatural name are in fact providing intensional 
definitions. Just as car Denotes the Class (four-wheeled, combustion 
engine, petrol driven), let us say, so unicorn Denotes (horned, horse, 
whiteness). To say that car has an extensional Denotation whereas 
unicorn does not is to say that there are Objects in the world which I 
can list which have the properties listed in the intensional 
Denotation of car, whereas for unicorn there are not. But the 
criterion for recognising and isolating those Objects is the 
possession of properties in the intensional definition as much for car 
as it is for unicorn. If we accept Denotation as applying only to 
Sets, there is no way to account for the meaning of unicorn. If we 
accept that Denotation applies only to Classes, there is no difference 
between car and unicorn. If Denotation applies to both Sets and 
Classes, then we can say car and unicorn Denote in the same way but 
car also Denotes actual Objects (i.e. it also Denotes extensionally). 
Once one allows that extension is subordinate to intension (i.e. that 
our ability to list Objects is secondary to our ability to create 
Items to be listed) one can also offer an extension of a kind to 
unicorn either through interpreting the intensional definition as 
implying extension 'of a sort' (i.e. if having properties entails 
existence then unicorns exist, albeit in some secondary manner) or by 
the distinction between primary and secondary e x t e n s i o n ^ B y  
either method we capture the notion that lexemes supposedly lacking in 
Denotation are constructions analogous to, but not extensionally 1
(1) Goodman (1969) elaborates this latter distinction.
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equivalent to, lexemes Denoting actual Objects. To put it more 
crudely, Objects are more real than fictions, but both are 
creations^1^ •
An interesting corollary of this would seem to be that the 
Denotation of a fiction tends to remain constant whereas that of 
entities usually changes. The difference arises from the nature of 
individual acts of Reference. If I wish to Refer to an aspect of an 
actual encountered situation I will probably choose a token of a 
lexeme whose intensional Denotation includes properties I recognise in 
that aspect of the situation I wish to Refer to. As that situation, 
being novel and thus unlisted in the extensional definition, will now 
become a member of the Set of Items Denoted, the extensional 
Denotation is extended. If, furthermore, the situation possesses 
properties additional to those listed in the intensional definition, 
it may well be that the intensional Denotation will also be expanded 
by those additional properties (particularly if those properties are 
confirmed in other future acts of Reference). Thus the lexeme's 
Denotation alters.
However there is no possibility of Referring to a fiction by 
using a lexeme with appropriate Denotational extension. The 
appropriate lexeme will be selected by the Class of properties it 
Denotes. As a particular fiction is 'defined' as only containing 
those properties, no new properties will be added. There can be no 1
(1) In fact the distinction is not even as clear as this might 
suggest, for detailed examination of the reality of Objects and the 
fictitiousness of fictions would almost certainly suggest that there 
are degrees of both and, furthermore, that both vary from subculture 
to subculture, even from individual to individual as a function of 
knowledge amd belief. See Berger and Luckmann (1971) and Ford (1975).
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new situations to be Referred to by fictions (or rather, by tokens of 
lexemes Denoting fictitious entities) as the Entity only exists by 
virtue of its traditional typification. An interesting implication 
would therefore seem to be, though of course it does not follow 
necessarily from the above discussion, that the less variation there 
is in a corpus containing a particular lexeme, the more fictitious its 
Denotatum. As we shall see in the main body of this study, in many 
respects this seems true of fairy.
Of course this conclusion could hardly be tested, as other factors 
enter into the process of lexical change. Indeed this judgement seems 
counter-intuitive, for we believe the things we encounter in normal 
situations to be unchanging. However the fact that any new experience 
containing a car, a cow, a table etc. is likely to resemble all 
previous experiences of those Objects more than it will differ from 
them, does not alter the fact that, over centuries, not only do 
extensional but also intensional definitions of real Items alter as 
those Items alter. It would be necessary today to include in an 
intensional definition of table the properties [legless, glass, 
stainless steel, formica, wipe-clean] which would not have been 
included in the Denotata five hundred years ago.
Be that as it may, there is one further problem with the notion 
of Denotation which bears directly on the problem of supernatural 
names. This is the nature of the connection between Denotation and 
Reference. For no speaker ever Denotes an Entity; he/she Refers by 
using a token of a lexeme which Denotes a Group containing that 
Entity. Although this is adequate as a linguistic description, it is 
not a description of what an individual actually does in speaking. 
Presumably what a speaker does in Referring is to recognise an Entity
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in the current situation as similar to an Entity or Entities he has 
previously identified and Referred to (or heard Referred to). Thus we 
must make a distinction between the Denotation of a lexeme across the 
language and its Denotation for an individual. The full Denotation of 
a word in the language may be a Group of Entities [a,b,c,d]. However 
it may well be that an individual speaker has only encountered 
situations in which the word is used to Refer to a, b and c; whereas 
another individual has encountered only b, c and d. Consequently 
those individuals know different Denotations. Thus it may be that no 
individuals know the full Denotation of the lexeme and to that extent 
the 'full Denotation' is an artificial construction of the linguist) 
and furthermore no two speakers may know perfectly identical 
Denotations. For example a lexeme L Denoting [a,b,c,d,e] may be used 
as follows:
Speaker V Refers to [a,b,c]
Speaker W Refers to [b,c,d]
Speaker X Refers to [c,d,e]
Speaker Y Refers to td,e,a]
Speaker Z Refers to [e,a,b]
Each of the speakers V, W, X, Y and Z possesses different notions 
of the Denotation of L, no speaker knows the 'full Denotation', yet 
all Entities are Referred to equally, and the distribution of Entities 
is equal across usage. Furthermore all speakers will be able to use 
the word meaningfully to each other, because no speaker knows a 
Denotation which does not include Entities included in the Denotation 
known to another.
If such a situation obtains in real language there is some
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overlap between Associative meaning and Denotational meaning. For 
example, from the point of view of Z, Y's understanding of lexeme L 
involves two Denoted Entities [e,a] and one Associative, idiosyncratic 
Entity [d]. Thus the 'full Denotation' of L is also made up entirely 
of Associative features, all the Entities a, b, c, d and e being 
regarded as idiosyncratic from at least one point of view.
It may be, therefore, that the distinction between Emotive 
meaning and Denotative meaning is artificial and that a term such as 
psychological meaning would be more useful in this respect. If 
analysis reveals certain components of meaning which, though 
frequently found, are by no means universal for a given lexeme it 
seems that it would be meaningless to call these either Associative or 
Denotational, for different points of view will characterise them 
differently. In general we could say that a given meaningful element 
ma^ be Associative from a psychological point of view and Denotative 
from a philosophical point of view. The problems of such a 
description are avoided to a large extent by the use of Cluster 
definitions as described later in this section
Admittedly the above example is artificial and somewhat extreme. 
It is, however, much simpler than any example found in normal 
language. For in natural languages it would be necessary not only to 
distinguish between Denotation for the whole language community, and 
Denotation for individuals, but also the Denotation known to 
sub-cultural groups, groups within the larger community. Thus 
although it might be possible to maintain that if an individual's 
Denotation of L differs from the 'full Denotation',
(1) The term belongs to Szalay and Deese (1978).
(2) See p.§9.
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his knowledge is only imperfect knowledge of the language, a la 
Chomsky, it would be counter-intuitive to claim that a 
fully-functioning Denotation for a sub-cultural group was an imperfect 
knowledge of the full Denotation. That this is so can be seen by the 
fact that a 'full Denotation', i.e. the Set of all the Groups of 
Denotation within the language, may well include contradictory Items. 
If, for example, the intensive Denotation of music for one Group was 
[sound, loud, repetitive, electronic] and for another [sound, quiet, 
variegated, acoustic] the full Denotation of music for the language 
would be almost meaningless, being nearly contradictory: [sound, loud, 
quiet, repetitive, variegated, electronic, acoustic].
These complexities are important in discussion of supernatural 
names because it is unlikely that a lexeme such as fairy has a single 
'full Denotation' across the language. Any definition of the word 
would have to include an indication of subcultural difference such as 
"believed by some..." or "often thought of as...".
It is probable, therefore, that intensional Denotation will vary 
across a language community. Consequently a more useful notion than 
Class, Set or Group is the C l u s t e r ^ T h i s  term is used here to mean 
a Group of Items which are believed by a user to relate to one another 
and whose organised relation is Denoted by a lexeme. The same lexeme 
may be used by different sub-cultural groups to Denote different 
Clusters, although some of the members of each Cluster may be similar 
or identical. Furthermore within each Cluster there is a certain focus 
upon Items which are felt to be more significant or more important
(]) See Gasking (1960); Cooper (1972).
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in its Organisation, (i.e. some Items within a Cluster are more 
likely to identify a situation as a potential Referent for that 
w o r d ^  than others).
A Cluster thus treats some properties as more relevant to
determining its utterance than others (and, of course, different
Groups may employ different foci). Furthermore Clusters permit a kind
of definition which neither intensional or extensional Denotation
allow, namely a 'sufficiency definition'. For intensional Denotation
an Item may be Referred to by a token of the lexeme if the Item
contains all the properties which define the Class. Fot extensional
Denotation, an Object may be Referred to by a token of the lexeme if
the Object is one of the members of the Set. In other'words an Entity
either is or is not Denoted by the lexeme, and consequently an
(2)utterance of a token of the lexeme will have a truth valuev ' •
However in a sufficiency definition an Item may be Referred to by a 
token of the lexeme if the Item merely contains sufficient of the 
properties which define the Class. Of a certain Set of properties [a, 
b, c, d, e] the Item need not necessarily have a or b or c or d or e, 
but it must have a sufficient number of those properties. If. we 
arbitrarily regard three as a sufficient number the Item need only 
have [a, b, c] or [b, c, d] etc. In other words the notion of a 
Cluster allows for the fact
(1) The terminology is kept loose here in order not to lose sight of 
the central pomt. A_sin.iler notion is that of dominance used be 
Szalay and Deese (1976). They cite other simil«7'notions' such as 
salience, centrality and ordmarv hiersrri,« f oj
(2) The notions of intensio™Tand'extensio^i Denotmion ha„e largely 
een eve ope y p 1 osophers interested in truth-value semantics.
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that across a language different speakers may know different 
Denotations and also may employ slightly different criteria on each 
occasion of utterance, and thus allows for the problem discussed above 
of the lack of full Denotation for some lexemes in some uses.
If we use the notion of a Cluster, we may be able to offer 
definitions of supernatural names which are not Sets or Classes, but 
open-ended lists of characteristics from which various combinations 
may be selected. If we restrict ourselves purely to the linguistic 
point of view, we can offer a Cluster Denotation for each supernatural 
name (providing, of course, analysis reveals such a Cluster); if we 
extend the viewpoint somewhat, we can regard the Cluster as a 
typification, i.e. a Group of features which actually occur in reality 
but which are traditionally associated by a principle of organisation, 
and perhaps by a principle of focussing, in different sub-cultural 
Groups. From any such typification only a limited number of features 
(Items) need be selected by circumstance to prompt Reference, but the 
features, their number and the Reference made may vary from speaker to 
speaker, group to group and situation to situation. It would be 
possible to treat folk motifs^ as features of this nature, and 
regard any folk narrrative as suggesting different Denotations by the 
Clusters of motifs it relates, and thus, with respect to the 
supernatural certain tales may be classifiable in respect of the 
typification of the supernatural they encode.
'But', of course, any text can be regarded in the same light, as a 
selection of features which contribute to a particular Denotation.
(!) See Thompson (1955-8).
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This returns us to the pseudo-extensional explanations of 
meaningfulness for 'denotationless' lexemes. The Cluster concept, 
because it involves only partial listing of features is a more useful 
approach to such lexemes than any of the three alternatives suggested 
above. For whilst it is true that in the case of lexemes such as 
unicorn it seems possible to list an intensional Class defined by 
[white, horse, horn etc.], for many other supernatural names this 
would be impossible. It would be difficult to list an exclusive Class 
for goblin or pooka for example. However it is possible to mark 
partial and overlapping lists by examining the features of the 
Contexts of such words' occurrence. Whilst it may not be true that 
any lexeme, token, feature or Item is invariably associated with fairy 
(for example) it may well be true that there are principles of focus, 
by which some lexemes, tokens, features or Items are more often 
associated than others; and there may well be some principles of 
organisation by which if certain Groups of lexemes, tokens, features 
or Items collocate, fairy is invariably the Denoting lexeme. 
Consequently in order to determine what the Denotation of a 
supernatural name is, if it has one, it is necessary, to establish what 
those Clusters could be.
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2.4 Sense
One influential theory of meaning^ is based on the dual 
notions of extensional Denotation and Sense relations. Essentially 
the theory holds that meaning is derived from the Denotational 
relation of some words to the real world, together with the Sense 
relations which hold between those words and words which lack 
extensional Denotation. It was argued above (section 2.3.3) that 
words lacking extension do not necessarily lack Denotation. However 
it is possible to maintain that what we know of the world is expressed 
by extensional Denotation, and lexemes supposedly having intensional 
Denotation only possess it by virtue of their Sense relations to 
extensionally Denotative lexemes. If one abandons the notion that 
Clusters in some sense reflect the Items a speaker actually selects, 
one can still offer a Cluster-type description of a lexeme based on 
the Sense relations between it and other lexemes. For example, we 
might abandon a Cluster definition of book which claims that if 
sufficient of the properties [made-of-paper, written on, bound, 
legible, titled] were evident we would call an Item a book, in favour 
of a definition which held that the lexeme book acquired its 
distinctive meaning from its relations to such lexemes as paper, 
writing,.leather title, reading,etc. Presuming that those lexemes 
have extensional Denotation, the latter theory would describe book as 
a lexeme uniting the Sense of paper , writing , leather title etc.
Clearly there are lexemes whose meaning derives largely from the 
relational qualities they express.
(1) See for example Lyons (1977a) pp. 210-211.
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Child for example possesses a Sense-relation with father and it seems 
one could point to no actual physical feature in which that relation 
could be located. Cat, dog , mouse are all related in Sense, and 
related to the lexeme animal, though there is no sense in which the 
fact that a cat is an animal entails there being an animal other than 
the cat. What is really in question here, therefore, is whether 
Sense-relations can be expressions of properties (the cat being an 
animal, the father being a parent) or only of purely lexical relations 
(we call all cats, dogs and mice animals because it conveniently 
groups them but does not represent anything inherent in or common to 
cats, dogs and mice). In view of the decision to accept verbal and 
mental meaning as equivalent (section 2.3.]) this question could 
probably be ignored in this study. However one can demonstrate that 
simply noting Sense relations which hold between supernatural names 
does not in itself necessarily tell us anything about the meaning of 
any of those names. Diagram 2.4.a for example, shows the relations of 
identity which were said to hold between some supernatural names in a 
small corpus of t e x t s T h e r e  are certainly no clear statements of 
meaning to be derived from this diagram and, though one might believe 
that a larger corpus would produce clearer sets of relations, it seems 
to be the case that the reverse is true. If one adds to this diagram 
an indication of the frequency such a relation is mentioned, some such
(1) The diagram was derived from a collection of forty texts which 
included a supernatural name. If a text recorded one name as 
equivalent to another, e.g. "Goblins are fairies", or a member of a 
set which was also supernatural, e.g. "a goblin is a kind of fairy" 
the relation was recorded as an identity relation on the diagram.
Names in capitals were the key-words by which the texts were selected, 
those m  lower case are incidental supernatural names occurring in th^ 
same texts. The diagram incidentally supports the earlier point, that 
there is a great deal of overlapping and confusion in use of 
supernatural names. See Chapter 1.
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Diagram 2.A.a Statements of Identity of Supernatural Names
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judgements can be made, but the addition of the notion of frequency 
shifts the description away from the 'pure' notion of stating 
Sense-relations towards the notion of focussing, i.e. towards the 
concept of Clusters.
Furthermore it would seem difficult to claim that the relation 
between father and child or cat and animal is of the same order as 
that between table and wood, or cat and mewing. It may be true that 
the former have no real equivalent, the relations may not be 
properties of the Items Denoted, but in the latter it would surely be 
false to say that we understand the lexeme table because we understand' 
the lexeme wood and its lexical relation to table. Surely the 
relation between the lexemes is understood because we understand the 
relation between the Entities they Denote, not the other way around.
So, at best, Sense relations are only partly independent of actual 
relations, and it may well be that in order to say anything useful 
about the Sense-relations between any two lexemes appeal must be made 
to a Denotatum of some kind. We must accept a picture close to 
Quine's^» in which some lexemes (sentences for Quine) are attached 
to the world, as it w e r e ^ \  whilst others are attached to those 
primary lexemes by Sense relations, more remote from the world, which 
can.only be understood by the tracing of the interlocking links back 
to the real world. Thus in order to describe Sense relations which 
supernatural names hold one must ultimately be able to attach them to 
actual situations or possible phenomena in order to understand the 
Denotata, the Clusters, which such names depend upon.
(1) Quine (1960)
(2) See Applicability, section 2.2.]
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2.5 Conclusion
It will be seen that all the foregoing sections present.arguments 
which suggest that a systemisation of cotexts across a corpus is 
sufficient to reveal most of the important aspects of lexemic meaning 
(of a supernatural name at least). This possibility follows from 
accepting as a metalanguage all words in the object language other 
than the object-word(s). Rather than offer a structural description 
of underlying forms (which says nothing of meaning, though it may 
reveal much of structure) or a statistical display (which says nothing 
of meaning, though it reveals much about frequency) the use of 
ordinary language as a metalanguage relies on intuitive understanding 
of native language to express 'meanings' and, though the methods and 
results outlined below make use of structural and statistical 
descriptions to some extent, the offering of extensional definitions 
is intended to convey the semantic features detected. For most local 
semantic investigations it is necessary only to establish a few axioms 
and otherwise rely for the remainder of the task of classification and 
definition on Items drawn from the object language itself, on the 
assumption that the meaning of those Items is known. This is 
essentially the method of conventional dictionary definition. For 
each definition certain other Items in the object language are treated 
as basic. In other words each dictionary selects a different 
metalanguage for the description of the Items in the Object language. 
Thus for these purposes object language and metalanguage are simply 
terms used to Denote different attitudes to the words involved, the 
first indicating the assumption that the meaning is unknown, the 
second the assumption that the meaning is known.
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Consequently the assumptions made for the discussion of 
supernatural names are twofold. Firstly it is assumed that words 
Denoting or used to Refer to the supernatural can be identified, but 
their meanings not understood, and secondly it is assumed that the 
meanings of all other words can be understood. The object language is 
therefore a Set of lexical items Denoting the supernatural, and the 
Metalanguage, for this study, all words in English which do not Denote 
the supernatural.
It would seem that accepting Ayer's statement of the 
meaninglessness of 'metaphysical' statements entails such an attitude 
as this for if supernatural names have no actual sensory equivalents, 
then both the ordinary speaker and the linguist are dependent on 
Contextual or Cotextual information for their definition of such a 
name, whether we treat the Cotext as yielding clues about the types of 
situations which promote Emotive meaning, statements of Stylistic 
distribution, clues to notions of possible Referents, descriptions of 
the properties which are brought together (in any of several possible 
ways) to create Denotata or a list of lexemes whose Sense relations 
contribute to the notion of the name.
The central problem then becomes one of establishing the 
specifications for applicable Context, together with the need to 
establish a methodology which reveals the elements which may be 
significant (in both senses). It would seem that the term Context can 
only be useful as a vague concept, and that for different purposes it 
is necessary to specify Context in different ways (or, from a 
different point of view, to examine different kinds of Context). 
Furthermore because any systematic reordering of words in a corpus 
necessarily breaks down the original structure of which they were
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part, particularly the syntactic structure, certain irregulariites 
necessarily would be included in analysis. For example it is 
necessary to distinguish homographs which are not homophones. Again, 
if structures such as "not a man" are split into the lexical 
components not and man it is possible to lose sight of the negation 
and treat man as a predicate (or whatever) of the object-word. 
Consequently it was decided to apply several different analytical 
approaches in the hope that (i) they would together overlap in such a 
way that different criteria for Cotext would reinforce each other to 
give an overall notion of the term, (ii) they would contain different 
classes of error if errors occurred by virtue of the method. Thus it 
was hoped that the correct judgements offered by each analysis would 
reinforce each other and the error-based judgements be correspondingly 
weakened. The actual methods employed are described in Chapter 3. 
Essentially they seek to establish a kind of Cotext in each case which 
can yield significant observations about the object-word without 
incorporating an inherent semantic bias^^* The three kinds of 
neutral relation postulated were (i) logical relations, '(ii) relations 
of proximity and (iii) relations of phonological affinity. In 
addition each text was given a broad stylistic classification in the 
hope that systematic distributions within each of those relations 
could be noted.
(1) Such bias might result, for example, from examining only one 
syntactic category that collocated with fairy, or from regarding fairy 
itself as a word exclusively of one syntactic category.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapters have outlined the nature of the semantic 
problems to be explored and established a theoretical groundwork and 
associated terminology for handling those problems at Levels (1) and
(2). Essentially the argument has been that a supernatural name 
acquires meaning and readers /hearers understand such a name's meaning, 
by virtue of the Cotext of that name in actual texts. It was held 
that for a name whose meaning is unknown in a text Emotive meaning may 
be so idiosyncratic that the only clues to its value for a particular 
name will lie in the words it collocates with; Stylistic meaning does 
not inhere in individual lexemes but in collocating Groups of lexemes; 
Denotation and Reference are constructed, learned and known (in 
default of Referents in the situation of use) by inference from known 
meanings in the surrounding Cotext; Sense relations are inter-lexemic 
relations which may be foregrounded^^ by selection in an actual 
text.
Such a theoretical frame is obviously constructed with a view to 
the analysis of texts isolated from their situations of use, i.e. to 
the exploration of>level(3). It remains therefore to describe the 
actual procedure of collecting those texts as examples of fairy, and
(]) Foregrounding is a term from Prague School linguistics signifying 
calling attention to a particular piece or aspect of a text by virtue 
of its difference from the background of the remainder of the text.
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how the theoretical approach was manifested as a procedure in accord 
with it in order to describe the particularities of the meaning of 
fairy. This chapter firstly details the method whereby data were 
collected, then describes two successive analyses of the data. The 
preliminary analysis aimed to identify important areas of meaning for 
further investigation through a method necessarily partly dependent on 
intuition. The main analysis sought to achieve aims (A) and (B) by a 
fuller and more formal analysis. The chapter concludes with a sketch 
of two additional analyses and an outline of how the results of the 
analyses may be evaluated. The following chapters then explore the 
intricate networks revealed by the analyses in respect of the five 
aspects of meaning described in Chapter 2 and in accord with the aims 
and questions proposed in Chapter 1.
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3.2 Collection
The search for occurrences of fairy in the period 1300-1829, 
undertaken over a period of eight months, provided a corpus of 1,964 
occurrences in a total of 468 texts^. Text here means an extracted 
body of discourse, which may be an entire work or only a portion of it 
and is taken to contain all words of Cotextual relevance for each 
occurrence of fairy within it. A particular local Cotext which 
contains only one token of the object-word fairy is a quote, each 
mention of fairy being an occurrence .
The object of study was thus defined extensionally as all items i-n 
this corpus^^» and the corpus was taken to be representative of the 
period. Although all the collected texts were within the period, in 
many cases there were problems in obtaining precise dates for each, 
particularly the early texts. For Middle English texts it was often 
difficult to obtain even an approximate date and the problem was often 
complicated by the existence of manuscript variants which were 
themselves of uncertain date. In some cases it was impossible. to
\
assign exact dates to the variants and thus impossible to determine an
order of precedence amongst them. Indeed the entire chronology of
texts taken from the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is
impossible to date precisely and even at the end of the period it is
sometimes difficult to determine the date at which a text was written
(as distinct from the date of its publication).
*
Thus in cases where there has been any doubt, and this is roughly 
one third of the collection, X have had recourse to detailed accounts
<!> *°l f " 0'" collection see note (I) page 13.
(2) A full specification of the corpus can be found in Appendix 1.
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of the works’ dating and attempted to select, whenever possible, the 
date most generally accepted by recent scholarship. In cases where 
two or more dates are possible, or the dating can be no more precise 
than, say, a decade, the latest date in each case has been selected 
for the purposes of the chronology. It seemed preferable to use the 
latest rather than, say, the earliest possible date as one can then be 
reasonably certain, in talking of the semantic development of the 
word, that a particular usage or semantic element had occurred by that 
date, even if its first occurrence was substantially earlier.
Certainly in many cases the first occurrence would probably be oral 
rather than written, so that even with very accurate textual, dating, 
we can never know precisely how long a particular usage or element had 
been current in the language. In some cases, particularly for 
material pre-1500 the manuscript date was used rather than the 
suggested date of composition as the former date can more often be 
stated with a reasonable degree of precision and the latter is
frequently purely conjectural^«
Whenever possible each occurrence was dated separately rather 
than, for example, all a poet's works being grouped under their date 
of collected publication. Where it has not been possible to obtain 
individual dates (and investigation of some of the possibilities has 
necessarily been limited because it often entails detailed 
biographical and bibliographical research) occurrences have been dated 
by the first known date of publication. In the case of texts
(1) For these early works either the most authoritative edition 
available was used, which was generally that of the Early English Text 
Society, or the manuscript dating found in Guddat-Figge (1976) which 
contains the estimates most recently made for most of the manuscripts 
in which the word fairy occurs.
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published posthumously the date of death of the author was taken as 
the terminal date rather than that of the posthumous publication.
In only a few cases were manuscript originals consulted as 
reliable facsimiles are available for most of the texts in the 
collection. For many of the occurrences post*1600 it was possible to 
consult and copy first editions. However in some cases it has not 
been possible to obtain a first edition or to find an edition which is 
as scholarly as might be wished. If for these reasons the text 
obtained seemed particularly uncertain or, for example, impossible to 
date it has been excluded from the corpus although it may have been 
used as supportive material if it was useful to do so. In those cases 
in which a text has been included in the citation and, if it is used 
in the body of the study, a note has been included to the same effect.
Having determined that identification of the meaning of fairy may 
be possible within the corpus by a formal examination of the Cotexts, 
it became obvious that several existing semantic methods would in the 
immediate instance be inapplicable, e.g. that which employs what is 
known as a semantic differential ^*^or the various kinds of 
componential analysis^. By examining various approaches and 
experimenting with their application to the material it was found that 
no existing semantic method was developed enough to be useful in this 
exercise.- I had therefore to devise my own method which meant, in 
effect, examining and finding solutions to several of the problems
(1) For this technique of analysis see Osgood (1967). It is 
inapplicable here because it depends on the subjective responses of 
informants to a graded test which obviously cannot be applied 
diachronically. It would also yield only quantification of Associative 
rather than Denotative meaning. See Leech (1975) pp.20-22.
(2) For discussions of and variations on componential analysis see: 
Bierwisch (1970); Leech (1975) pp.94-125,• Palmer (1976) pp. 85-91: 
Lyons (1977a) pp. 317-335.
83
which much more experienced semanticists have as yet been unable to 
solve. To the extent that I have come against the same barriers my 
method has been inadequate. In some cases partial solutions were 
found which are adequate for the limited purposes of this study. In 
others an attempt was made to assimilate or integrate different ideas 
from different sources. However in general there are difficulties 
about the method which could perhaps be expanded to form a critique 
both of results and conclusions. Where I have been unable to solve or 
avoid them I have tried to point out the various objections that may 
be made in order to indicate my awareness of them, but it has been 
necessary to ignore some of these difficulties (and make, therefore, 
intuitive decisions which may appear arbitrary) in order that a method 
of some rigour could be created. If I had sought a method free of all 
such difficulties I would still be searching. In order to 
compensate for any bias that might creep into the study as a result of 
such problems it was decided to employ at least two independent 
methods, and integrate the results arrived at into one total 
description. This, in accord with aim (A), allows us to regard 
meaning as the sum of all the valid analytical statements that can be 
made about the use and Cotext of the object-word. It was intended 
that the different approaches would reinforce each other where valid 
observations resulted and counteract any conclusions based on error.
It was also intended that the Cotextual relations examined would 
themselves be semantically neutral, i.e. should possess no inherent 
semantic bias, and should together cover all relations that might be 
called collocation. Thus three kinds of relation were postulated 
which seemed semantically neutral in themselves yet possessed possible 
semantic relations within individual texts.
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These were: (i) logical relation
(ii) relations of proximity
(iii) relations of phonemic/graphemic affinity 
These three types of relation led to the analyses described in 
sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 respectively.
In addition it was originally proposed to examine collocation by 
virtue of "syntactic relations" but this was clearly an error since 
different kinds of syntactic relation embody different meanings. The 
mere fact of there being a syntactic relationship of some kind between 
fairy and another word, aside from being impossibly difficult to 
specify without strict adherence to a single grammatical model, often 
appears to have no semantic significance beyond that encoded in the 
actual syntax. It would be necessary therefore to possess a complete 
description of the different relations between syntax and semantics in 
order to attempt this approach, a description which does not yet exist
and which is beyond the purpose of this study^*
Thus only three semantically neutral approaches were used. By 
logical relation is meant a relation between the object-word fairy and 
another word in each text such that one necessarily depended upon the 
other. By relation of proximity is meant a relation between the 
object-word and every word in each text within a certain distance. By 
phonemic/graphemic affinity is meant a relation between the
(i) The most successful attempts at unifying semantics and syntax seem 
to have been made as developments of transformational generative 
grammar. However there are fundamental differences between the major 
approaches of generative semantics and standard theory which have 
developed from early TG, in particular whether the semantic component 
of the grammar is independent of or incorporated in the syntactic
S ï t ï e à l  il"1 T "  ,ueitioM resolved, there can be no cîear theoretical basis for such a complete description as this 
investigation would require. See Fodor (1977).
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object-word and any other words in a particular text such that both 
are similar in form. As will become clear these approaches as 
initially formulated were altered in the course of the analyses as 
problems modified intent. From the outset however this formulation 
contained one concealed hypothesis, namely that a word can only yield 
semantic information about the object-word if it is also in some other 
relationship with it. Although this would seem a reasonable 
hypothesis, particularly as the notion of proximity can incorporate 
every relation we may call collocation (and thus potentially every 
word in a text), it is possible that words in a text possess 
significant semantic relations with each other which are not reflected 
in other relations. These however would only be recognisable to a 
reader (as opposed to an analyst) if they formed Associative links 
with which the reader was familiar or were part of the Sense relations 
of a language. As such they would not necessarily form any systematic 
structure in a text except for a native speaker aware of such 
structures outside the text.
The present analysis has two safeguards which should incorporate, 
if not reveal, such relations. Firstly the assumption under which 
English as intuitively understood by the analyst, being a native 
speaker, is regarded as the metalanguage allows the analyst to 
indicate any such relations of which he is aware. He may do so using 
only a degree of formalisation which is appropriate to his particular 
purpose, such that he need only appeal to the intuition of others if 
the relation seems obvious. As will become clear in subsequent 
chapters, this becomes necessary where aim (A) conflicts with aim (B), 
i.e. where rigour entails formal description, exclusion of important
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relations may result. Secondly if the specification of proximity is 
sufficiently broad it should incorporate most words with 'hidden' 
relations, and these may subsequently be identified within the larger 
analysis.
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3.3 Preliminary Analysis
The first analysis of the data was an examination of the logical 
relation between fairy and another element (word or phrase) in the 
Cotext. It was the first analysis conducted because it enabled a 
reasonably precise specification of Cotext and thus reduced one major 
problem of collocational analysis namely determining the amount of 
Cotext which is relevant Cotext; because also it would yield only 
about two thousand pieces of information, thus an amount amenable to 
exploration by one analyst in a relatively short period, and also 
could provide an indication of the number of such pieces which might 
be required to support a particular semantic description; because even 
if it showed no substantially significant semantic systems itself, it 
should indicate those areas which a wider analysis should concentrate 
upon; and because it would provide a testing ground for balancing 
formal and intuitive description. It was recognised therefore that 
the analysis might fail with regard to aims (A) and (B), but that even 
so it could be subsumed in subsequent analyses, and that overall 
failure would not prevent subsequent reinforcing judgements being 
successful as described in 3.2, nor the kind of tests described above.
The proposed logical relation may be expressed by the formula N+P 
or P-VN, where ■> means "is followed by", either N or P is fairy and the 
remaining element is that identified as logically related to fairy.
The rules of the relation can be written as follows:
1) N is an expression upon which another expression, called 
P, depends.
2) P is an expression dependent on N.
3) Dependency is taken to mean: a relationship between two 
expressions necessary to the occurrence of the dependent 
expression.
4) Although the meaning of N may be undiscoverable, or N may
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be inherently meaningless, N is taken to possess a 
meaning in terms of P.
5) The sign indicates the order of occurrence of the 
expressions N and P in a text.
The procedure involved is similar to immediate constituent 
analysis^ By dividing a sentence into units which depend on one 
another it was hoped to identify the expression on which fairy was 
immediately dependent in each case, or the expression immediately 
dependent on fairy. It was proposed that there was a logical priority 
between the two expressions such that N could exist in that Cotext 
independently of P, but P could not exist in that Cotext independently 
of N. Hence N was logically prior to P in each case, the presence of 
P being governed by the presence of N, but the presence of N being 
governed by other factors. Thus in a wider Context N would itself be 
dependent on another unit, which could be called M (but this might not 
be a linguistic unit) and one could propose a series of receding 
dependencies as the relevant Context was expanded.
However the problems of determining the independent unit multiply 
exponentially with each recessive stage. Even at the relatively 
simple level of N and P there were some problems. Fortunately however 
by far the majority of occurrences of fairy were of a type amenable to 
immediate constituent analysis, consisting of subject and predicate, 
or noun and modifier.
(1) Immediate constituent analysis involves the division of sentences 
into a hierarchy of grammatical units to yield a phrase structure and 
is thus analogous to the traditional grammatical pastime of parsing. 
The most well-known example is probably Chomsky (1957), although this 
was not strictly a work of analysis. The technique was introduced by 
Bloomfield (1935). For a brief survey of the attractions and 
disadvantages of the method see Crystal (1976) pp. 203-208.
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In cases where fairy could be N or P it was always taken to be 
N, i.e. independent. Also in some cases a particular N had 
twoequivalent expressions dependent on it, e.g. P-*N-»P. In such cases 
where no judgement could be made between them both dependent 
expressions were recorded as equally relevant. In a few examples it 
was difficult to decide which component was N and which P. The 
difficulty of decision does not invalidate the relation of dependency 
between them. In such cases fairy was always taken to be N.
In order to obtain an idea of the kind of function N and P 
represent one can read N as 'name' and P as 'predicate'. This reading 
frequently, but not invariably, corresponds to the traditional 
interpretation of the relation between the words isolated, N being 
frequently a noun and P an adjective. However there is no stipulation 
within the analysis that this should be the case. The categories N 
and P are somewhat wider, and certainly more ambiguous, than any 
reasonable definition of noun, adjective, name or predicate. This 
generality is particularly useful in analysis of fairy, especially in 
its earliest occurrences, as there are several instances of use in 
which the word seems to act in no clear grammatical capacity, in the 
manner of what might be called an 'intensifier', as the phrase 'cats 
and dogs' in "It's raining cats and dogs". For example the following 
passage by Miss Mitford (1828/01/010 and Oil).
What a piece of fairy land! The 
tall elms overhead just bursting into tender
....... vivid leaf, with here and there a hoary oak
or a silver-barked beech, every twig swelling 
with the brown buds, and yet not quite 
stripped of the tawny foliage of autumn; tall 
hollies and hawthorn beneath, with their 
crisp brilliant leaves mixed with the white 
blossoms of the sloe, and woven together with 
garlands of woodbines and wild-briers; - what 
a fairy land!
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The general procedure for the whole collection was thus:
1) For each occurrence of fairy identify an expression N-P 
or P-N such that either N or P is fairy.
2) Record all N - fairy.
3) Record all P - fairy.
4) For all N - fairy record P.
5) For all P * fairy record N.
Having listed all N and P for the collection the data was then 
subjected to various classifications as detailed below. Because of 
the presumed logical relation between N and P and because, in most
«
cases, P was adjacent to N, it may be possible to assert some form of 
priority for the conclusions derived from this analysis. Accordingly 
some of the final conclusions may be affected by this implication of 
priority.
The procedure can be objected to on several grounds. For 
example, intuition necessarily played a large part in assigning the 
value N or P to some tokens of fairy, and in determining the units of 
immediate dependence, particularly where fairy was embedded in a 
particularly complex syntactic structure. It could thus be said that 
the relations detected are not logical but simply expressions of the 
disposition of my intuition. Conversely it is difficult to see how 
any semantic study does not rely on intuitive grammatical knowledge at 
some level of analysis^, but whilst my interpretations remain 
implicit there is always the theoretical possibility that I have 
misunderstood or misinterpreted any or all of those structures.
(]) It is arguable that no semantic analysis can be free of intuition 
unless it is prescriptive, i.e. excludes from the language those 
utterances not accomodated by its system - see Lyons (1977b) pp. 
384-5.
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This method of analysis produced a number of examples each of 
which recorded a phrase in which fairy was replaced by N or P, e.g.
1) He gave his horse to the fairy king (quote).
2) the fairy king (abstract).
3) the ■» P •* king (card entry).
These examples were arranged chronologically. Then all the 
tokens taken as form words rather than function words, representative 
of types of diachronic lexemes, were listed under a citation form for 
that d-lexeme. By diachronic lexeme is meant a lexeme which has a 
diachronic dimension. This involves the premise that between any two 
synchronic states of a lexeme there is some semantic relationship, 
i.e. the diachronic lexeme involves a semantic continuum from which 
any lexicological work extracts a discrete segment (i.e. a synchronic 
lexeme). This concept is the basis of all etymology and as such is an 
essential one, but it may involve severe difficulties. In fact the 
assumption that the lexeme child in 1300 has a meaning sufficiently 
closely related to that of the lexeme child in 1800 may be little more 
than a terminological convenience, a way of grouping similar uses 
together.
On the principle that one occurrence of a lexeme may be 
idiosyncratic, and two coincidental, all lexemes which occurred three 
or more times were listed, categorised according to frequency, and 
charted on a graph against time to discover any pattern of
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development, concentration etc. Table 3.3.a is a list of the most 
frequently occurring d-lexemes.
TABLE 3.3.a
D-Lexeme Total 1st Date D-Lexeme Total Ist Date D-Lexeme Total Ist Date
Land 58 1325 Trip 10 1596 Kind 5 1566
Queen 56 * 1330 Circle 9 1607 Light 5 1600
Has 54 1503 Knight 9 1325 Old 5 1620
Was 39 1330 Our 9 1598 Origin 5 1809
Are 35 1530 Form 8 1708 Realm , 5 1530
Be 35 1330 ■Little 8 1611 Seem 5 1390
It 30 1330 Shall 8 1440 Those 5 1605
King 28 1330 Such 8 1390 Who 5 1530
Dance 27 1527 Them 8 1568 Train 5 1600
He 26 1350 Thou 8 1320 Can 4 1596
They 25 1400 Away 7 1330 Certain 4 1568
I 23 1390 Child . 7 1598 Concern 4 1653
This 20 1390 Give 7 1505. Country 4 1400
Ring 19 1598 Lady 7 1410 Existence 4 1651
She 19 1350 Love 7 1605 Great 4 1607
Call 17 1500 Man 7 1500 Hall 4 1676
Do 17 1500 Dream 7 1769 Inhabit 4 ' 1651
Is 1$ 1330 People 7 1530 Keep 4 1608
Come 15 1330 Play 7 1607 Lord 4 1530
That 15 1320 Belief 6 1320 Meet 4 1597
Elf 14 1567 Enter 6 1585 Money 4 1613
Tale 14 1691 Favour 6 1595 Mother 4 1596
Haunt 13 1593 Hear 6 1320 Name 4 1600
Make 13 1350 Know 6 1566 One 4 1500
Take 13 1390 Morgan 6 1400 Other 4 1500
(feontinued on p.94)
TABLE 3.3.a (cont.)
D-Lexeme Total lst Dì
There 13 1330
You 13 1530
Ground 12 1606
See 12 1570
Song 12 1591
We 12 1513
All 1 1 1440
Court 1 1 1548
Folk 1 1 1400
Foot 1 1 1550
Power 1 1 1530
Some 1 1 1460
Spirit 1 1 1500
Thing 1 1 1410
Will 1 1 1595
Hand 10 1500
Say 10 1500
D-Lexeme Total lst Dal
Many 6 1330
Prince 6 1596
Round 6 1598
Send 6 1420
Use 6 1598
Which 6 1390
Work 6 1520
Would 6 1580
Be ing 5 1550
Bower 5 1567
Bring 5 1597
City 5 1530
Eyes 5 1350
Forest 5 1607
Grace 5 1595
Here 5 1609
Hill 5 1567
D-Lexeme Total Is
Page 4 
Pinch 4 
Put 4 
Respect 4 
Skip 4 
Speak. 4 
Spell 4 
Story 4 
Talk 4 
Treasure 4 
Woman 4 
Wand 4 
Danger 4 
May 4 
Should 4 
Spright 4 
Steal 4
VO
t Date
1627
1591
1621
1801
1595
1704
1718
1685
1605
1606
1500
1792
1600
1530
1611
1595
1330
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The full graph of lexemes against time is unfortunately too large 
to reproduce here and its reproduction is unnecessary for it yields 
relatively little information.
However a simplified version of the graph is included as Diagram
3.3.b. This shows the date of each occurrence of the twenty-five most 
frequent lexemes, i.e. those occurring eleven or more times. It 
records the dates of the first occurrence of each d-lexeme and the 
subsequent frequencies of occurrence for comparative purposes.
It can be seen, for example, that whilst most of these d-lexemes 
first occur before 1600, implying that the meaning(s) they represent 
have become associated with fairy by this date, different lexemes 
cluster together at different periods, suggesting that the importance 
of some meanings varies with time, and that at different times certain 
lexemes were more significant semantically than others. Comparing 
lexemes in this way however is relatively unprofitable for two 
reasons. In the first place most lexemes have relatively few 
occurrences in the corpus. Even the most frequent, land, occurred on 
average little more than once a decade. Secondly many lexemes seemed 
semantically related, and therefore a more satisfactory comparison 
ought to result from listing semantic elements encoded in the lexemes 
rather than simply listing the lexemes themselves.
Accordingly, the next stage was to group all the d-lexemes into 
categories of some kind. Several methods were attempted but no 
systematic method could be found which seemed even approximately to 
accord with intuitive classification. It was decided to propose a 
series of categories which seemed frequently to occur in the lexemes,
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and to group under each category the lexemes which seemed to belong to 
that category. This procedure was, therefore, almost entirely 
intuitive. A series of test sentences for some categories was devised 
but as these amounted to no more than an elaboration of intuition and 
a somewhat inaccurate one at that, and as it had already been 
determined that all words which were not object words were 
comprehensible, it seemed best to adopt intuitive categories and 
record their members, so that any other observer could test his 
intuitions against my own. It may be the case that some lexemes have 
been omitted which other analysts might have included, but by 
attempting to be rigorous in exclusion it was hoped that the validity 
of the majority of inclusions would be acceptable.
This was probably the central stage in the analysis. The fact 
that only intuition seemed to provide adequate classes is probably 
significant, suggesting as it does that none but the most tightly 
constrained registers of ordinary language (as distinguished from the 
constructed languages of linguistic philosophy or the descriptions of 
ideal competence made by grammarians such as Chomsky) are solely and 
thoroughly systematic. It seems to be true that the larger the body 
of empirical evidence, the greater is the degree of variation and the 
number of exceptions which are encountered. This has a number of 
consequences. The most obvious is that the list of categories, 
summarise'd here as Table 3.3.c, collects lexemes which are related in 
different ways. For example although the majority, perhaps all, of 
the lexemes which are taken to include a semantic feature CREATURE
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would be so grouped by most native speakers of English, some are 
proper nouns, some common nouns, some pronouns; some are plural, some 
singular, some collective; some are human, some animal, some 
supernatural; and some may have such a slight implication of CREATURE 
that they would be excluded by some speakers, or at least detailed 
justification from each particular text would be required.
TABLE 3.3.c 
SEMANTIC CATEGORIES
(Arranged by total number of lexemes taken to contain that 
category)
CREATURE (106)
Adders, Arthur, aunt, barons, body, boy, brother, champions, 
child, company, creature, crowd, crew, dame, damsel, dwarf, 
devils, elf, family, father, faun, fellow, female, ffendys, 
fiddler, fisherman, fishes, flock, felloun, foe, folk, 
friend, giant, gent, god, guest, he, hosts, humans, 
huntsmen, huntswomen, husband, infant, Jack, king, knight, 
lackeys, lady, lemans, Mab, man, Melissa, midwife, mistress, 
monarch, monk, Morgan, mortal, mother, nation, nymph, oaf, 
Oberon, page, partners, peer, people, Pegasus, person, 
peris, poets, priest, prince, princess, Puck, queen, quires, 
race, rogue, Shakespeare, she, sister, slaves, slut, spirit, 
spright, subject, successor, swain, throng, tribe, troop, 
us, virgin, voyager, whales, whores, wif, woman, you.
MOTION/ACTION (78)
Approach, bend, blow, bring, build, carry, catch, cause, 
charge, chase, come, conduct, convey, dance, depart, 
disport, do, draw, drop, enter, enterchange, exchang'd, 
exit, fetch, fight, flee, fly, get, give, glide, guide, go, 
hop, invade, join, lead, live, make, mix, nip, pace, pinch, 
play, proceed, raise, range, return, rally, remove, rove, 
run, send, shun, skip, seize, sport, steal, stoop, stretch, 
swim, take, transport, tread, trip, turn, twist, use, waft, 
..... walk, wander, work, wrought, wave, weave, went.
PLACE/LOCATION (54)
Bank, boudoir, bower, castle, chappell, church, cottage, 
country, court, dales, dairy, desart, dome, downs, dwell, 
earth, empire, forest, ground, grove, habitation, hall, 
haunt, here, hill, holms, inhabit, kingdom, lake, land, 
meadow, mountain, palace, pavement, place, plains, realm, 
region, rock, room, sea, shore, stream, stone, strond, 
temple, thorn, tomb, terrace, town, valley, wood, world.
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UTTERANCE (47)
Address, anecdote, answer,ask, bless, chant, choral, call, 
command, confess, conversation, cry, decree, discourse, 
explain, fable, fiction, greet, insult, language, lore, 
lyric, legend, name, oyes, poet, prediction, prologue, 
promiss, query, question, quoth, relate, reply, request, 
rhyme, say, shout, speak, song, tale, talk, tongue, tell, 
written, word.
AURAL (40)
Address, answer, ask, bell, call, chant, choral, 
conversation, confess, cry, discourse, echo, explain, greet, 
hear, insult, language, listen, lore, lyric, mention, music, 
poets, query, question, quoth, rhyme, reply, request, shout, 
silent.
VISUAL(32)
Appear, apparition, bright, colour, dream, disappear, 
display, eyes, glimmer, glance, image, looks, light, 
moonlight, painting, perceive, radiance resemblance, see, 
seem, shining, shades, shadows, shapes, show, sighte, 
sparks, smart, twilight, vanishes, vigilance, vision.
NUMBER/QUANTIFICATION (27)
All, abundance, demi, dwarf, each, enough, every, few, 
giant, great, half, lesser, many, much, most, nothing, 
often, one, once, only, pair, part, quarter, short, some, 
such.
NATION/GROUP (27)
Band, bevy, brood, company, court, crew, crowd, empire, 
family, folk, jury, legion, nation, people, quires, race, 
rout, species, throng, train, troop, tribe, us, we.
MALE (25)
Arthur, barons, boy, brother, father, fellow, fisherman, 
gent, god, he, huntsmen, husband, Jack, king, knight, lord, 
man, monk, Oberon, page, priest, prince, son, Shakespeare, 
swain.
FEMALE (23)
Aunt, dame, damsel, female, huntswomen, lady, Mab, Melissa, 
midwife, mistress, Morgan, mother, nymph, princess, queen, 
she, sister, slut, virgin, whores, wif, woman.
ROYALTY (22)
Barons, castle, court, crown, empire, king, kingdom, knight, 
lady, lord, monarch, page, palace, prince, princess, queen, 
realm, royal, reign, state, sovereign, throne.
GAIETY (20)
Ball, dance, delight, disporten, enjoy, festivity, fun, gay, 
happy, lightfoote, merry, nimble, overjoy'd, play, pranks, 
revelry, round, skip, sport, trip.
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INJURY (18)
Blast, danger, destroy, harmless, hinder, hurt, injur, 
insults, malicious, malignant, menaces, misfortunes, nip, 
oppose, pinch, suffered, treachery, vext.
ANATOMY (17)
Body, bosoms, brain, claws, eyes, face, fingers, foot, form, 
hand, heart, lids, limbs, skeleton, throats, tongue, wings.
WATER (14)
Fisherman, fishes, fountain, lake, tear, sea, shell, shore, 
spring, stream, strond, swim, water, whales.
GO (13)
Away, depart, disappear, exeunt, flee, forsook, gang, gone, 
leave, remov'd, jider, vanishes, went.
VEGETATION (13)
Bank, bower, cucumber, fig, flower, forest, grove, holms, 
leaf, meadow, root, thorn, wood.
MAKING (13)
Arranging, art, cause, craft, invention, make, profession, 
raught, render'd, use, weave, work, wrought.
MISCHIEF/PLAY (12)
Disport, displease, fun, game, mischievous, peeve, play, 
pranks, revel, rogue, sport, toys.
BEAUTY (12)
Beauty, delicate, fair, favour, fine, grace, handsome, 
lovely, matchlesse, paradise, pretty, sweet.
TAKE (12)
Convey, enterchange, exchange, fetch, keep, reft, remov'd, 
seize, snatch, steal, take, theft.
RELIGION (12)
Annoint, benediction, bless, chapell, church, faith, god, 
mass, priest, psalter, quires, temple.
POWER/ABILITY (11)
Art, can, cause, craft, control, do, harmless, nygromancye, 
power, strongly.
FALSENESS/ILLUSION (11)
Apparition, deceive, delusions, dream, fable, fancy, feign, 
fiction, frawdfull, legend, phantasies.
MUSIC/SONG (10)
Air, chant, choral, lyric, music, opera, quires, rhyme, 
song, tone.
101
FEAST/FOOD (9)
Banquet, butter, cucumber, feast, festivity, junkets, 
lickorish, salt-seller, wine.
OFFSPRING/CHILD (9)
Boy, child, infant, off-spring, page, prince, princess, son, 
young.
MOUNTAIN/VALLEY (8)
Bank, dale, down, hill, knowe, mountain, terrace, valley. 
COMBAT (8)
Fight, foe, invade, oppose, peace, shot, warfare, weapons. 
EVIL (8)
Bad, evil, felloun, malicious, malignant, rogue, tyranous, 
wicked.
DECEIT (8)
Beguile, deceive, delusion, false, feign, secret, seem, 
treachery.
NAMING (7)
Address, call, deem, denominate, denote, name, term.
LOVE (7)
Beloved, cherished, friend, lemans, love, lovely, wooing. 
DRESS/COVERING (6)
Bows, cap, coverlet, dress, gowne, robe.
NIGHT (6)
Midnight, moonlight, night, sleep, star, twilight. 
ENCHANTMENT (6)
Charm, conjur, enchant, miracle, nygromancye, spell.
DANCE (6)
Ball, dance, glide, round, skip, trip.
BRING (6)
Bring, enterchange, exchange, give, leave, send.
TREASURE/WEALTH (5)
Groats, hoard, money, rich, treasure.
AID/HELP (5)
Aid, boon, friend, guard, guide.
t
COME (5)
Approach, bring, come, enter, return.
GOOD (5)
Good, harmless, honest, kind, vertu.
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STONE (4)
Pavement, rock, stone, mountain.
RING (3)
Circle, ring, round.
FOOT (3)
Foot, footsteps, ligbtfoote.
Words which might be particularly problematic which exist in the 
Group CREATURE are body, champions, company, dwarf, fellow, hosts, 
page, partners, peer, quires, race, spirit, subject. CREATURE is 
furthermore one of the simplest and least problematic Groups.
Secondly the Groups themselves are of different orders. For 
example titles such as creature, number, motion or visual seem like 
semantic features, but anatomy, water, religion or night do not. Some 
lists approximate to lists of "lexemes which encode the feature x", 
others are more like "lexemes which are associated with the feature 
y". One could argue that the difference between these two kinds of 
listing is more apparent than real, a function of cultural orientation 
which favours abstraction and hierarchical organisation over, let us 
say, extensional association or similarity by contiguity. Be this as 
it may, categorisation by implicit and non-exclusive categories 
conflicts with aim (B), and thus the practical consequence was a
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determination to employ tighter, more formal categories in the 
following analysis.
This does not mean that the extensional categories of Table 3.3.c 
are worthless, however. In the first place they provide the indication 
of areas for future investigation which was required of this analysis.
Most of the categories proposed here recurred in slightly different 
form in the major analysis. Secondly the decision that determined 
that the metalanguage should be normal English involves the assumption 
that most of these categories would be recognised by native speakers 
as prominent in the corpus. Thirdly they provided a grouping which, 
however loosely based, could be used as a framework within which 
individual features, trends, texts or patterns could be examined. In 
addition it seemed that part of the problem of these Groups was that 
the level of generalisation required could not be extracted from only 
two thousand pieces of information.
Most of the aims of this particular analysis were thus realised, 
method, formalisation, intuition and corpus being tested. The 
categories were thus examined in order to expose trends and patterns, 
although the simplest conclusion could be made without further 
examination, namely that the forty-five Groups listed in Table 3.3.c 
were the key semantic elements whose interrelations constitute the 
meaning of fairy. For each category the total N, total P, and grand 
total N + P was recorded (Table 3.3.d) and the distribution of 
occurrences was plotted against time. Tbrfee sample graphs are 
included as Tables 3.3.e, f and g. They illustrate three different 
types of distribution - FEMALE (Table 3.3.g) occurs throughout the 
period studied, and the majority of occurrences are as N; CREATURE 
(Table 3.3.e) shows very similar curves to that for FEMALE, but
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roughly twice the number of occurrences; DANCE (Table 3.3.f) in 
contrast shows much fewer occurrences, commences only in 1570, and has 
roughly equal distribution between N and P. Such graphs as these were 
taken as indicative of general trends which the fuller analysis was to 
explore.
The order of importance of the categories, which can be taken as 
a description of the relative significance of semantic Groups with 
respect to fairy, can be assessed in several ways, each producing 
somewhat different results, largely because many of the Groups have 
so few members. Categories could be ordered by total N, by total P or 
by total N + P (Table 3.3.d). Or the orders obtained for total N 
could be added to the orders obtained for total P to give an aggregate 
figure, an alternative which actually seems to give misleading 
results. Or the occurrences per category could be described in terms 
of the percentage of those totals (Table 3.3.h) or as a percentage of 
the real total (Table 3.3.j). (The difference between the recorded 
totals and the real totals is explained by the fact that the 
categories were not exclusive i.e. any lexeme could be included in 
more than one category). It is also possible to combine all these 
figures and obtain an aggregate picture, but this would probably be 
too complex to interpret.
Also prepared was a graph of total number of texts against time 
(Table 3.3.k) and of total number of occurrences against time (Table 
3.3.1) for comparison with the graphs of category occurrence. As an 
indication of the relative frequencies of occurrence of each category 
the average number of occurrences of each category per year were 
calculated (to two decimal places) as was the average number of 
occurrences per decade in approximate figures (Table 3.3.m).
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In addition a tree diagram was prepared which related the 
categories hierarchically (Table 3.3.n). It was intended that the 
major analysis should examine the same categories as far as possible 
in order to clarify, and possibly to modify, this hierarchy. As will 
be seen it is little more than a description of levels of 
generalisation moving from the level of NAME and ENTITY (which can be 
regarded as text existing at Level (2)) through postulated aspects of 
Entity to a level of description which corresponds roughly with that 
of systemic sentential roles (Agent, Action and Object) to the 
particularities of actual text. It will be seen that even at the most 
specific level, there are a number of Groups which must be considered 
as related to other Groups (indicated by arrowed lines) because of 
Sense relations which hold between their members. This hierarchy 
provided the key for the arrangement of the larger and more numerous 
groups produced by the subsequent analyses. Thus the intuitive 
process of the preliminary analysis serves as intended as an 
explanatory foray which laid bare the difficulties of analysis and 
produced descriptions of only limited usefulness, but established the 
route to be followed by the more rigorous procedures of the main 
analysis.
In addition the various graphs provided suggestions which 
subsequent analysis sought more rigorously to confirm or refute.
Table 3.3.d
Number of N + P Occurrences per Category
CATEGORY TOTAL N TOTAL P GRAND TOTAL 
(N+P)
Creature 515 69 584
Royalty 340 5 345
Place 263 50 313
Motion 99 159 258
Female 218 19 237
Male 162 17 179
Utterance 90 33 123
Aural 69 40 109
Nation 91 6 97
Quantification 36 50 86
Gaiety 33 49 82
Visual 37 36 73
Anatomy 44 11 55
Dance 23 29 52
Power 23 22 45
Ring 39 2 41
Make 19 21 40
Naming 29 8 37
Injury 13 21 34
Take 12 21 33
Offspring 26 5 31
Come 10 20 30
Go 13 16 29
Beauty 22 7 29
Music 16 9 25
Vegetation 21 3 24
Mischief/Play 10 13 23
Bring 13 10 23
Love 7 14 21
Water 12 9 21
Falseness 13 5 18
Mountains 12 4 16
Religion 12 3 15
Enchantment 12 1 13
Foot 10 3 13
-Deceit 5 8 13
Good 5 7 12
Aid 3 9 12
Night 1 1 I 12
Wealth 9 2 11
Combat 6 4 10
Feasting 8 2 10
Dress 4 5 9
Evil 1 8 9
Stone 4 4 8
1820
1820
-1
8
0
0
-
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Table 3.3.h
Absolute totals of semantic groups as a percentage of all groups.
Group % of
total Ns
% of 
total Ps
Z of
total (N+P)s
Creature 36.04 12.97 29.78
Royalty 23.79 0.94 17.59
Place 18.40 9.40 15.96
Motion 6.92 29.89 13.16
Female 15.25 3.57 12.08
Male H.34 3. 19 9. 13
Utterance 6.30 6.20 6.27
Aural 4.83 7.52 5.56
Nation 6.37 1. 13 4.95
Quantification 2.52 9.40 4.39
Gaiety 2.3 l 9.21 4.18
Visual 2.59 6.77 3.72
Anatomy 3.08 2.07 2.80
Dance 1.61 5.45 2.65
Power 1.61 4. 14 2.29
Ring 2.73 0.37 2.09
Make 1.33 3.95 2.04
Naming 2.03 1.50 1.89
Injury 0.91 3.95 1.73
Take 0.84 3.95 1.68
Offspring 1.82 0.94 1.58
Come 0.70 3.76 1.53
Go 0.91 3.00 1.48
Beauty 1.54 1.31 1.48
Music 1.12 1.69 1.27
Vegetation 1.47 0.56 1.22
Mischief/Play 0.70 2.44 1.17
Bring 0.91 1.88 1.17
Love 0.49 2.63 1.07
Water 0.84 1.69 1.07
Falseness 0.91 0.94 0.92
Mountains 0.84 0.75 0.82
Religion 0.84 0.56 0.76
Enchantment 0.84 0. 19 0.66
Foot 0.70 0.56 0.66
Deceit 0.35 1.50 0.66
Good 0.35 1.32 0.61
Aid 0.21 1.70 0.61
" Night 0.07 2.07 0.61
Wealth 0.63 0.37 0.56
Combat 0.42 0.75 0.51
Feasting 0.56 0.37 0.51
Dress 0.28 0.94 0.46
Evil 0.07 1.50 0.46
Stone 0.28 0.75 0.41
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Table 3.3. j
Relative totals of semantic groups as a percentage of all groups.
Group % of
24 10 (N)
% of 
858 (P)
% Of
3268 (N+P)
Creature 21.37 8.04 17.87
Royalty 14.1 I 0.58 10.56
Place 10.91 5.83 9.58
Motion 4.1 1 18.53 7.89
Female 9.05 2.21 7.25
Male 6.72 1.98 5.48
Utterance 3.73 3.85 3.76
Aural 2.86 4.66 3.33
Nation 3.78 0.70 2.97
Quantification 1.49 5.83 2.63
Gaiety 1.37 5.72 2.51
Visual 1.53 4.20 2.23
Anatomy 1.83 1.28 1.68
Dance 0.95 3.38 1.59
Power 0.95 5.24 1.38
Ring 1.62 0.23 1.25
Make 0.79 2.45 1.22
Naming 1.20 0.93 1.13
Injury 0.54 2.45 1.04
Take 0.50 2.45 1.01
Offspring 1.08 0.58 0.95
Come 0.41 2.33 0.92
Go 0.54 1.86 0.89
Beauty 0.91 0.82 0.89
Music 0.66 1.05 0.76
Vegetation 0.87 0.35 0.73
Mischief/Play 0.4 1 1.51 0.70
Bring 0.54 1. 17 0.70
Love 0.29 1.63 0.64
Water 0.50 1.05 0.64
Falseness 0.54 0.58 0.55
Mountains 0.50 0.47 0.49
Religion 0.50 0.35 0.46
Enchantment 0.50 0. 12 0.40
Foot 0.41 0.35 0.40
Deceit 0.21 0.93 0.40
Good 0.21 0.82 0.37
Aid . 0. 12 1.05 0.37
Night 0.04 1.28 0.37
Wealth 0.37 0.23 0.34
Combat 0.25 0.47 0.31
Feasting 0.33 0.23 0.31
Dress 0. 16 0.58 0.28
Evil 0.04 0.93 0.28
Stone 0. 17 0.47 0.24
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Table 3.3.m 
Average number
Group
Creature
Royalty
Place
Motion
Female
Male
Utterance
Aural
Nation
Quantification
Gaiety
Visual
Anatomy
Dance
Power
Ring
Make
Naming
Injury
Take
Offspring
Come
Go
Beauty
Music
Vegetation
Mischief/Play
Bring
Love
Water
Falseness
Mountains
Religion
Enchantment
Foot
De ceit
Good
Aid
Night
Wealth
Combat
Feasting
Dress
Evil
Stone
of occurrences of each semantic group per Decade.
Average per Decade
12.00
7.00
6.00
5.00
4.50
4.00
2.50
2.00 
2.00
1.50
1.50
1.50 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.75 
0.75 
0.66  
0. 66  
0.66  
0.50 
0.50 
0.50 
0.50 
0.50 
0.50 
0.50 
0.50 
0.50 
0.50 
0.33 
0.33 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.25 
0.20 
0.20 
0.20 
0.20 
0.20 
0.20
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TABLE 3.3.n.
Name/Utterance »
4♦Entity - --
— (Quality)
--- Dress
--- Power
--- Beauty
--- Good/Evil
----Number
I— (Setting)
Place
i .Vegetation
----Water
--- Mountain
--- Stone
--- Ring
■(Time) Night
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3.4 The Central Analysis
Initially the idea which prompted the second analysis was a 
rather naive notion of proximity under which the distance between the 
object-word and any other specified word in the Cotext was taken to be 
a measure of the semantic relevance of one word to the other. That 
is, the hypothesis was that the nearer a word was to fairy in a text 
the more important its meaning would be to the Sense, Reference or 
Denotation of fairy. It was hoped that by assigning a ’value’ to each 
word according to its distance from the object-word a pattern would 'be 
obtained which would reveal which of such words were the most 
important within a particular corpus. It is possible that this will 
prove a useful means of analysing a corpus. Each word in the corpus 
could in turn be treated as the object-word, with values being 
assigned for all other words according to their relative distances in 
each, text, obtaining across a corpus a table of the form:
_ Object word
Other words A B C • ...N
'A * x y z
B x * v q
C y v * w
...N z q w *
where each column contains a different object-word, each row another 
word in the corpus, and each number (represented as v, w, x, y, z) is- 
an expression of the cumulative distances between those words in the 
corpus. One would thus obtain a chart giving a numerical statement of 
the interrelating relevancies of all words in each text and in the
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corpus and it would be possible to draw maps of the affinity of or 
attraction between any two words for comparative purposes.
However such a procedure faces two major difficulties. In the 
first place although in many cases it is clearly true that in a vague 
sense the closer together two words are the more meaningful is the 
relationship between them it is usually possible to alter the 
syntactic structure of such cases so that the relative order and 
proximity of the words is altered without altering the meaning of the 
text. Thus in a majority of cases the syntactic relations between 
words are probably more important than mere relations of proximity. 
Secondly it is not clear that the notion of distance can be stated in 
any satisfactory way. A measure in terms of words (or types or 
tokens) faces the usual problems of defining word, and also such 
methodological problems as determining the status of hyphenated words, 
function-words, and morphemes; counting characters involves problems 
with punctuation, including hyphenation, and a complex of problems 
caused by the lack of correspondence between phonemes and graphemes; 
any measure at a rank higher than the word based on clause, sentence, 
group, line etc., tends to obscure the obvious features of proximity 
which prompt such a hypothesis, and encounters problems in attempting 
to deal with any text of unusual form such as a poem, an inventory or 
an 'index.
Such an elementary analytical approach as this is thus unlikely 
to produce any useful results without the solution of such problems. 
Success would depend on a fully functional account of textual 
cohesion, which is not yet a v a i l a b l e ^ A n y  systematic analysis of
(1) Although steps towards such an account have been taken. See 
GutwinskiC 1976), Haliiday and Tiasan (1976).
Cotext must therefore be more general than this. Although it would be 
theoretically possible to mark a catalogue of items in a corpus 
according to syntactic function and thus obtain a cross-textual 
pattern, this would depend on being able to assign those syntactic 
functions, which would entail many decisions on crucial grammatical 
questions beyond the scope of this study and which would probably 
build a further degree of uncertainty into the conclusions.
Accordingly it was decided that no form of marking of words within 
Cotexts could be sufficiently free of problems to ensure results which 
were clearly interpretable. Thus all words within a particular Cotext 
were initially considered as equivalent, irrespective of their 
syntactic functions.
The reasons for proposing an analysis of Cotext in addition to 
the lists of associations proposed in the preliminary analysis depend 
partly on the results of that analysis and partly on the arguments of 
such theoretical standpoints as those of semantic fields^ 
collocational meaning ^  and Quine's sentential n e t ^ .  Broadly 
speaking these approaches regard meaning as partly or wholly inhering 
in the associations or 'attractions' between words and between 
sentences. Such Cotextual approaches regard meaningful relations as 
complementary to the paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations between 
words which can be stated with a reasonable degree 1
(1) The term secantic field has come to be used rather vaguely to mean 
any group of related lexemes. Its original use was more specific 
referring to distinct sets of lexemes which fill one clearly defined 
area, such as colour terms. See Ullman(195 I); Palmer(1Q771 
pp.7l-2;Lyons(1977a) pp. 250-261.
«) Collocational meaning is usually described as part of a semantic 
theory rather than as a total theory. See Firth(l957) n 197- P “  (1977) pp. 94 - 94 ; Leech (1975) p.20. *«tbU957) P* 197* Pal“er
of precision^ ^ » Insofar as such verbal associations are reflective 
of 'real' associations in the world (i.e. asociations between Objects) 
or, in such views as Quine's, productive of associations which users 
take to be real (such as by assigning a Rem the status of Object) it 
is clear that the Referential or Denotational aspects of meaning will 
be closely connected to collocational meaning whether the Sense of 
such words is related to collocation or completely independent of it. 
For example one could regard the meaning of rancid as totally 
conditioned by its invariable association with one or other of the 
lexemes butter and bacon. Insofar as rancid Denotes or is used to 
Refer to an Item which invariably is associated with an Object Denoted 
or Referred to by butter (or bacon) (i.e. a quality or property of 
butter or bacon and no other Object) then the collocational account 
would appear valid.
However it is also true that in any given text many of the 
collocations will be semantically neutral, although it is seldom 
possible to predict in advance precisely those words which will not 
collocate significantly with any given object-word^» It is 
therefore necessary to analyse all of the relevant Cotext in order to 
discover which words are significant although such an
(1) Although different refinements of these approaches treat such 
relations, particularly paradigmatic relations, in different ways
<1 2) For fK»mple, one might expect thet function words in lacking ¡ny 
Applicability would be collocationally insignificant and therefore 
occur near an object-word only in a random manner. However for fairv 
in the period 1300-1500 of 74 occurrences the word of occurs —  
immediately before fair* 29 times and in a further iVven cases one 
word previous. This seems significantly more frequent than one would 
expect. For example, for the other three nouns which occur most 
frequently in the corpus m  this period, namely knieht(8 occurrences) 
men (8 occurrences) and aueen (7 occurrences) of~d5h~not occur in ’ 
either position. —
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analysis initially must include words which are not syntactically 
connected to the object-word.
Accordingly it was decided to apply an analysis to the whole 
Cotext for each occurrence using a more rigorous form of the 
analytical method employed in the preliminary analysis. There were 
two major methodological problems, however. In the first place it was 
necessary to determine in each case how much of the recorded text 
should be allowed as relevant Cotext. In general the clause in which 
the object-word occurred was recorded together with any adjacent 
material which seemed directly connected to the object-word. In the 
absence of any rigorous rules none could be applied but in general 
where sentences intuitively seemed connected those connections were 
allowed only where the kinds of textual cohesion described in 
Gutwinksi (1976) could be demonstrated. Generally this occurred where 
there was clear anaphoric relation to fairy. In doubtful cases the 
decision was made to exclude rather than include that material.
This yielded in some cases only a few words, in others one or two
paragraphs, but in the majority of cases only a single sentence or
clause. The total volume of material was therefore substantially in
excess of that examined in the first analysis. The preliminary
analysis examined a total of 2,064 tokens taken from 468 texts whereas
the main analysis examined 30,283 tokens taken from 487 texts. The
second methodological problem was a consequence of this, namely the
time that a thorough analysis of this volume of material requires.
*
Fortunately the duration of the analysis was substantially reduced by 
employing a computer. By the use of a package known as COCOA, which 
was specifically designed for the concording of texts^^» it was 1
(1) Berry-Roghe and Crawford ( 1973).
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possible to list all the allowed Cotexts and obtain concordances and 
word frequency counts both for the total corpus and for selected 
portions of it^^*
The procedure was as follows. Each text was numbered, the first 
four digits being its date of occurrence, the last two a numbering 
within that date to distinguish different texts of the same date. In 
addition each text was given coded labels for title, author, verse 
form and genre. Thus a typical label was <D 153001XT HUONBDXA 
BERNERXV PROSXW R0MAN>, signifying; "the text number one for 1530, 
Huon of Bourdeaux, by Lord Berners, in prose, a romance". The use of 
such labels enables the specification of date, title, author, mode 
(e.g. rhyme, alliterative verse, blank verse, prose) and genre or 
stylistic field (e.g. romance, narrative poem, witch trial, novel) in 
the recall of material from the file. Within each text each fragment 
of Cotext in which one token of the object-word could be found, (i.e. 
an occurrence) was also numbered although without reference to the 
actual line or page reference in the text. As far as possible the 
listing of the total corpus included as Appendix 1 follows the same 
numbering scheme, with the addition of page and line references.
As far as possible texts were recorded with the spelling, 
punctuation and orthography of the originals^* Only two 
orthographic details caused programming problems. It was not possible 
to reproduce capitalisation, and it was necessary to decide for each 
occurrence of a hyphenated compound whether it should be regarded as
(1) It would have been possible to conduct the preliminary analysis by 
means of this programme saving much analytical time, but I was unaware 
of that possiblity when I began the analysis.
(2) A notable exception was the Middle English characters J and > for' 
which no computer code exists. The symbols E and 1 respectivelyÎere 
substituted for these characters.
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one word or two. Only in those cases where the compound appeared to 
be idiosyncratic or unusual was it counted as two words. Diacritics 
such as umlaut and acute accent were also omitted for ease of 
transcription^ * ^ •
Once all texts had been recorded in a filestore it was possible 
to obtain concordances or word frequency counts for any date, period, 
author, text, mode or field. Thus once the analysis was completed for 
the full period it was possible to obtain samples for comparative 
purposes from any of these areas. It was also possible, for example, 
to compare the word frequencies for different authors, or different 
fields, or to compare different fields in the same period, or the same 
fields in different periods.
The major disadvantage of using a computer to list words is that
it can only list word-forms, not lexemes.’ It is, in principle,
possible to pre-edit texts so that homographs can be separated and
different forms of the same lexeme can be listed together, but for a
vocabulary of the size dealt with in this analysis such a task would
require so much work that the time saved by employing the computer in
the first place would almost be lost. It was considered more
practical firstly to list the frequency of forms and then discover,
through concording the relevant texts, if any form which occurred
frequently was in fact a combination of more than one lexeme. Thus
instead of pre-editing an entire text only those parts of the results
which were salient or anomalous were post-edited. From a theoretical
point of view this seemed preferable as pre-editing could be regarded
as prejudicial, whereas selective recombinations after a computer
(1) In principle they could have been recorded but it seemed 
inefficient to add characters to the alphabet recognised by the 
programmes for the sake of tokens forming .0003 of the corpus.
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analysis could, if necessary, be justified in each particular case. 
Thus only one lexeme, the object-word, was pre-edited. This was 
simply for methodological convenience as such pre-editing caused all 
forms of fairy to be listed together in the printout. As the 
specification of fairy as the object-word is itself a form of 
pre-editing, and the object-word is by definition not considered to 
contribute to its own contextual meaning, pre-editing of it creates no 
difficulties.
The material input into the computer for this analysis was not 
precisely the same corpus as used on the first analysis. In the 
latter, quotations from earlier texts had been included, as it was 
thought that the kind of quotation used in a period would indicate the 
area of meaning highlighted in that period, but it was decided that 
such indirect indications of meaning were difficult to demonstrate and 
that inclusion of quotations in the corpus would incorporate a bias. 
Consequently all texts which could be identified as quotations from 
earlier texts were excluded, together with entries such as titles and 
indexes, which had no definable Cotext, and also dictionaries and 
glossaries, on the grounds that these were metalinguistic statements 
rather than statements within the object-language.
Furthermore the first analysis showed that some periods were 
poorly represented in the data. Thus a second short investigation was 
begun, concentrating on those periods. In some cases this search 
produced no more occurrences and therefore supported the view that 
recorded occurrences in that period were in fact few (particularly in 
the sixty years 1420-1480). In other cases, particularly the second 
quarter of the eighteenth century, the search revealad more 
occurrences, mainly in poetry, and these were included in the second
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corpus. It was decided that as the preliminary analysis bad been less 
rigorous in some ways than the main one, had dealt with a slightly 
different corpus, and had revealed a few errors of analysis from the 
methodological point of view, it was to be regarded as a preliminary 
foray establishing the general areas to be examined in the subsequent 
analysis. As the procedure in the second analysis was more rigorous, 
more susceptible to control, and also admitted only a comparatively 
small degree of human error, and as furthermore it dealt with a much 
larger corpus which incorporated most of that used in the first 
analysis it was decided that the second analysis should be regarded as 
superior to the first and its results would be regarded as the core of 
the research, with the results of the other analyses to be regarded as 
supplementary and supporting.^
Thus the corpus of the second analysis consisted of 487 texts 
containing a total of 2019 occurrences giving a total word volume of 
30,282 tokens, which the computer analysed as containing a vocabulary 
of 6,384 different forms. Thus the average occurrence of a form in the 
corpus was approximately five times (4.7436). One could say therefore 
that any word which occurred five or more tines in the corpus 
possessed a significant frequency. Of course any frequency figure 
could be used arbitrarily to define significant here. It is necessary
to use some criterion for exclusion in such a large corpus and that of
( 2 )being more frequent than average seemed most suitable.
(1) The list of texts and occurrences used in this study (ADnendix 1) 
records against each entry those used in either or both of the 
analyses. All subsequent partial analyses were conducted within the 
corpus used for the m a m  analysis. See the introduction to Annendix I 
(2> At a later staSe e iurtber exclusion „as appiiel See b e i o T p ^ i
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It must be remembered however that this is a vocabulary of 
word forms and consequently different forms of the same lexeme were 
listed initially as different words. For example <queen>, <queene>, 
<qveen> and <quene> were all listed separately. Thus it was necessary 
to group together all forms which counted as the same lexeme before 
analysis could be continued. Forms which reflected only the markings 
of accidence, such as tense, plurality etc., or difference of spelling 
were gathered together as one lexeme. As the list of these lexemic 
groups exceeds seventy pages it could not be included here. An 
example of the type of variation encountered is:
Lexeme DANCE Recorded token No. of occurrences
dancd 3
dance 50
danced 7
dances 6
dancing 20
danct 2
dancynge 1
danse 1
dauncd 2
daunce 7
daunced 3
daunces 1
dauncing 3
daunst 2
Total - 108
Table 3.4.a
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Excluding therefore all lexemes occurring less than five times, the 
corpus was reduced from 6,384 forms to 742 lexemes, those accounting 
for 22,800 occurrences, i.e. 75.29% of the corpus. The core of the 
analysis is thus concerned with roughly three-quarters of the total 
word volume. Although some of the lexemes in the remaining quarter 
seem to be related to others occurring more frequently, it was deemed 
methodologically preferable in view of aim (B) to ignore all lexemes 
in that quarter, in view of the fact that the recognition of similar 
vague associations in the preliminary analysis had led to rather loose 
extensional categories (TABLE 3.3.c). However such associations were 
noted in the resultant discussion at any relevant point.
As the impulse behind the main analysis was to provide a more 
extensive and more rigorous examination of the corpus than that- in the 
preliminary one, it was felt that stricter definitions of semantic 
categories should be applied in this case in order to test the 
validity of the more intuitive categories suggested in the initial 
analysis. Athough for the reasons outlined in Chapter 2 and section
3.3, intuitive categories are easier to produce and to work with, 
because they depend on the natural functioning of ambiguity in the 
object language; although formal semantic definitions would 
necessarily exclude several lexemes which intuition would wish to 
include; although it seemed likely that the application of different 
criteria would produce a different hierarchy of categories (at least 
in terms of relative quantities), it was felt that part of the purpose 
of this work was to suggest and attempt to establish such categories 
and that if they could be established then they could provide the 
basis for future less formal classification, but that if the formal
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definitions proved inadequate, the informal categories would still be 
available to facilitate analysis. Thus each of the semantic 
categories proposed for grouping the lexemes generated by this 
analysis is stated in terms of a formal definition, for which the 
headword should be regarded as only a citation form, not as a summary 
of the meaning involved. Initially all function words were excluded 
from this semantic classification. Although several function words 
were clearly of importance in terms of their frequency of occurrence 
by definition they possess no Denotation or Reference being merely 
syntactic markers. Consequently they cannot be grouped according to a 
classification of lexemic semantics (the primary interest of this 
study), although an examination of syntactic semantics would 
necessitate their inclusion. Exclusion of function words left a total 
of 628 lexemes, together accounting for 33.42 of the total word volume 
of the corpus. It can be seen here that function words form a 
substantial proportion of the corpus, approximately 42% (12,765 
tokens). A large portion of the corpus is thus concerned with purely 
syntactic information. In general syntactic semantics can be ignored 
in discussing the lexemic semantics of a particular language, thus 
from the point of view of this work 42% of the corpus is irrelevant. 
Subtracting this from the total corpus leaves what may be called a 
semantic corpus of 17,518 occurrences. Thus the lexemes occurring 
five or more times account for 57.28% of the semantic corpus.
Having obtained a list of the most important lexemes at least 
three alternative procedures were possible. Firstly the list of 
lexemes could simply be regarded as a description of the meaning of 
the object-word, on the principle that those lexemes most freqently 
used were most significant semantically and thus most likely to be
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distinctive in description of phenomena, i.e. in the ascription of the 
meaning "fairy" to a phenomenon, or most significant in concrete 
situations. That is to say, the set of all important lexemes is 
treated as one Cluster from which any selection of members may be 
made, but those with the highest frequency are most likely to be 
selected.
This would thus be a parallel description to that derived from 
the preliminary analysis save that it was taken one stage further and 
an attempt was made to reduce the lexemes to semantic components in 
order to derive the single Cluster from a limited number of semantic 
elements (which would thus possess both higher frequencies and a 
greater range of frequencies) rather than a larger number of lexemes. 
Thus the second possible alternatve was to attempt to group the 
lexemes in terms of formal semantic similarities.
As it seemed intuitively clear that such similarities did exist, 
this second alternative of semantic classification was adopted. It 
was intended that the remaining lexemes should be grouped in a manner 
which used more formal criteria than the looser grouping employed in 
the preliminary analysis. Two methods of grouping were used, one 
based on synonymy and one based on entailment. Synonymy was defined 
formally by means of test sentences such as:
A(n) x is a(n) y and a(n) y is a(n) x.
or:
To x is to y and y is to x.
An example of such a test is:
A ring is a circle and a circle is a ring.
Any apparent synonyms not conforming to this test were excluded.
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Entailment was defined formally by means of such test sentences as:
A(n) x is a(n) y 
To x is to y.
An example of this test is: A king is a monarch.
Of course king and monarch are not synonymous for the reverse test 
would not apply: a monarch is not necessarily a king.
At this stage no lexemes were included in entailment groups which 
could be included in synonymous groups, nor were synonymous groups 
subsumed in larger entailments. This procedure gave 351 groups, a 
total which from a methodological point of view was too large for 
adequate examination. Therefore an arbitrary bar was imposed under 
which any group containing ten or fewer occurrences was regarded as 
insignificant. This gave 181 groups, which together account for 
30.55% of the total corpus, that is 52.8% of the semantic corpus.
It must be observed therefore that within this corpus there 
exists a great deal of unsystematic, idiosyncratic, perhaps Emotive, 
variation around the notion "fairy", for across the corpus it is 
associated with at least 2,600 different lexemes, yet over half the 
'meaning' of the corpus is encoded in only 483 of those lexemes. Thus 
the central meaning of fairy can be regarded as inhering in 483 
lexemes, yet it collocates with a large number of peripheral meanings.
It should be noted, in passing, that the various stages of 
exclusion described above not only serve to pare the corpus down to a 
central significant core, but also to remove any extraneous material 
which might have resulted from occasional liberal decisions concerning 
Cotext, or lexemes included in error (e.g through misspelling in the 
original text). Any particular mistake would need to have been
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repeated at least ten times for it to have a significant effect on the 
analysis. Furthermore the operation of these successive exclusions 
results in a much more solid data base than that produced by the 
initial analysis. If the same rigour had been applied in that 
analysis, twenty-one of its forty-five semantic categories would have 
been excluded.
Where entailment Groups or Groups of synonymous lexemes were 
found one member of the Group was selected as headword. The resulting 
list of Groups thus contained three kinds of Group, namely synonyms, 
entailments and single lexemes. These Groups treated as semantic 
categories thus differ from those established in the preliminary 
analysis in being intensionally rather than extensionally defined.
All the members of a lexemic Group have the property "token of the 
lexeme x". All the members of a synonymous Group have the property 
"meaning the same as other members of the Group". All the members of 
an entailment Group have the property "entailing the element y". In 
each case therefore the headwords can be regarded as of more value 
than the generally arbitrary labels employed for the Groups in the 
initial analysis, in that they are citation forms for a lexeme, a 
meaning with which all members of the name Group are synonymous, or a 
meaning which all members of the name Group contain. Generalisations 
based on these headwords therefore have firmer foundation than those 
in the previous analysis.
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The Groups are listed in Table 3.4.e, being marked as L, S and E 
respectively. From a formal point of view entailments are a higher 
level of organisation than synonyms, for two synonyms contain 
identical (or near identical) semantic elements (although any two 
synonyms will usually differ in Associative meaning) but any lexeme 
entailed by any other is semantically subsumed in that lexeme, i.e. it 
contains fewer semantic elements, its meaning is less specific. Thus, 
if a lexeme entailed by another is regarded as superordinate, the 
interrelationships can be expressed graphically as follows:
Entailment
Synonyms
Lexemes
HOUSE
house
Diagram 3.4.b
Conversely certain synonymous Groups can themselves be collected 
together as entailed by one lexeme.
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An example from the corpus is:
SUPERORDINATE: HUMAN
SYNONYM:
LEXEME: kiu£ ^uccu wuucu. son daughter child
Diagram 3.4.c
Consequently the synonymous Groups should be regarded as 'lexemic' but 
the superordinate Groups as 'semantic'. It was finally possible to 
draw up a full hierarchy of lexemes, synonyms and entailments which 
indicated the several different levels of encoding of the semantic 
elements of fairy. Thus, to reverse the description, one could write 
a list of major categories, these being entailed Groups, realised as a 
list of minor categories (either synonymous or lexemic), of which the 
synonymous Groups are in turn realised as lexemes, and the lexemes as 
particular formal types, tokens of which are recorded in the corpus.
An example of this arrangement is given in diagram 3.4.d. The 
categories at the highest level (i.e. those represented here as 
superordinate), are regarded as primary.
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DIAGRAM 3.4.d. An Example of the Semantic Organisation of the Corpus.
Superordinate DANCE HUMAN
Synonym DANCE MONARCH CHILD
dance kin^queen^onarch sorT'daughter childLexeme
RING
RING
ring circle
Types dance king queen monarch 
daunce kyng quene 
dancing qvene
/son daughter child ring circle 
sons dochtir children circling
133
Some of these primary categories are realised in the corpus in 
different ways, i.e. by different lexemes or different synonymous 
Groups, and these in turn are realised by different printed forms.
The primary categories are regarded as the main topics for discussion 
in the discursive portion of this work, subdivided according to the 
Groups and lexemes they are realised by. They are arranged in order 
of frequency in Appendix 2 which thus gives a statistical statement of 
the relative importance of the semantic categories in the corpus.
This can be regarded as a description of the meaning of fairy, and it 
provides a tabulated description which can be expressed as a 
percentage of the total corpus of lexemes and therefore can be used 
for comparative definition for any other corpus of whatever size which 
is analysed by the above method.
The final stage of this procedure was the drawing of a complete
hierarchical tree relating all three types of Group, on the assumption
that the hierarchical scheme generated by the preliminary analysis
(Table 3.3.n) was substantially valid. The result was Diagram
3.6.b^ As can be seen, the more rigorous method of the second
analysis results in a somewhat more complex hierarchy. However it
would seem that certain categories are frequently realised, some by a
few and some by many lexemes. It was felt that this hierarchy
summarised the meaning of fairy in the corpus and therefore that it
described the meaning of the object-word for the full period,
1320-1829. Essentially it schematises the Cluster which can be
regarded as the 'definition' of fairy for the period. The hierarchy
provides a conceptual typification which may be realised in whole or
part by any of the lexemes recorded within it, but which emphasises
(1) This diagram is given on pages 152a to 152f and is described in 
section 3.6.
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certain aspects more than others, i.e. realises some of the potential 
lexemes and semantic categories more frequently than others. These 
are indicated by the relative frequencies of co-occurrence in the 
corpus.
Such an account does not necessarily describe Emotive meaning as 
this is personal, idiosyncratic and perhaps is largely unrealised 
lexemically and thus unsystematic, although Emotive meaning may be 
subsumed in the description^. Nor does it necessarily describe the 
knowledge or usage of any actual individual, rather it shows the 
conceptual framework within which an individual would work and the 
semantic resources upon which he/she would draw in using the 
object-word. Nor does it account for why these particular lexemes or 
Groups should be so associated or used with these relative 
frequencies. The discursive bulk of this work is intended to examine 
this framework with these omissions in view, in order to explore 
possible reasons for such associations and for the frequency of 
occurrence of particular elements.
The third alternative approach is not based on this one large 
Cluster but on the notion of typification. Under the assumption that 
uses of fairy will depend on a limited number of typical experiences 
(i.e. certain Clusters, certain lexemic combinations are favoured 
because Referring situations are typified) an attempt may be made to 
discover the most frequent typification(s). This can be done using 
the techniques of cluster analysis.
Although there would seem to be no necessary similarity between 
the philosophical notion of the cluster as presented by Gasking and
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others^ a”nd the statistical method given the same name as presented
/ o \for example, by .Everitt'^ » the theory and the method do in fact 
marry well providing it is accepted that the meaning of an object-word 
can be regarded as inhering in the kind of words in the environment of 
which it typically occurs. Philosophically the concept of the cluster 
states that the meaning of at least some words lies in the range of 
selections actually made from a set of possible selections. To this I 
have added the notion that certain selections though not obligatory 
will be preferred (i.e. be found to occur more frequently in actual 
usage). The statistical procedure of cluster analysis seeks to group 
elements together according to their similarity in terms of a number 
of variables, i.e. whilst philosophy says that a cluster is a 
typification made up of a number of lexemes (or their Denotata, 
Referents etc.) statistics says that a cluster is a typification made 
up of number of variables. The semantic analyst recognises that the 
variables in semantic clusters are lexemes (or the items they present 
or represent). Thus descriptions can be matched according to their 
variables by cluster analysis, and attempts can be made to discover 
those clusters which are most significant, i.e. most frequently used.
An attempt was therefore made to discover if such typifications 
existed. Unfortunately certain purely physical limits on the 
capabilities of the COCOA program prevented any throrough 
investigation of this nature. Therefore the typifications discussed 
in subsequent sections are not statistically derived. They were 
initially suggested either by intuitive recognition or by descriptions
( 1 ) Gasking ( 1960). 
(2) Everitt (1974).
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in background texts and were subsequently confirmed or refuted by 
examination of the corpus. Although this method potentially would be 
most useful in this work it has thus not been systematically applied 
and the central statistical descriptions are those of the frequency 
lists (Table 3.3.h and Appendix 2) and the hierarchical trees 
(Diagram 3.3.n and Diagram 3.6.b).
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3.5 Partial Analyses
The third relationship proposed in 3.1 as semantically neutral 
was that of phonemic/graphemic similarity. As the material for this 
analysis is a subset of the corpus established for the second 
analysis, it would not of itself yield any information not already 
obtained by that analysis. However it was thought that Stylistic 
meaning may well be encoded in certain of the lexemic choices made in 
the corpus, particularly in those texts of a literary nature, which 
formed a high proportion of the total number of texts. It was felt, 
for example, that the frequency of collocation of certain lexemes 
might be influenced by such features as alliteration or rhyme.
Accordingly all forms which alliterated with fairy were recorded, 
as were all forms which might be taken to rhyme. Although the 
procedure for the former selection was not difficult, it being 
necessary only to list forms commencing with the graphemes <f> and 
<ph>, rhyme is somewhat more difficult to recover. In particular the 
actual pronunciation represented by any grapheme or group of graphemes 
can seldom be discovered. Therefore rhyme must be understood to mean 
"sight rhyme" (graphemic identity) although the actual process of 
reading may involve psychological sound-rhyme in addition to or 
instead of sight rhyme.
Thus <fairy> was analysed into two parts <f>, and <airy>^ and 
tokens of other lexemes were recovered which possessed one of these 
graphemic patterns, and the other forms recorded were treated 
similarly. The results of these additional analyses are incorporated 
into the relevant sections of the discussion, notably 6.2.3.).
TT) This accords with the formal account of rhyme, alliteration and 
other phcnic/graphic parallellisms given by Leech (1969) pp. 89-90.
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3* 6 Introduction to Analyses
Clearly there can be little in analytical methodology per se 
which takes explicit account of the considerations outlined in Chapter 
1, other than in respect of aims (A) and (B). Aim (A), exhaustiveness, 
is met by the use of overlapping analytical procedures, by applying 
both formal and intuitive methods, and by attempting to gather as 
large and as comprehensive a corpus as possible. Aim (B), rigour, is 
met by stating and following clear rules of analysis at every stage in 
the main analysis, by treating this analysis as that central to the 
study, and by excluding occurrences low in frequency. As has been 
noted however the two aims are in conflict. For example the exclusion 
of some Cotext whose direct attachment to fairy could not be formally 
stated yet was intuitively recognised meets (B) but reduces (A). One 
observation that can be made at this stage is thus that increasing the 
degree of rigour in the analysis to such an extent that any statements 
made or semantic descriptions offered could .be .regarded as 
unquestionable would so reduce the number and kind o’f observations 
that could be made that they would serve no useful purpose at all.
This point will become clearer in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, where it will 
be repeatedly shown that formal descriptions of a kind are often 
possible, but are equally often inadequate.
Conversely, however, aim (B) is not shown to be pointless. It 
leads to greater precision, to objective grounding in at least some 
areas for the statements that can be made, to the discovery of crucial 
elements, areas and patterns, to the exposing of information which may 
previously be known (intuitively as part of our knowledge of the
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language) but never articulated, and to establishing a framework 
against which intuition can be tested and upon which modifications can 
rest their justification. These points will all re-emerge in greater 
detail in subsequent chapters.
Regarding the different levels of specificity outlined in Chapter 
1, as previously stated the method was directed entirely to level (3). 
Levels (1) and (2) are implied therefore insofar as fairy encodes 
those levels, and level (4) is subsumed (and also disguised) by 
providing one of the sets of data constituting the corpus. The two 
general questions posed together with the five more specific ones 
affected the analysis insofar as they determined the focus of the 
theory in Chapter 2 and also seemed to dictate the Cotextual approach 
to meaning, both of which established parameters within which the 
analysis was conducted. However no particular analysis or section of 
an analysis was directed towards a particular question, with the 
exception of those sketched in 3.5 which are largely oriented towards 
Associative, specifically Stylistic, meaning. It is in Chapters 5, 6 
and 7 that the results of the analysis are processed with regard to 
these questions.
It is not claimed here that either the theory or its resultant 
analysis would be sufficient for a full account of the semantics of 
any language, although it may be the case that an elaboration of a 
Cluster theory of meaning would be sufficient to account for or 
describe the semantic properties of all lexical items in a given 
language. Application of theory and method to supernatural names does 
not depend on such comprehensiveness.
In essence the analyses employed generate lexemic lists according 
to different principles. These lists can be approached in different
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ways. The most liberal interpretation is to accept the notion of a 
vague concept^ which is recognised intuitively but is impossible to 
define intensionally and can only be defined by such extensional lists 
of all such lexemes which are "to do with" that concept. Thus the 
semantic Groups of both major analyses can be regarded as extensional 
definitions of such vague concepts. A more demanding view is that 
specification of the meaning of fairy cannot depend on Groups which 
are themselves unclear in specification and that we should therefore 
regard extensional Groups as imprecise specifications of semantic 
areas of which intensional Groups are the only useful descriptions. 
This view would discount the Groups provided by the preliminary 
analysis.
The Groups themselves can be regarded in at least three ways. 
Firstly they can be regarded as artificial constructions, or 
abstractions, made by a linguist as aspects of his total construction, 
which he calls the langue. As such they can be regarded as, to some 
extent at least, fictional rather than real, incorporating theoretical 
decisions and therefore a degree of explanation rather than being 
purely descriptive. Or they can be regarded as some of the many 
possible subsets of the total set of lexemes which are essentially 
descriptive (i.e. no more than lists). Under this interpretation 
explanation occurs with just those subsets which are designated, but 
it is intuitive explanation, based on a recognition by the analyst of 
those prominent semantic features in the corpus and which he uses as 
selection principles. This lacks rigour to the extent that its 
justification depends on accounts of processes which cannot be 
offered, i.e. the neurological activity of the analysts, and his
(1) See Chapter 2; Wittgenstein (1972) paragraphs 76-77.
understanding of the meanings of other words, but perfectly rigorous 
under the assumption of ordinary language as metalanguage^- Both 
these views do not look beyond language, but a third view is possible, 
namely that some of the Groups at least are applicable to the real 
world, i.e. they are definite descriptions, they specify recognisable 
phenomena^^- (A fourth view is also possible, namely that these 
lists are arbitrary concatenations and possess no semantic 
significance. There is no adequate refutation of this view save the 
commonsense or intuitive one which says such lists are relevant in 
some sense. Chapter 2, consists in elaboration and refinement of this 
common sense opinion).
One can thus read these lists (definitions) as if prefaced with 
one of three statements! ( 1) this is a semantic category inherent in 
the corpus under the above interpretation of semantic theory; (2) this 
is a postulated semantic category which seems to the analyst to be of 
importance, semantic being used pretheoretically; (3) this is a 
description of a phenomenon (or kind of, or Class of, phenomena) which 
prompts assent to, or may induce use of, the lexeme fairy. If one 
considers the analyst now to be a native reader/hearer, these three 
attitudes can be equated with the three major aspects of meaning 
outlined in Chapter 2, the first seeing the lists as expressive of 
Sense relations, inherent in the system of the langue, the second as 
Associative, dependent on participants' attitudes, and the third as 
Applicability, related to actual Entities. Discussion in subsequent 
chapters therefore takes into account all three points of view, 
examining the results not only as data about langue but also about
(1) See above, p.58.
(2) See section 2.3.1 on Applicability. Also Russell (1956).
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belief systems and phenomena. This is consequent on the theory 
established in Chapter 2, and on the necessary framework of 
considering supernatural names as the province of several overlapping 
disciplines.
The most interesting aspect of the data resulting from the two 
major analyses is the fact that they can be organised hierarchically 
into sets of relations which correspond remarkably with one set of 
formal categories of sentence analysis proposed by systemic grammar^.
It must be emphasised that the analyses outlined above were 
conducted independently of any particular syntactic analysis. The 
hierarchy schematised in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 is the result of (a) 
isolating semantic categories which occur most frequently in the two 
corpora, and (b) ordering those categories according to the criteria 
specified in the relevant sections.
The suggestion is, therefore, that there is a linguistic formula 
(which'may in fact be representative of a fixed psychological 
imperative) used to describe supernatural phenomena and that either 
the formula is adequate for any descriptive/expressive corpus (in 
which case accounts of the supernatural cannot be said to differ in 
form from any other descriptive accounts, consequently the status of a 
supernatural name cannot differ from that of any other name in this 
respect) or that the formula is specific to supernatural phenomena (in 
which case accounts of the supernatural may be a subset of one class 
of descriptive accounts, or may be a unique subset of descriptions, 
with its own defining features). What follows is intended as 
applicable primarily to level (3). However it seems that Groups with 
a high degree of generality apply also to levels (1) and (2).
(1) Berry (1975).
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Groups such as TIME, PLACE or BEING would seem to apply to most uses 
of supernatural names and many cases of fictional reference.
In relation to the systemic analysis of sentences it should be 
noted that fairy can take any of the roles of actor, action, goal or 
situation so that if the typical description is conceived of as 
possessing these four roles, it would be impossible to predict which 
aspects of the description or of the phenomena described, would be 
regarded as supernatural. It may be the case that some supernatural 
names are restricted to a particular role (e.g. the bogeyman almost 
invariably takes the role of actor) however it seems that many are not 
so restricted (e.g. ghost, spirit, god). Those names which do seem to 
be role-restricted also, unsurprisingly, seem to be restricted in 
other semantic features, e.g. a supernatural name restricted to the 
role of actor will almost certainly encode BEING.
In many cases it seems easier to assign roles to individual 
tokens of fairy than to assign syntactic categories. There is no 
clear correspondence between the syntactic category it realises and 
the role it fills, other than the tendency typical of English 
sentences for nouns to take the roles of actor or goal and modifiers 
the situational roles. For example in those cases where we might wish 
to translate fairy as "fairyland" or "enchanted place" it is a nominal 
in the role of situation; in a modification such as the fairy queen it 
may be taking the role of actor, although syntactically it would 
probably be called an adjective. Indeed there are some cases in which 
fairy has no clear syntactic funtion yet indisputably fills the
situational role.
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Nevertheless, if one ignores the nonce forms such as fairyism and 
faerily ^^one would still be inclined to say that fairy occurs 
typically with one of two syntactic functions, namely noun and 
adjective. Yet examination of actual use in particular contexts 
exposes a number of problematic uses. In some it is difficult to 
decide which of the two categories the token falls into, in others it 
seems it should fall into both simultaneously. If there were a large 
number of cases it would suggest that the distinction between noun and 
adjective is not one that can be made precise for fairy, and may in 
fact be misleading in some cases.
One must ask, for example, what such a phrase as the fairy king 
is actually expressing. Probably the most obvious analysis would be: 
Determiner + Adjective + Noun. Substituting P for Adjective and N for 
Noun produces the analysis of this phrase included in the initial 
analysis. Such an analysis puts forward the hypothesis that the topic 
of the utterance is the king and the comment is fairy. It presumes 
that the Entity being talked about is a "king", and that the quality 
attributed to him is that he is "fairy". This analysis seems the most 
natural because we know king is a noun and cannot be (or is not) used 
attributively.
Consider however a passage which is talking of fairies in 
general, perhaps for several paragraphs or pages, during which only 
one mention is made of a king e.g. Fairies do not follow laws or obey 
rules but they do follow the fairy king. Here the topic is not the 
king, it is the race of fairies. Thus one might prefer an analysis 
which treated fairy as the 'genitive* form of a plural, or a
(!) See corpus items numbers 1763/03/001; 1796/01/001,002; 1813/01/003 
and 1819/04/001; 1819/07/002. ’
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collective noun. For if we were to rewrite it to bring out the 
meaning more clearly in this second context it would probably seem 
more accurate to rewrite the fairy king as the king of the fairies or 
the king of the fairy race rather than the king with fairy properties, 
or the king with the property of fairyness. Nor does the rewriting 
the king with the property 'that he is a fairy' seem to be adequate, 
for the implication of the sentence would seem to be that there is 
only one king who fits the description, whereas many kings may be 
fairies. The implications of the antithesis of but and the meaning of 
follow both suggest that this one king is a particular king, and his 
particularity lies in the fact that he is king of the fairies who are 
the topic of the sentence (and the paragraph).
A further possible phrase could be the king fairy. This does not
occur in the corpus. However it illustrates the point that king may
also be used 'attributively', that is if this example follows a rule
of English which (generally) places a modifying adjective before the
noun it modifies. Of course there is also an archaic phrasal form
under which king in this expression would be read as a noun. The
central point is that the relation of name and attribute may be by no
means as clear as it first seems even in such apparently
straightforward cases as this. The actual attributive relation which
is understood in any particular context may depend to a large extent
on factors other than simple syntactic relationships^1^  In actual
usage fairy may well be ambiguous in terms of 'case', plurality, or*
syntactic ’function depending on the focus of the Cotext. Nor is it 
necessary to explicate or disambiguate such usage in most cases, as
(I) This becomes even more problematic in a corpus such as this which 
contains examples over a large diachronic span.
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the occurrence is normally perfectly well understood. It would be 
possible to regard one part of the meaningfulness and/or usefulness of 
fair£, and perhaps other supernatural names as this very ambiguity.
If it was always clear that a particular thing or a particular 
property was being mentioned, then straightforward objective criteria 
could be applied for the testing of the utterance and the application 
of truth conditions0 If however a certain degree of ambiguity is 
possible, tolerated or even necessary to the word's meaning, no such 
criteria could be workable, and there is room for a great deal of 
expressiveness (Associative meaning)0  ^ in the utterance both for the 
speaker in using the word and the bearer in interpreting it. '
Any subjective aspect of the entity under discussion can be 
suggested (but not communicated)0  ^ so that questions of belief and 
opinion can be suspended for the duration of the utterance. If fairy 
has both a distinct noun-meaning and a distinct adjective-meaning, it 
can be counted as "two words" and therefore be used in deviant ways 
syntactically. If it is only one word worth two aspects of 
meaningfulness, functioning in the language as necessarily ambiguous, 
no such deviance can exist.
This ambiguity can be captured by regarding 'the Entity named 
fairy.' as an Item of experience rather than an Object even in its 
nominal uses. The essential naming quality of a word such as fairy is 
that it characterises a portion of experience in such a way that
(1) In the manner favoured by Ayer. See Chapters l and 2—  ----------
(2) It will be remembered that this is precisely the function fairy 
seems to be serving m  the corpus, as indicated by the volume of 
infrequently collocating lexemes. volume or
(3) I mean by this that it is not possible to communicate my 
subjective experience to you, though it is possible for me to suggest 
that I have such an experience and to call up a corollary in you
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questions about the nature of that experience (such as its 
objectivity or substantiality) and questions concerning whether the 
referent is Rem or Item can be ignored. If the word could not be 
used with such systematic ambiguity it would lose much of its 
usefulness in the language. It is important to remember in the 
remainder of this study that syntactic vagueness does not necessarily 
entail semantic vagueness, for syntactic categories are linguistic 
abstractions and may therefore falsify any kind of experience which is 
felt to be a cline. If fairy were the name of an experiential cline 
rather than of a distinct Object or quality, syntactic categories 
would necessarily falsify its use in the language by cutting the cline 
into sections (unless, of course, one takes the view that syntactic 
relations are purely formal and have no ontological implications).
Thus the systemic analysis of a sentence into roles would seem 
the most useful for capturing the full function of this object word, 
for to assign it the role of situation in any particular text allows 
it to function in terms of the remainder of the text whilst permitting 
its full ambiguity. Thus at the level of roles an expression consists 
of an actor, action and goal which occur in an environment 
(situation), and it is not necessary to specify precisely how the 
situation affects actor, action or goal although it is within the 
capacities of language to narrow that specification. Possibly one 
means by which a speaker may narrow that specification is by 
clarifying the syntactic function of a word in terms of the 
distinction between noun and adjective (or nominal and modifier), i.e. 
for many uses the precise relation of those tokens filling the 
situational role to other tokens in the utterance need not be 
specified for the meaning of the utterance to be understood (or at
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least for sufficient information to be communicated), but in those 
cases where the meaning or intention of the utterance depends on a 
clear understanding of the relation between situation .and actor, 
action or goal, one means of achieving that clarity is by indicating 
whether the situational token is a noun or an adjective.
Specificity and ambiguity would thus be complementary poles of 
language use, and one could regard specificity as related to rational 
precision in Denotation and Reference, and ambiguity as related to 
Associative connotation. Thus one means of estimating the relative 
strength of the Denotative and Associative aspects of the meaning of 
fairy might be in terms of this dichotomy. The more ambiguous the * 
function of the object word within an expression, the more connotative 
its semantic component. However it would seem impossible to quantify, 
or even to give a precise statement of this difference.
The appropriateness of the systemic analysis of sentences into 
roles was first suggested by the hierarchical arrangement of semantic 
Groups resulting from the initial analysis, as summarised in Table
3.3.n. Although built of intuition rather than formal argument this 
seemed to suggest that the 'highest' semantic categories encoded in 
descriptions of the supernatural were similar to sentence roles. 
Consequently the results of the major analysis were structured in 
terms of the systemic model. The remainder of this work is concerned 
with interpreting the results of the two analyses in terms of the 
three points of view outlined at the beginning of this chapter, i.e. 
examining those lexemes and semantic groups which occurred most 
frequently in terms of their interconnections, their relations to 
belief systems and their possible relations to phenomena, within the 
systemic model of roles in sentences.
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The basic form of the hierarchy used as the primary structure in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 is shown in Diagram 3.6.a.
DIAGRAM 3.6.a
ROLE
v
encoded in 
GROUPS 
entailed by
LEXEMES *------■— synonymous with---- ►LEXEMES
realised as realised as
type/tokeaCs) type/ t o L ( s >
The diagrams which conclude this chapter are of this form. 
Although it can be regarded as a description of the collocational 
meaning such that one can treat branches of the hierarchy as schema of 
the actual knowledge of users, and one can trace such branches as 
•models of the processing of users in specifying fairy, both as 
possessing semantic features in an environment which determines use of 
fair* as a Cluster definition and as creative typifications used in 
creating an appropriate fiction to be called fairy, it cannot be 
interpreted in precise terms as an exact model of any of these. The
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fact that it can yield satisfying descriptions of all these aspects of 
use of fairy indicates that to a large extent it is an accurate and 
useful model. For example one can draw up a set of Chomskyan rewrite 
rules such that "supernatural" can be rewritten at different levels of 
specificity or with different degrees of detail all of which encode 
"fairy". This then would be a 'generative model'. It is a descriptive 
model of a particular corpus defined as precisely as seems possible.
It is not, therefore, an absolute description of the object word, as 
it incorporates variations inherent in the corpus which can only be 
captured by rules unique to each particular case. These include 
several relations between Groups which are not evident in the 
hierarchy as such but nevertheless should be noted as Sense relations; 
the introduction of a small miscellaneous category; the fact that in 
some cases branches of the hierarchy represent exclusive, incompatible 
choices but in others both choices may be realised in the same Cotext; 
the fact that 'height' in the hierarchy does not necessarily represent 
greater frequency, higher priority or significance of choice, although 
it may do in many cases.
These problems are discussed in subsequent chapters as 
consequences of both the data and the approach. It must be remembered 
throughout therefore that this is a model pragmatically determined, 
arranged as a satisfactory compromise to provide a guide to most, but 
not all, of the major relations which hold between semantic elements 
in the corpus. It has the merits of providing a fixed frame within 
which to work and which can be duplicated, tested and used as an 
objective comparison with other similar corpora, and of indicating 
those patterns which are most prominent in determining the use of 
fairy. But, as will become clear as this study progresses, its
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inadequacy lies to a great extent in the high degree of formalisation 
it possesses, for whilst it may indicate prominent patterns it does 
not explain them and, more importantly, it may disguise equally 
important patterns which obtain and which may be crucial in that 
explanation.
The following chapters thus have two complementary roles. Firstly 
they attempt to explicate the results of the analyses, particularly 
with respect to the hierarchical models produced, and secondly they 
aim to explain those models with regard to the five aspects of lexical 
meaning described in Chapter 2, modifying the models if appropriate, 
going beyond them where necessary. Their overall aim is thus to 
provide a complete model of the semantics of fairy in the corpus which 
both explains and incorporates the results of the analyses, but to do 
so with the wider implications of levels (1) and (2) in mind.
Chapter 4 is however something of an anomaly. It exists as a 
hiatus, a pause between the general discussion which has taken us to 
this point, and the specifics of the actual semantics of fairy in 
particular texts. It aims to describe the object word as fully as 
possible and to indicate the possible background for its subsequent 
development, by suggesting possible influences and origins prior to 
its use in Middle English. Such a discussion seems necessary in view 
of the strong diachronic element in this study but more particularly 
because several of the key areas of later meaning seem to be derived 
from or related to earlier supernatural names. Indeed if we are to 
explain much of subsequent use, especially in oral traditions, 
recourse to earlier material seems necessary, particularly with regard
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to the word's overarching notion of "fatedness"^ • In addition one 
might suppose that the word today has a clear, unambiguous and exact 
meaning such that everyone would recognise and assent to a single 
definition^- This may well be the case, but it seems not to have 
been so for the period under discussion here. It is thus necessary to 
state as strongly as possible that early supernatural names were 
imprecise (at least as far as can be determined from the available 
evidence), with numerous interrelations and correspondences. Such 
imprecision probably derives from a high degree of Emotive meaning in 
earlier use where belief in the supernatural was more widespread than 
at present. Today, one could argue,fairy seems to be of narrow and 
fixed Denotation, highly restricted Stylistically, with little Emotive 
meaning, and only fictional Reference.
(]) Discussed below p.171-7,
(2) The evidence for this is based on conversation and a number of 
small oral surveys conducted amongst children, students and adults. 
The central question in both conversation and survey was "How would 
you describe a fairy?" and the responses obtained were remarkably 
similar. A fairy is small, female, winged, good, pretty and delicate 
creature whom no-one believes in. The total number of informants was 
forty four, so the evidence is not conclusive, but I have encountered 
no counter examples.
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Table 3.6.b Hierarchical Table Derived from Analysis Two
Note: Group names in square brackets are invented link terms rather 
than derived by the procedures described in Chapter 3»
Cotext
i---------------- r ~
1 2 
[ACTOR/GOAL] [ACTION]
1
3
[SITUATION]
1
[ACTOR/GOAL] 12
11
[NAME]
12 13
BEING THING
111 112 121 
PROPER NOUN SUPERNATURAL NAME [GROUP]
1211 1212 1213 1214
BAND TRAIN PEOPLE NATION
122
[INDIVIDUAL]
1222 
WOMAN 
__I
123
BODY
131 132
RING WAND
12211 12212 12213 12214 12215
[NOBLE] SHEPHERD FRIEND PARENT CHILD
122111 -122112 122113 122114 
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2
[ACTION]
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[GENERIC CHANGE [ASSISTANCE] MOVE [BIOLOGICAL 
VERBS] PROCESS]
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BE
212
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2
DO
214
GET
215
HAVE
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[APPEARING] ENCHANT DECEIVE
2211 2212
APPEAR DISAPPEAR
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[HINDER]
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[HELP]
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SEEK FIND LEAD SERVE GUARD
23231 23232 23241
GUIDE FOLLOW ATTEND
152b
24
MOVE 24
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2452 2453 2454
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1
251
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BLESS SAY
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SING
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SEE
25152
HEAR
2521 2522 2523
LOVE PLEASE BELIEVE
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SHOW 25231 25232 25233 
THINK KNOW IMAGINE
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SITUATION
3
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LOCATION
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SPATIAL
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TEMPORAL
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POSITION PLACE TIME [EVENT]
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TIME
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____U -
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311211 311212 311213 311214 31125
EARTH WATER AIR VEGETATION MOON
!
\31)2111 r ~3112112
13112113
J
311214
FIELD HILL STONE WOOD
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I----------------- -— I321 322
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1
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3224
1
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[SENSATION]
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3311 3312 3313 3314 3321 3322 3323 3324
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SOUND
1
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1
33111
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MUSIC SPEECH
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33131
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1
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1
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34 1 342
SIZE QUANTITY
r  1 I i3411 3412 3421 3422
SMALL GREAT NUMBER FULL
153
CHAPTER FOUR ; THE ETYMOLOGY AND FORM OF 'FAIRYV
4.1 The Need for Description
Strictly speaking, as noted in Chapter 3, the material presented 
here breaks the thread of the argument and provides information which 
could be summarised without discussion in a few paragraphs. There are 
however several reasons for producing a full description of the 
object-word here, prior to interpretation of the results of the 
analyses, rather than relegating it to brief parenthetical or 
appendical comment.
Underlying the other reasons are the two overriding aims of this 
study, (A) and (B). Exhaustiveness implies a knowledge of as many 
aspects of the object-word as possible, rigour implies as tight a 
definition of the object of study as is feasible. More specifically 
the confusion of and manifold relations among supernatural names has 
already been mentioned"1'} It would seem however that modern use and 
commentators are reasonably certain that fairy has a clear and single 
meaning and a reasonable etymology which established (or 
retrospectively supports) that meaning. However the fact that fairy 
has a reasonably fixed meaning today does not mean that it did so 
yesterday. Nor, of course, does the general contemporary acceptance of 
a plausible etymology mean that that etymology is correct, or more 
importantly, that early users of fairy in English were influenced by a 
'correct' etymology. Rather it seems to be the case both that the 
meaning of fairy has varied a great deal within the period 1320-1829, 
and that its early use, the foundation for much subsequent variation, 
was not simple or single but potentially at least influenced by a
(1) See above pp.72-3 and p.152.
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large number of factors extant before its first use in written 
English. Such variation is also evident in the form of the word, so 
much in fact that one cannot define that form absolutely. Thus the 
object-word is itself neither an object with clear boundaries nor 
possessed of a meaning with clear boundaries. The arbitrary 
restrictions necessitated by rigorous study, of period, of language, 
of approach, of definition, of object-of-study actually tend to 
describe fairy as a word of fixed parameters whereas this does not 
seem to have been the case in early and oral use at least. Whether 
this is a feature of many or all words examined in a large data base, 
or a function of unusually frequent Emotive meaning in supernatural 
names (at least when they imply a high degree of belief in the Denoted 
entities by users) is beyond the province of this discussion.
Whichever is true, examination of this inherent vagueness and 
confusion is crucial to an understanding of the word and an important 
caveat with which to preface the clearer observations derived from 
formal analysis.
More specific than this is the fact that many of the individual 
semantic features discussed below do not occur only within the period 
but prior to it, nor do they only occur in English; more importantly, • 
understanding of some of those features and the rationale behind them- 
in several cases depends on some knowledge of prior history of the 
word. This is particularly the case with repect to levels (]) and 
(2). It thus seems preferable to gather a*number of necessary 
observations into one chapter than insert a series of overlapping 
arguments at several places in subsequent discussion.
One additional reason for the present chapter, though only a 
partial justification for its place here, is that several of the
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points brought together here either have been ignored by commentators 
or not considered collectively. The general consequence is that the 
material presented here is apparently not available in other studies, 
the specific consequence, that the reader may reach this point without 
being aware that what appears to be a straightforward word of clear 
meaning and certain heritage is in fact by no means so certain. That 
certainty seems to be retrospectively justified by subsequent use, but 
not necessarily by early users of the word.
Finally there are ways of answering the questions asked in 
Chapter 1 which necessitate some appeal to meaning outside the corpus.
For example the question "how does fairy mean?" can with respect to a 
fixed period be answered in terms of previous use, previous meaning, 
the language(s) it is derived from, its history up to the time the 
question was asked, relations previously held with other words etc. A 
possible conclusion, and one given some weight in the present study, 
is that fairy comes into the language with at least one meaning 
reasonably fixed (as with many loan-words) and that original meaning, 
determined therefore outside the corpus and the studied period, 
remains central throughout.
However important the above reasons are felt to be it is 
necessary when performing an analysis with aim (B) in mind that the 
object-word is clearly defined in order that it can be recognised and 
described. Purely pragmatic considerations necessitate therefore a 
description of fairy which is both phonological, including graphemic 
representations of that phonological form, and which takes into 
account the boundaries of the language within which that phonological 
form is taken to be the object-word and not a different word of 
another language. For example, it would be insufficient to describe an
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English object-word as represented by the graphemic form <train> if it 
could not be distinguished from the French word of identical 
graphemic, though different phonological, form.
For all practical purposes the second description is normally 
achieved by an arbitrary restriction. As all languages are constantly 
changing, many are continually affected by others, and most have 
evolved from earlier states which, with hindsight, we call separate 
languages, the distinction between one natural language and another 
may by no means be clear. Consequently such a study as this can do no 
more than state that it is concerned with English and presume that its 
readers will have an intuitive grasp of the province of that language, 
such that English and French homographs are not confused. In addition 
this study also presupposes that, in some sense, the language we call 
English is homogenous between its terminal dates i.e. between 1320 and 
1829.
What follows is thus a description of the form of fairy and the
criteria used for counting a text as containing an example of it,
together with an outline of pertinent aspects of its early history.
Supernatural names in the period of transition from Old English to
Middle English deserve fuller study, and the early development of
fairy could only fully be understood against such a background, but
that is beyond the scope of this study. Rather, an attempt is made to
show some of the meanings that may have accrued to fairy prior to its
first recorded occurrence in English, in particular the notion of
*
"fatedness"*which is central to much subsequent discussion, to 
indicate the reasons why the etymology is not as straightforward as 
might be supposed, and to show that even if we can asign a simple 
history to the origination and development of the form, so many
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traditions may be involved in that development that the meanings 
attached to that form are already varied and complex.
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4.2 The Form of the Object-Word
The form of an object-word may have important stylistic
implications, which could in turn affect Stylistic meaning and may
also have an influence on other semantic areas, e.g. if the
object-word frequently occurs as the last word in a rhyming couplet,
its phonological form will influence collocation, particularly if the
range of rhymes for the object-word within the language is limited.
Those effects which the form of fairy seems to have on its environment
( 1)are discussed below .
In terms of the corpus here studied the form of fairy has only 
two important aspects, the phonemic/graphemic and the syntactic. As 
the corpus is a collection of written texts it is concerned with types 
that have graphemic rather than phonemic shape. However purely 
graphemic description would suggest that this corpus contains 
ninety-three different object-words, or ninety-three different forms 
of the same word, as shown in Table 4.2.a. Even allowing for 
syntactic marking (generally for plurality) there are at least fifty 
different forms within the corpus which are regarded in this study as 
representing a single object-word.
The most efficient and elegant means of describing these forms as 
types of one lexeme is to define the lexeme phonemically and regard 
each graphemic token as a particular realisation of the stated 
phonemic shape. Establishing this corpus, therefore, involved an 
assumption that the analyst could recognise different graphemic 
representations of the stated phonemic form.
For the purposes of establishing
( 1) In section 6.2.4.1.
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TABLE 4.2.a.
Total
Occurrences
Total
Occurrences
1 Faarie
] Faerey
37 Faeries
131 Faery
18 Faeryes
1 Fai
7 Faierie
8 Faiery
1 Fair
1 Fairees
1 Fairfolkis
52 Fairie
1 Fairly
9 Fairye
4 Fairyism
128 Fairys
1 Faree
1 Farey
20 Farie
7 Fary
2 Faryes
24 Fay
1 Fayeree
1 Fayeries
4 Fayery
2 Fayeryes
4 Fayre
1 Fayrees
39 Fayrey
44 Fayrie
1 Fayrre
55 Fayry
1 Fayryes
25 Fays
3 Fearrie
1 Fees
1 Feirie
3 Feries
1 Ferye
1 Feyrrye
2 Ffarye
2 Ffayre
1 Ffayrie
1 Ffeyre
5 Phairie
4 Pbarie
1 Pbary
1 Faee
49 Faerie
2 Faerily
1 Faerye
5 Faerys
5 Faie
6 Faieries
6 Faies
2 Faire
1 Faires
4 Fairi
477 Fairies
724 Fairy
7 Fairyes
12 Fairyland
1 Fare
1 Fares
1 Fareys
9 Faries
3 Far ye
1 Faryies
4 Faye
14 Fayerie
1 Fayeriy
8 Fayerye
4 Fayes
3 Fayree
3 Fayres
1 Fayri
67 Fayries
1 Fayrrey
19 Fayrye
1 Fayryje
1 Fearie
1 Fee
1 Feire
I Feiries
1 Fery
1 Feyrie
1 Ffair
1 Ffayeries
2 Ffayrees
1 Ffey
1 Ffeyrye
1 Phareis
2 Pharies
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and analysing the corpus two basic phonemic forms were regarded as one 
object-word, these being /fterx/ and /{«/. The phonemes composing 
these words could be realised graphemically in any of the ways 
summarised in Table 4.2.b. Although this table potentially generates 
at least six hundred and sixty forms, comparison with Table 4.2.a will 
show that most of these are not realised in the corpus. Indeed many 
of them do not seem to have been realised in English at all. All of 
the forms of the object-word found in the corpus can be generated by 
Table 4.2.b, and most of the forms by which fairy has been 
realised in English can be found in the corpus.
Table 4«2.b Rules For Generating all Graphemic Variants 
of the Object-Word in the Corpus
POSSIBLE GRAPHEMIC REALISATION 
<f> <ff> <ph>
<a> <aa> <ae> <ai> <aie> <ay> <aye> <e> 
<ea> <ei> <ey>
<r> <rr>
<e> <ee> <ey> <i> <ie> <iy> <y>
<ye> <y e> <0>
<aee> <ai> <aie> <ay> <aye> <ee> <ey>
(Vertical arrows show order. 0 signifies an empty 
grapheme.) 1
PHONEME
r-/{/ 
1U1
I
M
/*/
•/«/
( 1) <fairy> is used as the citation form of the object word throughout 
this study as it is the form most frequently recorded in the corpus.
161
However there are in addition to the forms recorded in the corpus 
a number of borderline cases found in other texts which seem related 
to fairy but cannot be generated by the Table. These include 
farrisee^, pbarisee^1 2 345678\  farisee^, pharises^\ farises^,
(6) ( 6 ) (7) . (8) (9)fairisees',u/, fairessesvu/, ferisbersw  ' , fareesesv w , ferrisbyn 
fairises^10\  ferrish^11 ,^ ferist/12 13456\  fairish^, feriers^9\  
f r a r y ^ \  f r a r i e s ^ \  vaairy^, vairies^1^ ,  fairney^I7\  
faireen^ and farefolkis^^. Clearly some of these represent 
different attempts to render the same sounds, and some could be 
generated by a modified version of Table 4.2.b. The majority however 
could be accounted for by no clear rules for grapbemic realisation o*f 
the defined phonemic shape. For fairy these forms represent the same 
kind of confusing periphery discussed in the following section for 
bog. Such a form as <farefolkis> would certainly seem to be derived
(1) Wright (1898-1905) s.v. fairy; Moor (1970) s.v.
(2) Rye (1895) s.v.frary; Briggs’(1976) s.v.; Simpson (1976) n 75
(3) Wright <1696-I90rr;.v. fjiry; feightley (1900) p.306; B r L s
(1976) s.v.;.Briggs (1977) p.2 17. P Sg
(4) Hartland (18900 p.89.
(5) Briggs (1977) p. 98.
(6) Wright (1898-1905) s.v. fairy.
(7) Wright (1898-1905) s.v. fairy; Briggs (1976) s.v.
(8) Simpson (1976) p. 75.
(9) .Briggs (1976) s.v; Briggs (1977) p. 217.
(10) Briggs and Tongue (1965) p.34; Tongue (1970) on. 78-9
(11) Moore (1971) p. 34.
(12) Moore (197 1) p. 36.
(13) Jamieson (1808) s.v.
(14) Rye (1895) s.v.
(15) Folklore VII (1896) pp.3-4; Keightley'(1900) p. 306* Brives 
(1976) s.v.
(16) Briggs and Tongue (1965) p.33.
(17) Heslop (1892) s.v.
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from fair and folk , the fair folk being a common euphemism for
(2 )fairies , yet it may well be formed with the underlying /ftSn/ in 
mind, as the meanings or Denotata of farefolkis and fairy would 
pretheoretically seem to be identical. As only one example of this 
kind was found for potential inclusion in the corpus it was thought 
preferable to exclude it rather than modify the rules for specifying 
the object-word.
It should be noted that Table 4.2.b operates on the assumption of
only two phonemic forms. In all probability this is an
oversimplification. It is likely that many of the unusual graphemic
forms of fairy represent different phonemic forms, e.g. Scottish
(3)<phary> or <pharie> may represent /|Vx/ rather than it
is assumed therefore that fairy entered the language with one 
recognisable phonemic shape and was subsequently pronounced 
differently in different dialects of English. The two phonemic words 
taken to define the object-word are thus best regarded as descriptions 
of an underlying or original form, on the analogy of the allophone^, 
rather than a precise description of the pronunciation represented by 
each token. In most cases it would appear that graphemic variation 12*4
( 1) See for example Douglas (1874). Edwards (1974) pp.25-6 suggests 
that it is not derived from fair but OE far an «*• "to go". This may have 
been the original euphemism but if so it seems to have developed into 
the more common fair folk. In the corpus fair collocates forty five 
times with fairy, and folk twenty one times, both totals being 
significantly above average.
(2) On euphemism see below, section 7.2. Examples of fair folk are 
1576/01/001; Jamieson (1808) s/v. A similar euphemism is the Welsh 
Tylwylth Teg, i.e. "the fair family".
X$) As in 1568/02/001; 1600/05/001,002; 1610/01/006; 1685/01/003.
(4) "two or more sounds which differ non-distinctively but are in the 
same range on all the axes of distinctiveness are calleda allopbones 
of the same phoneme." Sommerstein (1977) p.3. By analogy two or more 
phonemic forms may be regarded as realisations of one underlying form (or 'alloform'.)
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is a result of the lack of universal orthographic conventions in 
Middle English, as the majority of graphemic variants disappear with 
the advent of printing. There is, however, at least one graphemic 
variant which appears to have stylistic associations slightly 
different from the standard <fairy>, namely the spelling <faery>. 
This is discussed below in Chapter 6.
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4.3 The Etymology of Fairy
Many words used to Refer to the supernatural are of uncertain or 
obscure origin, often existing in an imprecise matrix of relations 
with groups of other words either related in form but differing in 
meaning, or different in form but related in meaning. This is the 
problem which is central to this study at level (2). Groups which best 
demonstrate this confusion are those centring on bog, bug and guck^^. 
One could describe these three groups as one, based on the formula:
/bilabial plosive + back vowel + alveolar fricative/ 
which encodes such meanings as "frightening" and "revolting". However 
such a description must on the one hand account for possible relations 
with words such as boghost, barghest, phooka, bugalug, boobagger, 
tantarabogus and on the other for the meanings of homonyms, such as 
"scarecrow", "nightjar", "soft land", "pimple", "nest of 
caterpillars", "boastful" and "railway truck". Clearly an examination 
of these interrelations must consider not only standard etymology but 
also folk etymology, and a complex series of relations between 
homonyms and homophones. In principle such an explication might be 
possible, in practice it is not. To account for the meaning 
"nightjar", for example, which might be postulated as a separate 
lexeme from puck meaning "demon", one must be aware of the folk belief 
that the nightjar attacked cattle and drank their blood and/or caused 
disease, as did demons called pucks. The nightjar is called goatsucker 
for a similar reason. However such an explication also must be aware 
that elves, witches, hares, hedgehogs, fairies and other creatures 
were held to be responsible either for nocturnal attacks on cattle or 1
(1) Wasson (1957); Henry (1959)
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for taking the nourishment from them(I). Thus not only is the question 
of the separateness of the lexemes difficult to determine, but also 
the meaning(s) of those lexemes are part of a larger set of 
relationships between the behaviour of real creatures, beliefs about
the behaviour of supernatural creatures and words used to Refer to all 
these phenomena.
Similarly the meaning "scarecrow" for bug(ge) might be treated as 
a separate lexeme from the meaning "object of dread", were it not for 
the fact that scaring crows is obviously related to frightening 
people. Yet if bug - "scarecrow" is regarded as the same lexeme as bug
demon , what is the status of the forms bugalug, bucca, bucca-bo,*
(2)bogle, boggart and boggy-bo which all mean "scarecrow", but only 
some of which are recorded as also having a meaning approximating to 
"demon"?
Furthermore many other words Denoting the supernatural or similar 
to words Denoting the supernatural also mean "scarecrow". How are we 
to decide which forms are derived from "demon" or vice versa, or if 
both are derived from an ur-form meaning "frightening object"; which 
word should be listed as ’the same lexeme' and which separated; or 
whether it is necessary to explicate the relations between other 
supernatural names-and "scarecrow" in order to obtain a full 12
(1) See for example: Willan (1811) s.v. toad-bit; Cockavne ( iraz \ tt
14/15, 16/17, 156/7, 174/5, 290/1, 304/5; Courtly ( I S ^ V l f ? -  
Atkinson (1891) pp. 87-9 and 93; Hole (1945) pp. 50, 56 95* Stewart
(1970) pp. 134-5; Moore (1971) pp. 95, 147-8; Sternber*(1971) l 
Rudkin (1973) pp. 73-5; Evans (1974) pp. 156-8; Hackwood (1974) n I5fi 
col. 2; Kirk (1976) pp. 53-4; White (,976) p. ^flndrews O  7 )';81; MacNeil (1977) p. 108. ’ AnareMS U977) p.
(2) These forms can be found in Wright (1898-1905) end Murray (1933) 
The problem is not as straightforward as this account suggests as
“ “ ' f  \dentlfalA ° rmS “lt” °tber meanings, forms whi^h seem related tobug which have those meanings some of which also mean 
"demon and some of which do not. and
forms which are only distantly related to bug. meaiUn8S are. encoded by
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understanding of the (possible) relations in these groups?
Similar problems can be found in many other areas of lexis, 
particularly in vocabularies drawn largely from oral rather than 
written varieties. Indeed it may be true that the notions of distinct 
lexemes and 'etymological laws' may be more artificial than the 
lexicographer might like to believe. It would certainly seem that the 
closer a dictionary or word list comes to recording the actual oral 
vocabulary currently in use, the greater are such problems. Oral 
language makes use of many nonce-forms, lexical items subject to 
fashion, slang, colloquialism and vocabularies drawn from areas of 
casual or temporary interest, many of which, unsurprisingly, are never 
collected in dictionaries and, if they are collected, are often 
recorded with meanings somewhat more restricted than those found in 
usage, for usage often employs words with very vague Applicability.
Fairy is one word which enters into such a complex of relations 
and it is part of the task of the present work to explicate some of 
the possible uses the word may have been made to serve and some of the 
most important of the relations it entered into. In the first place 
its etymology is by no means clear, although one etymology now seems 
to be generally accepted. Etymologies for fairy have generally been 
suggested as derived from words Denoting female supernatural creatures 
in other languages. Thus it has been derived from the last syllable of 
Latin nymph a ^ and from Arabic peri^ . Alternatively it has been
derived from words with supernatural associations, or words connoting 
properties regarded as attributes of fairies. Amongst these are 
derivations from fair^3\  OE fagan^ ,  and Latin fatua^ .  The 12345
(1) See Keightley (1900) p.4 for this and other unlikely etymologies.
(2) Keightley (1900) pp. 4-5; Edwards (1974) pp. 15-17
(3) Brand (1853) vol II p. 477; Keightley (1900) p.4
(4) Keightley (1900) p.4; Edwards (1974) p. 26
(5) Coote (1879)
accepted etymology also follows the pattern of derivation from a word
taken to mean female supernatural creatures( 1}. Ultimately it would
seem to be derived from Latin faturn - "thing said". This gave fata -
"fate", a neuter plural which, it is supposed, was misinterpreted in
the Dark Ages as feminine singular, fata - "female fate, goddess", and
these goddesses of fate were supposedly identified with Greek
Lachesis, Atropos and Clotbo and subsequently, following the Roman
conquest of the Celtic peoples, further identified with various Celtic
female deities manifested as tripartite. The evidence for such
goddesses (known collectively as matronae) is largely archaeological
and generally in Roman stonework. Several examples may be seen in
museums along Hadrian's Wall, such as a stone relief at Housesteads,
Northumberland depicting three identical hooded deities(2); other
examples can be found at Ancaster, Lines; Kirkham, Lancs; and
(3)Cirencester, Glous, , which suggest a general adoption of the 
tripartite goddess(es) by the Roman invaders. It is presumed therefore 
that fata became attached to the Celtic goddess(es) in vulgar Latin 
and, as that language became Old French, the /t/ was dropped to give 
*fa a, thence *fae. There seems to be no written evidence for these 
changes.
The first recorded Old French forms occur in Old French and
Anglo-Norman romances of the twelfth century and later, and in
collections of tales and anecdotes made in Latin, also in the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries. It is presumed either that the association
*
of classical and Celtic goddesses is preserved in these romances (i.e. 
the fays of romance are derived from older Celtic goddesses) or that a 
further identification was made, this time by the romanciers, between 123
(1) Maury (1896); Keightley (1900) pp.5-11; 
Chambers (n.d.) pp. 150-15I.
(2) Birley (1976) p.49.
(3) Ross (19749 pp. 269, 270 and plate X.
Edwards (1974) pp. 4-5;
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Celtic goddesses called *fa'a and creatures in romance. In support 
of such an argument one could point to such features as the frequency 
with which Celtic females appear in multiples of three, their gifts of 
prophecy, their association with spinning or their association with 
the world of the dead. There are many scholarly works which seek to 
prove that the Arthurian cycle of romances and some related romances 
are derived from Celtic religion or myth^-
This identification firstly gives a noun fai, fae, fay referring 
to an individual female with supernatural powers, probably best 
translated as "enchantress", so that we must suppose that the 
substantive faierie is derived from this, meaning "enchantment".
Later, this was again misunderstood or perhaps extended to signify 
"fairyland", and as a plural "enchantresses", whose singular was then 
mistakenly taken to be not fay but fairie. At this stage of 
development, perhaps at about the middle of the thirteenth century, 
this complex of meanings was carried into romances written in Middle 
English, the first recorded examples occurring in the Auchinleck 
manuscript (a. 1330)^*
There are clearly many imperfections and difficulties in this, 
the most generally accepted, etymology. In the first place different 
commentators give different accounts of the precise development of the 
word and of the interrelations supplied by the evidence. All agree 
that fata was interpreted as feminine and eventually gave four 12
(1) Such as Nutt (1897); Cross 0915) ; Loomis (1936), (1945), (1956), 
(1959), (1974); Paton 0960) ; Newstead (1946).
(2) It seems likely that the manuscript was a compilation of stories 
including romances originating in different places, see Hibbard 
(1924). Thus it is probably evidence of a relatively widespread use of 
the word in Middle English before 1330. The occurrences of fairy are : 
1330/01 Kyng Alisaunder 1 occurrence; 1330/02 Lai le Freine 1 
occurrence; 1330/03 Reinbrun 2 occurrences; 1330/04 Degare 2 
occurrences; 1330/05 Sir Orfeo 5 occurrences.
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distinct meanings in Old French which passed into English, namely (1) 
enchantment, illusion; (2) fairyland, land of illusion; (3) human with 
special powers; (4) supernatural beings; but they differ as to which 
came first, and which developed from which. Although this etymology 
seems plausible in essence, it necessarily relies rather heavily upon 
vague processes of 'identification' and 'misunderstanding'. Most 
important is the fact that many if not most of the occurrences of Old 
French fee_ and Middle English fay, or fairy are not nouns and, if 
nouns, frequently do not denote or refer to 'enchantress’ or 'female 
spirit'. In a sample survey of one Anglo-Norman and six Old French 
works which use-the word, of fifteen occurrences ten are adjectival,- 
four nouns and one doubtful, being in noun form but used adjectivally 
(Orva la fee)0 ) . Three of the nouns occur in one work(2). By far the 
most popular phrase is c_'est chose fale, which is used six times of 
these fifteen. The Dictionnaire de L'Ancienne Langue Francaise^is able 
to quote many examples of faer, 'to enchant', almost all of which are 
of the past participle fae, i.e. an 'adjectival' form, but offers very 
few examples of fee, noun, 'enchantress'.
This would suggest that the notion of fairy in its earliest uses 
is not primarily to Denote creatures, but a quality of phenomena or 
events which may or may not be associated with creatures. In Middle 
English before 1400 only two of thirty-five occurrences seem certainly 123
1155-1160; Thomas: The
(1) The romances examined were:
Benoit de Sainte-Maure: Le Roman de Troie r
Romance of Horn (Anglo-Norman) c. 1170; Les Enffln« c'r’ ¿J
1205; A i d  : chanson de gest c. 1205- ' ,
de meun : Le Roman de la Rose c. 127*;-fin. t__ r* . e ^orris an^ Jean
1280; CMtury.’ Ft0l,,,tt : c. .
(2) Froissart : Meliador (1895) Is. 7Q*a ,o v , ____
furthermore thet’ this li one of the l « « t  o f  t L  \  '
(3) Godefroy (188«), eSC °f these “orks-
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to refer to creatures and both these are plural (or possibly 
collective):
Prosepina and al hire fayerye 
Disporten hem and maken melodye
1400/01/006
This maketh that they ben no fayeryes
1400/01/010Certainly many of the other occurrences in this period could be
interpreted as Referring to creatures (a further fourteen) but none
are singular nouns referring to individual creatures and, when
Reference to any individual creature is made fairy takes the form of
an adjective which modifies a noun which Denotes 'creature', e.g.
A fairy knijt herin is
1330/03/001
There is no instance of fay or fairy being used in Middle English 
to mean 'enchantress ' before Morgne la Fay (1400/02/002) and the only 
other probable examples are Galathe was a fairye and Galathe, je which 
was a fairye (1440/01/001 + 002) and by Nygromancye of a Faee^ 
(1505/01/001). Even here lajaye, as in Orva la fee above, may perhaps 
be better translated "the magical", "the strange", "(of) unusual 
power" or "(of) the strangeness" than "the fairy", the appellation 
being probably attributive rather than defining, as in Sir Brennor le
Noire or Balin le Savage^.
Thus, though it is certainly true that fay is used on some 
occasions to mean 'enchantress' it does not seem to have been the most 
frequent or most central use of the more frequent term fairy. Although
O  These are both taken from Malory (1969). As Malor, seems to have 
col ected a large number of such names from disparate sources bis
collection provides a good il ustration of the vagueness of connection between name and epithet, as m: vol I n 15 o;_ r • , ^uuneciion
p.33 Me lot de la «Scbei p.90 GrifI.°1 ^ “ l e '
Savage; p.162 Sir Sagramoure le Desirous; p.283 Sir L a ^ o t e ^ i  1 
Taile; p.284 Sir Uwain les Avoutres; n. 310 i.p Male
Sir Nabon le Noire; p.370 Sir Nanowne le Petite- p 370£IsoudSi P‘369 
“ e ^ "  p.393 Sir Breunor le Noire ^ S w a i ^ e  n Se de
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the meanings seem intuitively to be related, it has never been made 
clear precisely how a word meaning 'fate' in an abstract or general 
sense could come to mean 'enchantress’, and thence give a further 
generic word 'enchanted'. It seems more in accord with the evidence 
and also more likely, that the notion of fate "degenerated" into that 
of enchantment, and that this notion of 'fatedness' is the central 
connotation of fairy, with fa^ being derived from, or developed 
parallel to this conceptual development.. It seems likely that the 
generally accepted etymology, in following previous etymologies and 
attempting to derive Modern English fairy from an earlier form meaning 
'unusual female creature’ is committing an error made by those earlier 
attempts, that of reading the later meaning into earlier forms.
Whereas the more evidence one considers the more likely it seems that 
the idea of a female supernatural being as specifically faee does not 
antedate the general idea of fairie, hence the etymology may not be 
based upon fata giving faU, but on an original term for the general 
concept. Such a concept may lie in the vague idea of 'fatedness',
a quality in the world which can control and direct the actions of 
humanity, and hence is more powerful than humanity. For example there 
is clearly a link between the idea of fate and that of death. Death is 
perhaps the one mystery for which people feel they can never have an 
explanation fully adequate to their experience and the supernatural, 
in i.tS widest sense> has always been connected with death, and is 
probably universally s o ^ «
A similar connection can be found in Old English. The word faege 
meaning "fated, doomed to die" was a commonplace of Old English 
poetry. It often seems to carry with it a semi-supernatural idea of
(1) For further discussion on the association of fairy and death see 
below, section 0.5 . ----ca m  see
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'the marked man', such as is still evident in the modern notion of 
'the bullet with my number on it'. Perhaps such fatalism was a 
response to frequent warfare. Certainly it is an expression of the 
central place of battle in the Anglo-Saxon scheme of things. The 
notion is retained in the Scottish word fey. By extension it was used 
to mean "destined", "dead", "accursed", "feeble", "cowardly". It is 
easy to see how tne notion of some form of supernatural or divine 
selection could accompany use of this word, as part of its Associative 
meaning, especially in relation to the Denotational meanings "fated" 
and "accursed".
In this connection one might suggest that the notion of female 
supernatural beings who mark or select the dead may have been an 
important one in Anglo-Saxon pagan belief and may therefore have added 
a connotation to faege which encouraged this association. The word 
waelcyrge (valkyrie) meaning "choosers of the slain", is used to gloss 
Bellone , Allecto, Venus, erinys and tisifone ^ a n d  is regarded by 
a least one commentator as a "fierce and vengeful spirit of the 
u n d e r w o r l d " J u d i t h ,  shortly before she kills Holofernes, is 
called ides aelfscinu 2^^• Ides is also used of Grendel's mother 
"apparently as a synonym with aglaecwif, a ’formidable' or 'terrifying 
w o m a n Aelf means "supernatural" and -scinu has supernatural 
connotations, belonging to a group of related words concerned with 
'appearance', 'shining' and 'skin'. Sc inn means both "skin" and 
••phantom, illusion, magical image"; scinncraeft is "sorcery, magic", 
scinnes is "radiance", scinan "shine", sciene "beautiful, brilliant, *123
light", scinnhiw "spectre, illusion". The two groups are separable
(1) Serjeant son (1936). " ~~ '
(2) Chadwick (1959),
(3) Beowulf (1954).
(A) Chadwick (1959).
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only by virtue of the long and short vowels but, as Storms says, the 
length of the vowel in scinn is uncertain:
It is uncertain whether we have a long or a short 
vowel. The etymology points to a long vowel, the form 
scinn with double n to a short one.'-17
Insofar as all examples seem connected by the notion of "visual 
appearance" it seems reasonable to suggest that Anglo-Saxons were 
aware of a group of supernatural beings having a shining appearance. 
Whether this group was evil or not before the advent of Christianity 
cannot be determined. In Salomon and Saturn a fiend (feond) is called 
seines.. Sc_innis used to gloss fantasia» portentum. imaginatio. 
praestigium, non strum, nebula,. necromantia. and is used in the 
Leechdoms to mean "affected by apparations, haunted" It seems
to differ from sickness caused by devils, elves or dwarfs in that 
there is an implication of hallucination. Storms relates scin to the 
ignis fatuus, which may be one source of the conception of 
supernatural radiance or nimbus:
The magical connotation of scin probably arose from 
flames appearing in decaying trees or in marshy 
districts and caused by the phosphorescent effects of 
the rotting process. The flame and the light produced in 
this way flares up in continually varying spots, 
thus creating an impression of dancing spirits.'3^
Judith therefore is given all the connotations of a 
death-dealing, supernatural’female.
In one charm mention is also made of sige-wif, i.e. 
"victory-women", who have supernatural p o w e r T h u s  the bees in 
this charm, Judith, waelcyrge (which normally Denotes "witch") and 
Grendel's mother are all described as females who are connected with 1234
(1) Storms (1948) p. 114,
(2) scin-seoc. Cockayne (1864-6) 1.364.
(3) Storms (1948) p. 1 14.
(4) Storms ( 1948) p. 140.
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death and have supernatural power. Though the evidence is slight, one 
might conclude that this conception was available to speakers of Old 
English, though by the time of the importation of fairy such an
association could hardly have been a central one, for those speakers 
had long been Christian.
One might wish to argue therefore that even if the notion of the 
"fatal woman" was the central one in Old French (and this does not 
seem to be the case) in Middle English sufficient similarity between 
the connotations, forms and sounds of Old English faege and 
Anglo-Norman faierie existed to promote the connotation "fatedness" t*o 
the central semantic position. That'faierie took over some of the 
connotations of faege may particularly seem to be the case in view of 
the fact that I^amon’s Brut(1), one of the last works to use faege 
extensively is also one of the first to use material from the romance 
cycles. Furthermore Layamon uses aluen (2)to describe creatures 
associated with the birth, weapon and death of Arthur (hence his 
'fate'), creatures whose functions are later fulfilled by Morgan la 
fee, the Lady of the Lake and other fays in later versions. This 
suggests that the notion of "fatedness" was associated with the 
romance material, but had not yet been encapsulated in the word 
faierie..
Thus at the close of the twelfth and beginning of the thirteenth
centuries .occur the following recorded phenomena. Firstly Old French• *
faer has produced Anglo-Norman faee in a romance of c.1170^3  ^which 
is almost certainly.derived from an Old English story. Twenty years
t *23
(]) Laxamon (1847).
(2) Layamon (1847) II Is. 384, 385, 463, 489,
(3) Thomas (1964) The Romance of Horn. 500; III Is. 144, 145.
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later we have a romance in early Middle English whose immediate source 
is French (Wace's Brut ) but which also appears to have incorporated 
some local, probably Celtic, tales for which an Old English word alven 
is used, and which also employs a word similar both in form and 
meaning to Old French/Anglo-Norman faee, including the forms <faeie>, 
<feie>, <faei>, <faie> and <feye>^.
By 1320 the three traditions have sufficiently intermingled so 
that one word, faierie, may do duty in stories from any source, and 
fae^e is diminished in use (though not totally redundant). There can 
thus be no clear demonstration of the possible influences of 0E faege 
on OF faer, and the point should not be pressed, but there remains a 
strong possibility that the Associative meaning of the Old English 
word is in part transferred to that of the import. However this may 
be, the notion of "fatedness" does seem to be a strong one in the 
development of fairy in English from its earliest occurrences, and 
this is particularly evident in the development of later associations 
such as 'death', 'hurt', 'sickness', 'birth' and 'love'1 (2) 3.
The hypothesis of faierie preceding fai in Old French would be 
happier if there were an intermediary Medieval Latin form *fatalia or 
*fataria2_ for which there is no evidence and the forms themselves seem 
unlikely. Keightley says:
In the Middle Ages there was in use a Latin verb fatare
derived from fatum or fata,, and signifying to eichan't (j).
However the only recorded examples of this verb seem to be 
twelfth century or later, by which time Old French fae existed, and
(1) Clearly there is sufficient similarity with Old
French/Anglo-Norman forms to suggest a connection in the minds of 
anyone knowing both languages. For detailed references see Layamon 
(1847) glossary. s
(2) See below pp. Orfeq 1330/05; Chaucer's Merchant's Tale 1400/n».
Launfaj 1460/02 and perhaps Reinbrun 1330/0T"siem to connTct fairv* 
with the dead. —
(3) Keightley (1900) p.6.
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those Latin examples all appear to be participles. It would therefore 
not contravene the evidence to surest that the recorded Latin forms 
are Latinate borrowings of a previously extant popular word. Grimm 
quotes a thirteenth century manuscript:
Aquisgrani licitur Ays, et dicitur eo, quod Karolus tenebat 
ibiquandam mulierem fatatam, sive guandam fatam, quae alio 
nomine nimpha vel dea vel adriades. J ----
( 2 ) .Latham cites fatalitatis. fatatus and fatata , which are
translated as "fairy nature", "haunted" and "fairy" respectively.
Although no specific source is cited these seem to come from Map's De
(3)Nugis CuriaHum (c. 1190) and Gervase of Tilbury's Otia Imperialia
(4) --- ---------—(c.1212) , in which case these three texts seem to constitute the
entire evidence for the Latin verb fatare. As these texts all seem to
be later than the earliest Old French sources, the evidence is not
clear cut. The Latin forms may, as Keightley argues, represent an
earlier Latin verb which became Old French faierie. or they may
represent an attempt to express in medieval Latin a concept already
current in vulgar speech. In either case Old French faee may be
derived from these or may have developed along parallel lines as
Gervase also uses fadug and fadae with what appears to be a nominal
function, so that they may represent a noun (- 'a fairy') rather than
a participle (~ 'enchanted'). The contexts of use are translated by 
Ritson as:
some of this kind of larvae, which they named fadae. we have heard to be lovers ----- 1234
(1) Grimm ( ¡883-8) p.405. He cites the 
92".
(2) Latham (1965) s.v.
(3) Map (1923) Dist. II Chap. XII.
(4) Gervase (1856).
source a "Isodori etym. 8, 1 1
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and:
I know not if it were a true horse, or if it were a fairy 
\fadus), as men assert.’^  ^
Here in the earliest uses there exists the same ambiguity that 
persists throughout the period examined. It is seldom clear if fairy 
(or fee, or fadus) is being used as a nominal or with a modifying
function of some kind, i.e. whether the Entity described is regarded 
as an Object or an Item.
The evidence of the cognate forms Italian fada (2)and Spanish 
fada, hada(3)affirm the accepted etymology of fay_(4). It seems at 
least possible therefore that the two forms fa£ and fairy did not 
develop one from the other, but each under the influence of the other 
from Medieval Latin roots which were themselves related, and both were 
used to characterise a particular quality in experience which can be 
called 'fatedness' and was probably felt to be a particular feature of 
Celtic tales. The invention of, or increased use of, fairy in the 
twelfth century can be explained as the adoption of a generic term 
used to cover a set of tales and beliefs for which the Welsh 
themselves seem to have had no term. For it seems that Welsh names 
for supernatural beings tend either to be specific, unique to a 
particular place or circumstance, or euphemistic, such as Tylwyth Teg 
(the fair f a m i l y ) O l d  French faierie seems to be a more 
objective term, less culturally restricted than these names. The 
Celtic peoples possessed a series of beliefs not felt to be totally 
homogenous by the culture to which they belonged, but appearing so to 
a culture which found each belief alien. In a similar manner 12345
(1) Ritson (1831) p.13
(2) Battaglia (1961-73) s.v.
(3) Boggs et al (1948) s.v.
(4) For additional corroborative examples
(5) On the Tylwtyh Teg see Briggs (1976) c 
142, 146, 223.
see Buck (1949) p p . 1499— 1500 
.v.; Briggs (1977) pp. 120-1,
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Christianity seems to have grouped together multifarious Entities of 
teutonic belief under the term devils.
Thus, despite possible origins in oral vocabulary, it is best 
regarded as primarily a literary word, and therefore not initially an 
item in the vocabulary of the illiterate in Medieval England. To 
express their supernatural beliefs medieval peasants in England almost 
certainly retained Old English words. Some of these passed out of 
usage; some were emptied of specific meaning and equated with the 
Christian devil; some occasionally occur in literature but most seem 
to go underground for a long period, preserved largely in oral 
tradition, to re-emerge in records of later folk, belief.
Of the first kind OE scin, scinlac, drymann, ent, ore, aeglaeca 
seem to disappear by the fifteenth century0 K  Of the second, most 
aspects of Anglo-Saxon pagan belief seem to have been regarded by 
Christians as evil and therefore devilish. Many Old English words 
used of the supernatural come to characterise generic evil, or 
personified evil, i.e. devils, or the specific source of evil, the 
Devil. Elf (OE alven) seems occasionally to be used in this sense. 
Feond and deoful are the words most'frequently used. Puca. bugge and 
schucke are also used with these senses, particularly in Early Middle 
English. Those Old English supernatural names preserved in literature 
are generally those in the latter group; used to characterise evil. 
Their occurrence correlates well with alliterative traditions. In St 
Juliana and Seinte_Mjrharete schucke may well have been chosen for its 
alliterative value^', as may pouke in several occurrences in Piers 12
(1) Serjeantson (>936).
(2) SeinteMarhete (1866). p.9 ; p.17. St Juliana
(1872) p .5 6 .  -----------------*
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Plowman(1), and thurse in Morte Artbure and Seinte Marh*r*r»(2) It
seems that the change in literary fashion from traditional
alliteration to French rhyme not only caused a certain conflict
between rival vocabularies for one semantic area, as it were,
(resulting in, for example, the tendency for fairy to replace elf, or
gobelyn to replace thurse and schuck) but also a reduction in
alliterative verse also reduced the need for a rich vocabulary of
synonyms. Conversely one can see that the alliterative revival tended
to reintroduce such synonyms. In addition one could note that in Old
French and Anglo-Norman it is easy to rhyme on /z/ or A V * 2(3) 4, and this
facility was useful to Middle English writers adopting the French
(4)style , tending therefore to reinforce the use of fairy (and perhaps 
supporting the contention that it is primarily a literary word).
Yet, although the records indicate that OE supernatural names 
declined in Middle English, both in frequency of use and in 
specificity of meaning, many of the displaced words seem to have been 
alive in oral traditions. Bugge becomes part of a complex and 
widespread set of meanings(5) 6. Schucke seems to preserve its original 
meaning of "phantom" in East Anglian dialect Shuck and Shock(6\
( 0  Langland (1867-73) A text X.62; XI. 158; B text XVI.51; C text 
XIX.279; XIX.282
(2) Morte Arthure (1847) 1. 1100. Seinte Marherete (1866) p. 12.
(3) For a good example employing faee see Thomas (1964) Is. 437-454.
(4) E.g. Chaucer (1970) Wife of Bath Is.859-69 fayerye/corapaignye; 
Is.871-2 dayeryes/fayeryes; Sir Thopas Is. 799 and 802 espye/Fairye; 
Is. 814-5 Fayerye/symphonye.
Gower (1901) Confessio Amantis I. Is. 2316-17 faie/assaie; II Is. 
963-4 certifie/faierie; II Is. 1019-1020 faie/delaie; V Is. 7073-4 
faierie/ here yhe.
(5) For discussion of bugge and its cognates see Allen (1935-6) and Henry (1959).
(6) These names have been recorded as dialect for the devil and 
various forms of apparition. See Chambers (1866) II p.434; Scott 
(1895) p-145; Briggs ( 1977) p.362.
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Po.U-kg- is recalled into literature in the late sixteenth century with a
modified sense, but is probably preserved in the dialect names Hodge
Pok6r> T-°SLP?,ker» Pjj Poker and Mum-poker(1}. Thurse is retained as a
component in many dialect supernatural names^1 2 34\
It seems likely, therefore, that as the literary vocabulary of
French superseded that of English in this area, although the words
must have been felt to be equivalent in the central meaning, the new
vocabulary would tend to be modified by connotations inherited from
the old. There was not, as folklorists tend to express it, a
'confusion' of fairies and elves in medieval belief but a tendency of
the more generic and more fashionable word to attract and take over
the Associative meanings of its rivals. Chaucer, for example, uses
fayery_e predominantly to characterise a kind of place or experience
(3)(i.e. Denoting an Item) but elf for a kind of creature (i.e.
(4)
Denoting an Object) . Although on four occasions he uses fayerye 
collectively of creatures, he never uses the word for an individiual.
(1) These a ™ 68 “ n be found in Scott (1895). Although he comments: 
"This word...seems to be identical with the Swedish pocker, nokker 
the devil, the deuce be does not mention the possibility of a 
derivation from pouke. Indeed I have not seen such an etymology 
suggested in any source. Briggs (1977) includes Mum-poker and 
Pokey-Hokey. Henry (1959) discusses puca.
(2) Thurse seems to survive in many recent dialect supernatural name.
See Scott (1895) on Guytrash, Hob Tburse, Hob Thurst, Hob Thruss Hob* 
Thrust, Hob Thrush, Hob Truss, Hob-trash, Hob-dross, Hob Hurst * °
Thurse, Thurst, Thrust, Thruss, Thrush and Trash. See also Clarke 
0935) and Dickins (1942). Both |b£ck and trash seem to be names for 
black dogs see Brown (1970) and Briggs (1977) s.v.
(3) Chaucer (1970). Sir_Thopas 1.802; Squire's Tale 1.96 seem to Refer
to places. ----- - ciec
Merchant's Tale 1.1743 and Squire’s Tale 1 im ___ _ , ...
meanl^^ilTWion". J , 8 3  n0t clear* P™b*bly
(4) Chaucer (1970). Man.of.Lawe's Tale 1.754, Wife of Bath 1 .jm 
to individual creatures, and Miller's Tale 1.3479 has elven as a 
piural noun. Chaucer also uses elf in the compound e l f ^ ^ e (wifo nf
Bath 1.860 and Sir Thopas Is. 788, 790, 795) as o t h e ^ T ? ^ ,use fairy queen. ’ “utnors
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In addition to those aspects of meaning which fairy may have acquired 
from displaced Old English lexemes a number of disparate elements seem 
to have been attracted by the word from its earliest occurrences in 
English, largely from Classical and Celtic traditions. Insofar as 
fairx may represent a development of a classical word to accommodate a 
set of Celtic beliefs then the traditions certainly combine, but to 
ask whether the traditions were 'identified' or 'confused' would be to 
ask a meaningless question. In the romances the important feature was 
the exotic itself, not its source. Details would be assimilated and 
combined by individual tale-tellers in accord with their own sense of 
the degree of the exotic to be incorporated, the amount of familiar 
detail to be reiterated, the degree to which the familiar could be 
heightened or exaggerated, and the appropriateness of the 
relationships of these details to the particular idiom, form and tone 
of the work. These would be modified by the author’s knowledge and 
abilities, the demands and capabilities of his audience, and the 
accidents of transmission. Probably in very few cases would only one 
consideration apply in the adoption of a detail. There would be a 
complicated balance to achieve between recognition of the familiar and 
the enjoyment of novelty. Hence there can be no single explanation 
for the complete form of any romance as we have inherited it.
As romance is the genre in which most of the earliest occurrences 
°f fairy are to be found it is worth examining one example in detail 
to indicate the degree of complexity of the texts in which fairy may 
be embedded, and thus both the complex semantic net which surrounds it 
and the fact that we are not dealing with an object-word which begins 
with a simple meaning which is later expanded and confounded but one 
which from its earliest uses is problematic. Sir Orfeo is a good 
example as it has been much discussed as one of the best and most 
intriguing of the short metrical romances. It was probably based on
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an Old French source, the lai d'Ornhev(l) „w.u ,- -- t-— L which may have been written
by Marie de France, being similar to the Lai de Frein. and Sir 
La_ndey_a_l(1). If so it may well be based on an original Breton lay(l\  
This Breton lay may have influenced or conversely been 
influenced by Walter Map<2>. The Middle English author may have 
introduced modifications extant in Anglo-Saxon tradition as found in 
King Alfred's translation of Boethius. The original tale may have 
been derived from Boethius, Virgil or Ovid(3) *5or all three, and might 
have been a deliberate attempt at welding the classical myth to a 
Celtic one, such as the Wooing of Etain^or may simply represent 
the rewriting of the classical along familiar lines. The Auchinleck 
romance may therefore contain elements from Classical Latin, Medieval 
Latin, Old French, Old English, Breton and Irish as well as Middle 
English traditions, and there are also possible analogies with Welsh 
and continental tales. A final statement of the 'source' of Sir Orfeo 
is thus impossible, and any attempt to isolate the constituent 
elements of the traditions it embodies seems certain to fail^3\
Those features in Sir_Orfeo which might be interpreted as 
belonging to or contributing to the experience of "fairy” constitute 
about half the poem. It is unclear which, if any, of those features 
properly belong to that experience whether from the characters', the 
author's or the audience's point of view. There are no details that 
can be isolated and treated as the distinguishing features of what 
constitute* fair^ for the Orfeo poet. There are two ways of
(]) Davies ( 1936),
(2) Loomis (1936).
(3) Severs (19611
(A) Hibbard (1924).
(5) In addition one could note that many elements in this as in other 
romances are analogous to folk motifs in widely disparate cultures and
that, perhaps, one must look to psychological universals for any final account of "sources".
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attempting to overcome this problem. One is to regard the poet's 
treatment of fairy, as the reproduction of a typification, then to 
search out other statements of the supernatural which contain that 
same typification. From the point of view of literature this is a 
search for themes and parallels, from the point of view of folklore it 
is a search for motifs, from the point of view of language it is a 
search for cognates, etymologies and parallel terms. The second 
approach is to regard the poet's attitude as in some sense 
metaphorical, i.e. he is trying to convey an idea of "fairy", his own 
subjective understanding of the term, not in any detail or series of 
details but in the subjective reponse those cumulative details 
arranged in that way may arouse in the reader. This is essentially a 
romantic interpretation of the poetic method and as such is somewhat 
suspect when applied to writing in Middle English. In general, 
however, if any writer is concerned to convey an experience and he 
cannot rely on Reference to external details (the sensory data) of 
that experience adequately to recreate it for a reader he must resort 
to an evocative method. In literature this resides in metaphor and 
image, in language in the Associative meaning of words, in folklore in 
the levels of irrational belief certain human situations demand.
These two approaches which regard description or text of this
nature as either a typification of experience or a metaphor for
experience constitute searches for Applicability of meaning and the
Associative in meaning respectively, as described in Chapter 2. From
*
the earliest date fairy seems to partake of both kinds of meaning, as 
can be seen from the unclear etymology, from the vagueness or 
ambiguity of early uses and from the number of contributory influences 
on romances such as Sir Orfeo.
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4.4 Conclusion
Wbat bearing then do these observations have on the issues 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 and on the data which provide the 
substance of the remainder of this study? They have little direct 
relevance to level (4), but to the other three are quite pertinent. 
With regard to level (1), one can extrapolate from the above argument 
the interpretation that the relation between word and putative 
Referent is a loose one, such that the form of the word may vary 
whilst the Referent remains constant (in some sense), or the Referent 
may vary for a word of fixed form, or both may vary;'and this is 
particularly true for level (2), supernatural names, as shown by the 
bo* and puck examples. At level (3) fairy is no exception to this. Its 
meaning and origin may be nothing like as precise as we might imagine 
or as dictionaries might lead us to believe.
The observations also serve to underline the restrictions on the 
value of a rigorous formal analysis of lexical meaning, the testing of 
which, it will be remembered, was an auxiliary aim. We may achieve aim 
<B), rigour, in specifying the language studied (English), the period 
studied (1320 to 1829), the field, mode and genre of each text, the 
object-word, and the province of the word semantic. Each has been 
managed herein with a satisfactory degree of success. However each is 
aiso exposed as arbitrary by this chapter. The chosen example is 
neither unique nor distinct from other names such as elf, pixy, puck 
and goblin. It has no precisely specifiable form, but shades into 
forms such as <frairies>, <ferrishers> and <fairfolk>. The meanings it 
possesses are not specific to the chosen language nor period, and are 
dependent on/related to meanings of other words and similar words in 
other languages in other periods. We may characterise the style of a
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text by internal criteria, but if we wish to know the constraints 
forming that style, precise specification of genre or field break 
down, and thus does precision in the specification of the Stylistc 
meaning of the object-word. Many more objections and variations could 
be listed. Essentially the conclusion is that fairy exists as a fuzzy 
point on not one but several intersecting continua, and that a formal 
operation upon that point pares much of the fuzziness away and thus 
disguises the continua and distorts the object of study. Thus no 
matter how precise our formal description of the meaning of fairy it 
must be no more than a model, and cannot be an objective description
•of fact.
For example it is clear that fairy begins in English with a 
complex meaning. It acquires that meaning not merely by virtue of the 
texts in which it is used, but probably by virtue of those texts in 
which it is not used. It acquires meaning by virtue of extant words 
which are similar and may or may not be used in similar texts. It 
acquires meaning by virtue of its previous history, of the traditions 
and beliefs its different users are aware of, of rhetorical 
constraints on usage and fashions in diction, such as the preference 
for rhyming 'French' verse over alliterative 'English'. And it 
acquires meaning by virtue of complex cultural interactions concerning 
the supernatural. Thus one of the key notions which links usage of 
fairy throughout the period seems to be that of "fatedness" but not 
only can we trace this notion to no particular culture, tradition, 
style, register or period, we cannot even specify what that notion 
entails. ''Fatedness" is itself a vague concept. How then are we to 
define the vague concept "fairy” if we can only appeal in turn to 
other vague concepts? The answer can only be that assumed in allowing 
metalanguage equivalence with native speakers' intuitive knowledge of 
the object language. The object word is defined by a model which is an
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abstraction from a data base, and that model is tested intuitively 
against the testers' knowledge of the rest of the language.
The remaining chapters can now be approached in a suitably 
cautious way. They represent as objective an exhaustive examination of 
the semantics of one word as can be made, and they provide an 
explanation of many aspects of those semantics. They do so adhering to 
the model of the problem outlined in Chapter 1, the model of possible 
solutions provided in Chapter 2 and the procedure given in Chapter 3. 
However they provide only one of many possible abstractions from one 
of many possible sets of data which deliberately sets aside the kind 
of difficulty discussed above. This abstraction is therefore only a 
model itself. Thus it can only partly meet question (i), "How does 
fairy mean?” because the model appeals to knowledge outside the texts 
rather than describing that knowledge. With respect to questions (a) 
to (c) then, characterise is the operative word, for the chapters 
model semantic relations that probably obtain the accuracy of which 
can only ultimately be tested by reader's intuition, but a good 
measure of which is the cohesion of the model and its explanatory 
adequacy^Question (d), "does a supernatural name have one 
meaning, several, or a continuum of meaning?" can already be answered 
to a large extent. We can say that from the earliest date fairy 
possesses several meanings which seem to exist on continua. Whether it 
subsequently expands, contracts, acquires firm boundaries or remains 
essentially the same is the subject of the remaining chapters.
Cl) For discussion of the notion of explanatory adequacy see Chomsky 
( J 957) .
CHAPTER 5 : LINGUISTIC RELATIONS IN THE MEANING OF ‘FAIRY*
5.1 Introduction
The preceding chapters of this study have defined its province in 
progressively narrower terms, moving from general concern with the 
meaningfulness of lexemes through Level 1, the specification of the 
problems of a particular Class of lexemes, those with fictional 
Reference, to Level 2, concern with the subset supernatural names of 
which Level 3, fairy, was selected as typical and worthy of detailed 
study. A general theory of the meaningfulness of such lexemes was 
outlined by use of the notion of the Cluster and meaningful Clusters 
were identified with the Cotext of a given object-word on the 
assumption that this Cotext encodes clues to the Reference,
Denotation, Sense relations and Associative meaning of that 
object-word The general answer to question B, "how does fairy
mean?" is thus that, if in no other way, supernatural names are 
interpreted as possessing meaning and putative Reference by virtue of 
the Cotexts in which they occur and/or the semantic Clusters which 
prompt their use.
Chapter 3 outlined methods whereby the information encoded in 
Cotext could be revealed and organised so that generalisations could 
be extracted from the established corpus as valid for the total langue 
for English in the prescribed period and it was suggested that some of 
those generalisations would apply not only at Level 3 but also at 
Levels 1 and 2. In contrast Chapter 4 detailed as a caveat the 
difficulties inherent in attempting to gain a completely hermetic 
formal description, particularly in respect of the boundaries of 1
(1) See Chapter 2.
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period, form and the language studied, and began to answer question A, 
"what does fairy, mean?" as well as providing the foundation for a 
diachronic answer to question B, by showing some of the semantic 
features fairy. could be said to have brought into English or acquired 
in its earliest uses, in particular the concept "fatedness".
The remaining chapters of this investigation are primarily 
concerned with Level 3. They take each of the broad semantic areas 
decribed in Chapter 2 in turn, and examine the data derived from the 
corpus as evidence of those types of meaning. Whilst it would be 
possible to discuss every semantic Group and Cluster, this is not the 
intention of the present work as it would be unnecessarily bulky, 
repetitious and unstructured. Earlier drafts of this study illustrated 
the unwieldy nature of such an approach. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 thus 
constitute a distillation of a much larger discussion. Reproducing the 
discussion here in full would entail a number of repetitions of 
evidence, observation and argument. Consequently it was decided to 
state each argument once in the appropriate chapter, supported by 
illustrative data from the corpus rather than a complete account of 
every example. Where these observations could be expanded in 
discussion of further Groups they have been noted but not detailed.
The accounts provided in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 together with the 
resultant models are thus substantiated by additional evidence, not 
just-the examples quoted. Exceptions to this general rule are always 
noted in the text.
Thus each of the three chapters proceeds in the following way. An 
introductory section outlines the arguments to be presented and how 
they relate to the levels, questions and problems raised in section
I.I and Chapter 2. Each of those arguments is then given in full, 
usually with the support of detailed exploration of one or more
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important semantic Groups. Where it is felt that other observations 
need to be made about that Group they are generally included even if 
peripheral to the m a m  argument but in such a way that they should not 
distract or detract from it. Finally the semantic area under 
consideration is summarised, its problems with respect to fairy 
stated, and a model of the described relations is given. Each model is 
an abstract of the major relations established in the chapter 
preceding it, and can be read as a model of the semantic inputs in the 
total meaning of fair^ and the choices possible between those inputs. 
They may thus be read also as models of the encoding (and, by 
reversing the model, decoding) processes of users^ although this 
can only be done tentatively and there is no claim here that those 
models are cognitive. The three models are integrated in Chapter 8 
where also will be found a detailed evaluation of the whole study and 
its adequacy to the problem. An additional organisational feature of 
all four of these chapters is the tracing of diachronic trends, where 
evident, in an attempt to relate the theoretical description to an 
actual process. This is done partly because treatment of the entire 
corpus as a synchronic unity would clearly be a gross 
oversimplification and partly because the explanation of some of the 
Groups appears to lie in local historical facts rather than semantic 
universals or ontological relations.
This chapter is concerned with those aspects of meaning which 
most properly can be.regarded as intra-linguistic, particularly Sense 
relations. 5.2 examines sentential rolel^ in the systemic sense, 
as these form the highest nodes in the hierarchy of Table 3.6.b. 12
(1) Using encoding and decoding as descriptions of human language 
processes according to the model provided by information processing
research. 6
(2) See Berry (1975) pp.77-82 where function is used rather than role
Berry uses circumstance rather than situation. •
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These roles are thus regarded as representative of fundamental choices 
and thus the implication of choosing fairy to fill a particular role 
is discussed at some length, involving examination of topicalisation, 
of stylistic distribution and of diachronic development. It is argued 
that selection of the role filled by fair* involves a macro-semantic 
choice, that is a choice which focusses upon or away from fairy, and 
may thus relate to Associative meaning, but that no specific Sense 
relations, Groups or Clusters are entailed by such choices so that 
choices at a more specific level are not constrained. However filling 
one role in a sentence by fair* necessarily means that the remaining 
roles will be taken by tokens of other lexemes, and these are 
restricted within this corpus.
5.3 is concerned with Sense relations^ It is shown that Table
3.6.b does encode some prominent and significant Sense relations, but
also obscures others; and that fairy cannot be described purely in
terms of such relations, which thus undermines the theory of fictional
(2)
Reference founded on such a description i GROUP is used as an 
example of a semantic category which simultaneously illustrates the 
usefulness and inadequacy of such an approach. Relations of partial 
synonymity and antonymity are discussed, and three semantic groups are 
examined as evidence of the varying adequacy of the notion of Sense 
relations for explaining fairy, and as areas in which Sense relations 
provide important constraints on Cotext. These groups are POSITION 
SMALL and SENSATION. POSITION is shown to be amenable to formal 
description as a Set of Sense relations, but that description to be of 
little use. SMALL is shown to be distorted by the Sense relations it 
possesses. SENSATION is shown to be a Group which, despite 
expectations of its ontological determinacy is highly structured by 12
(1) See 2.4.
(2) See 2.3.2.
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Sense. The reasons for the presence of these Groups in the corpus is 
also examined. Finally all the aspects of Sense which are discussed 
are summarised in one model, and possible connections with other 
semantic areas are suggested.
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5.2 Sentential roles
As this study is primarily concerned with linguistic problems 
those aspects of meaning which can be seen as existing as linguistic 
knowledge are of central importance. Although inferences will be made 
in subsequent chapters which extrapolate from linguistic knowledge to 
other areas of human knowledge, it is language that binds these areas 
together, and it is textual evidence which underlies those 
extrapolative arguments.
For the analyst one of the most striking features of the 
processes of analyses described in Chapter 3 was the fact that they 
seemed to produce generic semantic categories which corresponded 
closely with semantic primitives derived from other research 
programmes. The phrase semantic primitive is here used to mean any 
semantic unit or category which is taken to exist at the most basic 
levels of a semantic system, i.e. the most general and most essential 
units of meaning out of which more complex units are built. As can be 
seen from Table 3.6.b the primitives proposed by the procedure here 
adopted, encoded in the highest nodes of the relational hierarchy, 
correspond closely with the categories known in systemic grammar as 
sentential roles. The categories were arrived at independently of 
systemic description, although the labels adopted for those categories 
are those of that grammar in order to demonstrate the connection.
- --- If-,the descriptions of systemic grammar are generally applicable 
to English it is unsurprising that analysis of a corpus of sentences 
should produce systemic type categories. The fact that an independent 
study can do so must be confirmatory of the validity of systemic 
approaches to grammatical description. At the same-time the fact of
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such a descriptive grammar independently existing suggests that the 
procedure described above and the semantic groups produced by it are 
valid in language as a whole.
If meaning implies cboice(l) 234 then from the point of view of a
(2)sentence-based grammar the fundamental meaning of any lexeme, 
independent of any signifying or symbolic function it may have as 
itself, will be the role it typically adopts in a sentence. Whether 
syntactic choice constitutes meaningful choice is merely a quibble 
about vocabulary. Essentially, as any choice entails information, 
then the typical sentential role of a lexeme will be indicative of the 
part it plays in the whole linguistic (and perhaps also conceptual)
system. As is common knowledge, and has previously been described in
(3)this study fairy almost exclusively occurs in two roles, or two 
syntactic or conceptual categories. On the one band it is frequently 
a noun, a nominal, usually filling the sentential role of
(4)actor/goal , and this is typically its grammatical slot under the 
label N used in the preliminary analysis. On the other, the label P 
in that analysis covered almost exclusively tokens of the lexeme which 
were adjectival, modifiers, generally filling the siiuational role.
It would be easier simply to say that fairy occurs in the corpus 
almost exclusively as either noun or adjective. Pretheoretically one
(1) This is a functionally abstract notion of meaning, typical of 
vllvlTasl9he0Ty deSCripti00S of -»«ingfulneas, e.g. Shannon and
(2) As distinguished from a text-based grammar. Such grammars differ 
fundamentally with regard to the nature of grammatically and 
implicitly, the notion of bow an indvidual creates, conceives’and 
interprets utterances. For discussions of the debates between 
sentence-based and text-based grammars see Dre^l^r
(3) See Chapter 4. 16 vi
(4) In systemic actor and goal are distinct roles, but it »ill
be argued here that it ts often impossible to distinguish betueen 
them.
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would accept this statement and, for all practical purposes, it is 
sufficient. However as has been demonstrated, the noun/adjective
important as has been shown in the examination of the etymology of 
fair* in Chapter 4. There it was argued that in early usage the noun 
was no more than a 'special case' of the adjective, the primary sense 
of fairer being that it was a quality in events or situations (and thus 
generally filling the situational role) and the noun form simply being 
a shorthand form of the adjective, as in Orva la fee. Whilst the 
distinction between a noun, an adjective 'used as' a noun and a clause 
containing an adjective together with a 'deleted' noun may be 
hairsplitting and perhaps only of methodological significance 
linguistically, semantically it may be crucial if we are concerned to 
know whether this occurrence Refers to a specific kind of creature or 
thing, a quality of the world or experience which (necessarily) 
happens to be manifest in creatures and things (such as the notion of 
"fatedeness" proposed above(2)) or an ambiguous notion, the precise 
status of which is unclear even to the user. A pertinent analogy 
ocCurs in Si^Gawayn and The Green Knight, interpretations of which 
could be radically different according to the status awarded to grene
Is it the colour "green" they are laughing at? Does j>at grene 
mean" "they are laughing at that (particular shade of) green"? Clearly 
the phrase means "that green creature/man". But are we then to 
suppose that £rene is here 'acting' as a noun (for which there is a
(1) See pages 143-7.
(2) Chapter 4.
distinction may not always be a clear one^^> and the ambiguity is
"Ve kyng and Gawen fare
At fat grene yay laje and grenne,
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special category, namely "substantive")? Or is it 'actually' an 
adjective whose noun has been suppressed or deleted? Does it perhaps 
imply that the author, or Arthur, believed in a class of creatures 
called the greens (after their colour, perhaps)? If so one could 
argue that, as fairies lived in,fairy, so these creatures lived in 
jgeen or on .green{they lived on village greens, wore green clothes, 
ate green plants). Or perhaps it suggests that there were many 
things/creatures called green(s) from which the notion of "green" was 
eventually abstracted. Perhaps the author was uncertain whether green 
was actually a quality of certain creatures, or a type of creature and 
therefore used this ambiguous construction. Perhaps he is 
simultaneously thinking of both a notion of "greenness" and a specific 
green creature, as Empson describes for his first type of ambiguity^
The argument could be taken to absurd lengths. It demonstrates, 
however, that different interpretations are possible. The question: 
"When is a noun not a noun?" and: "When does a noun not Denote an' 
Object?" can usually be solved in actual texts by breadth of 
knowledge, detailed examination of Cotext and Context and 
high-probability guesses, but they are much more difficult to solve in 
the abstract. Unfortunately as outlined in Chapter 1, when dealing 
with nouns Denoting the supernatural one necessarily must consider 
those questions in the abstract. Consequently the terms actor/goal 
and situation seem more appropriate as they^are less categorical than 
noun and adj.e_ctive, paying for this usefulness by an equivalent amount
(I) Empson (/96IJ pp.2-5: ”cbeSe reasons, and «.an, more...,must all 
combine to give the line its beauty, and there ,■« » t- *
in not knowing which of them to hold most clearly in mind. CleaifJ * 
this is involved in ell such richness and heightening of effect and 
the machinations of ambiguity are among the very roots of poetry "
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of vagueness, and also they capture something of the extra-sentential 
use of lexemes as well as their intra-sentential functions.
In general nominal groups fill the role of actor or goal, verbal 
groups fill the role of action and adjectives and other modifiers that 
of situation, although in principle any role may be filled by any 
syntactic unit. Any noun in any sentence is as likely to be filling 
the role of actor as that of goal. In a sense actor and goal are 
similar roles, for the use of either in a sentence seems to imply that 
the Referent is an Object, and in an intransitive sentence if one is 
to assign the role of goal in that sentence (rather than saying that 
that role is not filled in that sentence) it will be filled by the 
noun or nominal which also fills the role of actor. It would seem 
merely conventional (or else implying in some sense that actor is more 
important than or logically prior to goal) to say that the boy in the 
sentence The_boy thought is actor rather than goal, for the goal of 
the action of thinking must surely be the thinker. One could thus
characterise intransitive verbs as assigning the role of goal to the 
actor, or as dealing with a hybrid role called the actor/goal.
Within the corpus fair* seldom fills the role of action, and is
roughly equally distributed between actor and goal with twice as many
occurrences of situation. In some cases it is not clear whether a
given token is filling the role of situation or goal, for it may be
difficult to decide if the token or phrase is the specific goal of the
action or a situational modifier applying to the whole nuclear
sentence. For example, the angel flew up to heaven consists of a
nuclear sentence composed of ACTOR, the angel, and ACTION, flew,
together with an additional element, up to hea^n Three
interpretations are possible. Up to heaven v■JL.. » neaven can be regarded as part of
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tbe action, i.e. flying up'1 is a specific action distinct from 
merely flying ; or up to heaven may be regarded as the goal of the 
action, up being the directional goal of flew, heaven the locational 
goa1’ or up-t°-heaven can be regarded as situational, modifying tbe 
whole of the nuclear sentence. Therefore in this study in cases where 
tbe distinction between goal and situation is difficult to make, the 
ambiguous elements have been interpreted as situation if they Denoted 
time or place, or seem to imply Item rather than Object.
With regard to the roles of actor and goal fairy is roughly 
equally distributed between the two. In some cases it fills the role • 
of actor for a lexeme taking tbe role of goal whereas in others the 
lexeme is actor and fairy is goal. For these lexemes which are within 
the corpus equally distributed between tbe two roles this exchange of 
roles probably represents a shift of focus between the two elements 
such that in some cases fairy is regarded as prior to the Entity ’ 
Denoted by tbe other lexeme, whereas in others the reverse is the 
case. This difference of focus may represent tbe difference between 
credulity and scepticism, as in the difference between the sentences:
(1) Fairies dance their circles on the green.
(2) Circles of grass are fairy rings.
Although these sentences both say very similar things, there 
seems to be a difference of emphasis between them such that (1) 
implies existence of an Entity "fairy" mcnre than (2). One could say 
that tbe logic of (1) treats grass circles as a consequence of there 
being fairies, and therefore implies tbe existence of fairies, whereas 
(2) regards fairies as an explanation for grass circles, implying 
that tbe circles exist and therefore require explanation.
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Other reasons for the difference of focus can be suggested 
however, most of which are Context or Cotext dependent. One may be 
that the topic of the text is figured primarily in one of the two 
lexemes, whereas another text reverses those concerns, i.e. whereas 
one text is 'about fairies' another simply mentions fairies in 
passing. For example one could compare the typical concerns of a 
romance and a scientific treatise or, to take particular examples, 
Mfjuglni (1500/01) and Fulke’s Meteors (1563/02). The former has as a 
central topic the existence of fairies and their behaviour, and much 
of its matter is concerned with this behaviour, whereas the latter is 
concerned with scientific explanation of natural phenomena, 
particularly marks on the surface of the earth. Obviously the 
difference in topics reflects different attitudes towards phenomena 
which can be characterised as "credulity" and "scepticism" 
respectively (in terms of the texts) although the actual beliefs of 
the author of Melusine and Fulke perhaps do not differ.
One can suggest therefore that a primary semantic choice made in 
use of fajjJE. within the period is that of focus or topicalisation, 
such that use of fairy in the role of actor/goal implies, at least 
within the text, more substantiality for the Denotatum than its use in 
the situational role. One of the major Groups in the hierarchy is 12 
BEING, a Group whose lexemic tokens almost invariably fill the 
actor/goal role. As will be shown in Chapter- 7 on Denotation, the 
crucial feature of this Group is the substantiality awarded it by 
users, for BEING is primarily used in an agentive capacity, and that 
substantiality is keyed to the sentence role such tokens are given. 
That is to say, role focus is not simply a linguistic choice in vacuo,
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but a choice which depends on and encodes attitudinal and conceptual 
orientations of the user. This is a theme which is one of the clearest 
general conclusions of this study, and which it will be necessary to 
reiterate throughout the following chapters: it is not possible to 
discuss the important linguistic aspects of a supernatural name (and, 
by implication any noun with fictional Reference) without recourse to 
extralinguistic information. Linguistic facts in isolation can tell us 
something about the nature, meaning and use of fairy, but by no means 
give us a fully adequate account.
Having observed that the choice between actor/goal and situation 
is one of the most fundamental a user can make, it is possible to look 
at the diachronic pattern of such use and to use the relative 
proportions of the choices made as an index of fluctuations in 
attitude. It must be remembered that what is being described is 
textual attitude rather than actual attitude, i.e. such an index would 
not necessarily represent actual attitudes of authors, audience or 
people of the period in general, as no text necessarily encodes such 
information. One could however extend the inference to what may be 
called "conventional attitudes" and conclude that whether or not the 
fluctuations represent actual changes in the collective attitudes of 
individuals, they nevertheless represent changes of convention, i.e. 
changes' in the attitudes people wished to exhibit.
There are three pieces of information of use at this level of 
abstraction which were provided by the above analyses. Firstly one can 
examine the number of occurrences of fairy in each period, using this 
as an index of use and interest. To be a thoroughly accurate index one 
would need to amend the graph of occurrences collected by a 
statistical estimate of the degree of error for each period but,
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within the assumption of the study that the number of occurrences 
collected reflects the actual usage, such estimate of error is 
unnecessary (and would probably be impossible to achieve). The second 
type of information is the actual numerical difference between roles 
adopted for each period. This can be regarded as an index of the 
interest in "fairy" as a substantial or a qualitative entity. Thus, 
for example, if a given period shows four occurrences of fairy in the 
role of situation and twenty-four in the role of actor/goal, one could 
infer that fairy was much more frequently regarded as an Object rather 
than an Item in that period by a factor of 6:1. However the apparently 
absolute nature of the inferences derived from these two types of 
information may well be misleading. It is obviously difficult, if not 
impossible, to quantify degrees of attitudinal difference, and there 
are too many uncertainties in the analytical procedures adopted for 
the figures presented to be acceptable in absolute terms. Furthermore 
the bald statement that "in the decade beginning 1740 there were 24 
occurrences of fairy and of these 8 took the actor/goal role and 16 
the situational role" is of little interest or use in isolation. Thus 
the most useful type of information is the third, namely the relative 
proportions of the roles for each period, that is, the total number of 
times a particular role was filled in a particular period by the 
lexeme fairy expressed as a percentage of the total number of 
occurrences of fairy for that period. This information not only 
reveals.for each period the degree to which "fairy" was regarded as a 
substantial Entity (an Object) but also enables comparison with other 
periods and thus the establishment of trends and diachronic patterns. 
Table 5.2.1 summarises this percentage information as a bar graph, 
each bar representing a decade, beginning with the year 1320, with the
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shaded area representing the proportion of occurrences of fairy in the 
role of actor/goal and the unshaded area that proportion in the role 
of situation. It is also useful to know the degree to which one role 
rather than the other is chosen, i.e. the difference between the two 
roles expressed as as a percentage of the total occurrences for each 
decade. This is recorded on the line graph Table 5.2.2, with the 
dotted line indicating zero percentage difference.
It will be seen that situational (modificational, adjectival) use 
of ! a.ir .y greatly predominates throughout the period. This is 
counter-intuitive as we would expect the preferred use of fairy to be 
as a noun Denoting a particular supernatural creature. In only two 
decades, those beginning in 1720 and 1750, is the role of actor/goal
( i)preferred to that of situation' 'and in the latter of these this is 
only a 10% favouring. The question of whether the situational role is 
actually preferred in the other decades, or whether the two possible 
functions are regarded/used equally depends on what is regarded as a 
significant difference. Clearly over the whole period situation is 
favoured, though in some periods it is favoured rather more than in 
others. A gross simplification which nevertheless provides an 
insightful framework within which to work divides the corpus as a 
whole into five periods, namely:
1320 - 1599 Situational role favoured : Medieval 
1600 - 1629 No significant difference : Renaissance 
1630 - 1719 Situational role favoured :Post-Renaissance 
1720 - 1759 No significant difference :C 18 Classical 
1760 - 1829 Situational role favoured -.Romantic 
As the period titles on the right indicate, very rough equations 
can be made with very broad literary/historical periods. 1
1. I t  must be remembered that the analysis attempts to equate 
single tokens with roles, rather than clauses or groups. In 
many cases fairer i s  acting as a situational modifier within a 
group or dependent clause which as a whole takes the nominal role
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Th£S6 rosy b6 thought of as providing a broad overview of 
stylistic/semantic change.
It would be unwise to press such an simplification too far, but 
taking it this far at least serves to reify those trends which are 
observable. Furthermore a tentative suggestion can be offered in 
explanation of this pattern, although it must be recognised that the 
availability of the explanation m  some measure accounts for this 
broad historical classification. The general explanation would be that 
during periods where no significant difference exists, or where it is 
much reduced, there is an increase in regarding fairy as nominal, thus 
referring to a creature, place etc. and/or a decrease in regarding it 
as a modifier, thus quality, attribute etc.; or, in the terminology 
proposed in Chapter 2, there is a shift towards regarding "fairy" as 
an Object and away from regarding it as an Item. One possible reason 
for this may be a comparative emphasis on oral folk tradition. As will 
be seen below there is a broad stylistic difference between the 
oral and literary traditions in that the former tend to use fairy more 
in the role of actor/goal, tend to nominalise it more, tend to 
topicalise in the direction of credibilty^ and tend not to use 
fairY in a generic qualitative sense. Thus an increase in records of 
oral traditions, or an increasing use of such traditions in 
literature, may be evident in the periods called here Renaissance and 
C18 Classical. The former seems likely, the latter less so, yet it is 
the latter where the move towards actor/goal is most strongly 
manifest. Examination of actual texts shows that in the Renaissance 12
(1) Section 6.2.3.2.
(2) As discussed above, pp.196-7.
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period the sixty-seven texts recorded in the second analysis fall into 
the following fifteen categories of mode^\
Comic Drama 19
Literary
X
Oral
Lyric 14 X (x)
Tragic Drama 7 X
Tract 7 X
Witch Trial 5 X
Masque 3 X
Treatise 3 X
Narrative Poem 2 X
Bestiary I X
Satire 1 X
Eclogue 1 X
Tale 1 X
Elegy 1 X
Chapbook 1 X
Conjuration 1 X
67 48 19(33)
These do not readily fall into the two categories
, ( 2)literary/sophisticated and'oral/folk* although
tolttll 6 . fUUer trea£me,,t the S ty liS tic  c^ o r U s used here see
(2) Oral is in inverted commas as it self evident r .
textrdiscussed in the corpus ere in f«t oral 2°“  °f tbe
characterise a type of written discourse rather than iiteiaily"1 “  
assuming that these discourses are closer renraco«*^;,/ t y’
particular oral varieties than those texts more rnncr- nS1ofi c co sciously worked and
called here literary .
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tentative ascriptions have been proposed beside these categories. 
Examination of Tables 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 will show that fairy encodes 
situation in slightly less than two thirds of the occurrences in this 
period. The ascription above identifies roughly two thirds of the 
texts as literary. One may thus conclude though tentatively that there 
is some measure of correlation between 'literariness' and treating 
fair^as situational. The conclusion must be tentative because it has 
taken no account of the relation between number of texts and 
occurrences, criteria for stylistic classification of text and for 
ascription of literary/oral have not been adduced, and the 
correspondence of figures is only very rough. Without a lengthy 
exposition it would be difficult to offer more certain conclusions. 
However sampling of the texts here called oral seems to validate the 
judgement (i.e. many of the actor/goal encodings are manifest in these 
texts), and it is a truism of Renaissance scholarship that oral, folk 
traditions were increasingly evident in written texts for two reasons, 
firstly a scholarly and literary interest in native traditions in 
general, sparked off by envy of the classical Greek and Roman 
traditions, by a desire to emulate them in native culture and by 
manifestation of a related desire, the curiosity of reason emulating 
Greek science; secondly as a result of cheap printing, relative 
affluence, and a larger educated middle class drawn from the working 
classes, an increasingly greater market for popular lore and anecdote, 
change of medium for traditions previously oral. Popular 
treatises and tracts, accounts of witchtrials, and the development of 
chapbooks (cheap literature on any and all subjects) all catered to a 
growing literacy and all either used material of the folk or developed 
other material along popular lines. Thus, for example, the
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Renaissance produced numerous treatises of popular theology and the 
supernatural, as today there are innumerable snippets of popular 
science diluted in the floods of the media.
There is thus no need to belabour the point that the Renaissance 
represents an upsurge in written versions of oral, folk tradition. 
However for the period 1720-1759 this is not the case. Indeed it 
could be argued that this is the period of literary sophistication par 
excellence and that by no means was elevated literature interested in 
the superstitions of the uncivilised and boorish masses. The texts for 
this period break down into the following modes: ‘
Literary Oral
Tale 8 X
Narrative Poem 3 X
Lyric 2 X (x)
Eclogue 2 X
Complaint 2 X
Ode 2 X
Travelogue 1 (x) X
Treatise 1 X
Chapbook 1 X
Epistle 1 X
Satire 1
%
X
24 13(11) 11(13)
Once again examination of Tables 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 shows that the • 
proportions of actor/goal to situation for the period are roughly 
47:53, which is approximately a ratio of 12:13, surprisingly close to
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the proportion of texts'0 . simplifying once more one cen sey that 
half the text, are literary and half oral, that half the occurrences 
of fairy are situational and half actor/goal, and examination of the 
texts confirms that the correspondence is literary to situation and 
oral to actor, though the actual textual correspondences are not as 
perfectly one to one as this might suggest. The reason that oral 
formulations are present here is plain. Despite the frequency of 
sophisticated literary forms in this period which use fair*. such as 
the eclogue, the ode and the complaint there is equally an interest in 
oral lore, particularly in the form of folktales which, in the second 
quarter of the Eighteenth century were enjoying a vogue as a 
fashionable genre - tales collected from oral sources and, generally
rewritten, presented as naive and new for an audience somewhat sated 
with literary artifice.
Thus the identification of five periods in the development of 
fair,; seems plausible. It will be taken up and expanded in Chapter 6. 
The present purpose is simply to draw the general conclusion that even 
the most abstract semantic categories of the corpus, sentential roles, 
cannot simply be regarded as isolated structures existing in the 
abstract as the necessary frame for the sentence. Certainly they do 
provide and describe that necessary frame, but they exist by virtue of 
what is done with them, i.e. by virtue of actual sentences made and 
uttered, 'not as a construct of the mind w^ich, in some sense, 
sentences can be made out of. They serve firstly syntactic function in 
that they establish relations between tokens in sentences, but they (I)
(I) It must be confessed that, considering the imprecision of the 
methods the closeness of the correspondence is remarkable. The 
proportions of actor/goal to situation were calculated after the 
attribution of literary/oral to texts in order to prevent bias.
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serve other semantic functions also. They facilitate topicalisation, 
which is a function of Affective meaning (the interest a 
writer/speaker has in a particular Entity) and Reference (the.degree 
to which an Entity is made important by the situation it is in). 
Furthermore they seem to encode Stylistic meaning, in that encoding 
f.ain. in actor/goal indicates "folk idiom" and encoding it in 
situation indicates "literary idiom". However there is no intrinsic 
property of syntactic roles, nor do they appear to correlate with any 
property which is related to Sense. Sense relations as discussed in 
Chapter 2 and below encode the basic semantic logic of the language. 
One can thus regard the primary input of a text using a supernatural 
name as composed of a selection of Sense relations to be encoded plus 
assignation of sentential roles to tokens of the lexemes encoding 
those relations, i.e. selection of cognitive meaning plus syntactic 
realisation of that meaning. However as has been shown other factors 
may determine the manner in which such meaning will be syntactically 
encoded and, as will be shown, such factors may also influence the 
selection of the Sense relations.
One can summarise the processes so far described at levels (1) 
and (2) in Table 5.2.3.
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Table 5.2.3
SENSE
TOPICALISATION
influences---► encoding
STYLE
t
ROLES
And in the case of fairy at level (3), the particular choices can be 
represented as in Table 5.2.4.
Table 5.2.4
SENSE
actor/goal or situation
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It will be seen that this first small model 
offers a partial answer to problem (ii) and questions (a) and (b), 
insofar as the literary/oral distinction is cultural, and the inputs 
credibility, affective power and situational prominence are real-world 
relations.
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5.3.1 Sense
Despite the insistence in much of the previous discussion that 
the meaning of fair* depends on Contextual rather than intrinsically 
linguistic information it is clear that there is such a thing as 
linguistic meaning, and consequently that Sense relations do exist 
between lexemes by virtue of their status as lexemes, as linguistic 
units. Indeed a structural linguist might well argue that semantics is 
only concerned with such relations, that the system of the langue is 
the proper object of study, and contextual, referential, 
psychological, stylistic and ontological information is irrelevant to 
language as an independent system. Such a viewpoint is very useful if 
the aim is to understand the principles of lexemic interaction at a 
general or theoretical level, and it must be at that level that 
discussion of Sense relations is carried on, but if the aim is to 
obtain as clear an understanding as possible of the actual semantics 
of particular lexemes in real texts then the abstraction must 
necessarily be anchored to the real situations of use. If furthermore 
meaning, is taken to imply at least some aspects of use and function of 
the object word, as is the case in this study, this is doubly true.
It is the purpose of this section, therefore, to divorce the 
abstract statements of graph, frequency, distribution and statistic 
from the actual corpus from which those statements are derived. It 
w i n  be assumed that those statements are about langue, about the 
relationships between lexemes which collocate with fairy rather than 
about actual texts. In this way it will be possible on the one hand to 
make statements about the object-word with a high degree of 
abstraction and on the other hand to exhibit the deficiencies of that
213
degree of abstraction (if any) and consequently the extent of the need 
for and justification of subsequent chapters.
To begin with, many statements about Sense relations have already 
been made in the course of the analytical development of Chapter 3.
The relations of entailment and synonymity as defined there are Sense 
relations. Consequently the most abstract statement that can be made 
about the Sense relations of lexemes in the corpus in terms of 
entailment and synonymy are those summarised in the hierarchical Table 
3.6.b. Two other important types of Sense relation are not contained 
in this summary however for these relations are more difficult to 
capture in formal terms. These are the relations of antonymity and 
likeness (or similarity). Clearly inversion of the test sentence for 
synonymity does not give a test for antonymity, as the negative of a 
sentence of the form "To x is to y and to y is to x" would be "To x is 
not to y and to y is not to x" which only indicates difference of 
meaning, not oppositeness of meaning. However a reasonable test 
sentence might be of the form "To x is to not-y and to y is to not-x", 
e.g. "to hate is to not-love and to love is to not-hate". Leaving 
aside the obvious ungrammaticality of such a sentence, it does provide 
a reasonable test. Thus the hierarchical summaries of entailment and 
synonymity could also be modified by relations of antonymity as tested 
by such sentences, though this would probably make the diagrams 
graphically confusing. Some such relations are however apparent where 
two dichotomous lexemes (two antonyms) or Groups are entailed by one 
lexeme or Group as 122 INDIVIDUAL BEING entails 1221 MAN and 1222 
WOMAN, or 221 APPEARING entails 2211 APPEAR and 2212 DISAPPEAR.
Likeness, of meaning is on the other hand impossible to specify 
succinctly. In effect it is partial synonymity, where two lexemes
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share common features or overlap in meaning, but that overlap is often 
tenuous. The typical expression of likeness of meaning would be "x is 
something to do with y", or "x is in some ways similar to y".
Generally likeness of meaning is understood intuitively by native 
speakers, differences being often a matter of typical situation of use 
rather than any Denotative difference( 1 K  Sharing of a single feature 
is usually insufficient for likeness to be attributed although in 
formal terms this would appear sufficient, e.g. polar bear and milk 
share the attribute "white", but are not regarded as related in 
meaning. Two lexemes which are similar in meaning will share several 
features and in addition will also exhibit similarities in the 
patterning of relationships between those features.
Thus the Group 121 GROUP has four realisations in this corpus:
1211 BAND, 1212 TRAIN, 1213 PEOPLE and 1214 NATION. Intuitively these 
are seen to be both like and unlike in meaning. In the preliminary 
analysis, where grouping of lexemes was made on a largely intuitive 
basis, these lexemes would all have been counted together despite 
their differences of meaning. Indeed one could argue that if there 
were no differences between their meanings there would be no reason 
for all four to occur in the corpus or even to exist in the language 
as useful lexemes.
As the difference between singular and plural is not only a major 
discrimination in the language but also in accounts of fairy, the 
notion of GROUP entailing as it does "band", "train", "people" and 
"nation" is here discussed on detail. The discussion firstly 
elaborates the notion of the supernatural group, then relates this to 
the four lexemes above, and finally examines the notion of the 1
(1) See Chapter 6 on Stylistic meaning.
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supernatural individual. It will be seen that whilst the recognition 
of generalised Sense relations is a useful clarification of the 
framework in which imaginative formulation of a notion such as "fairy" 
operates, the resultant broad categories obscure the manifold 
different relationships which contribute to the complementary ideas of 
likeness and difference in meaning. In other words, the discussion 
shows that although the formal hierarchy provides a framework within 
which logical constructions can be made, which might be called the 
macrostructure (,) of conceptualisation, it obscures the numerous 
illogical or paralogical constructions which are manifest in actual 
texts as the microstructure of conceptualisation. Logical structures 
in the lan^ue, such as BEING may be encoded either as GROUP or as 
INDIVIDUAL but not simultaneously as both", permit a range of less 
logical correspondences to be set up as in The fairy is a goblin, 
which could mean "A member of the group called fairies is also a 
member of the group called goblins" or "the individual called fairy is 
a member of the group called goblins" or "the individual called fairy 
is also an individual called goblin" or "the member of the group 
called fairies is also an individual called goblin" or "The group 
called fairies is also a group called goblins" etc. (I)
(I) It is not intended that macrostructure should here have rh» 
precise sense attributed to it in text  ^ 1 .
peto£i ( 1973). However such attribution „ould not'^qui« a 
modification of the model here presented. 4 re 8 maJor
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5.3.2 An Example of Sense Relations: Fairy as GROUP
Whether as a headword or modifier fairy often involves a sense of 
plurality, i.e. a group or society of fairies or a place where many 
creatures live or many phenomena of fairy kind can be found. This 
plurality led W.B. Yeats and, following him, K. Briggs (I) to identify 
a class of creatures called trooping fairies who are to be 
distinguished from a second class, the solitary fairies. The 
classification is useful up to a point, but it is misleading for 
several reasons. In the first place there are many groups of 
supernatural creatures who have features similar to groups called 
fairy, such as the Wild Hunt <2) or dancing creatures * (3), yet are not 
included in the trooping fairy classification (probably because they 
lack the fairy appellation). Secondly many of the creatures called 
fairy who are individual or isolated are incorporated by Briggs' 
classification into the trooping fairy class, probably because they 
possess many of the attributes of some of that class such as being of 
normal human size, being fond of hunting and hawking etc. The fairy 
knight in Reinbrun (1330/03/001) is abnormally isolated, living in an 
underground palace which is protected by a water sterne and grim, and 
is very ostentatious, beautiful, large, well protected and empty: Ac 
wimman ne manjfand he nonjere (83/10). Similarly Partenope (4) comes 
to a strange, beautiful, well-protected land, with beautiful bouses 
and a well fortified tower, but sees no-one, although attended by 
invisible beings: He saw no wyghteJat him bade. He believes he is in 
a^re (1490/01/002) and finds an isolated woman who becomes his lover.
M )  Yeats (1973); Briggs ( 1957), ( 1976), ( 1977). 
i?) E p. Map(1924) "King Kerla" pp.13-17.
(3) See B r a y (1879); Palmer (1973) pp.107-8.
(4) 1490/01 Partenope of Blots..
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She is later referred to as a Jynge of ffeyre (1490/01/003) but the 
contexts of these two references seem to suggest that the lady is
definitely not a fairy or fay. Even so Briggs would include her in the 
trooping fairy class.
In addition there are individual creatures who would be included 
in the classification who are not supernatural creatures at all.
Morgan la fee for example is generally described not as supernatural 
but as an enchantress, a woman who has learned particular skills 
Certainly the appellation la fee could be read as 'Morgan the fairy', 
but it could also be read as 'Morgan the enchantress' or even 'Morgan 
the magical', 'Morgan the strange', 'Morgan (of) the special power' or 
'Morgan (of) the strangeness'^.
Finally many of the creatures identified by Yeats and Briggs as 
solitary fairies are never called fairy. The Grant; for example, is 
daemonum genus '• Thus not only is the classification as it is used 
somewhat arbitrary, but it is difficult to maintain. Rather than use 
the. word fairer, it would probably be better to divide all the 
supernatural creatures on more .logical grounds if the classification 
by group is to be established in four categories, and this can be done 
using Sense criteria derived from actual texts, viz:
(a) Creatures which are always described en masse as a 
group, a host, a crowd, a hunt etc.
(b) Creatures which belong to an identified group but have 
T>een individuated from that group,
(c) Creatures which are always described as existing in 
isolation, acting alone, but spoken of as belonging to a 12
(1) See Chapter 4.
(2) Gervase of Tilbury (1856). For a translation see Reightley (1900).
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species, i.e. a 'group' or class of creatures which exist as 
individuals
(d) Unique creatures which are never classed with any others 
In general Briggs' 'trooping fairies' would be classed in (a) or 
(b) and the solitary fairies in (c) or (d). However it is not always 
possible in a particular description to decide if a creature belongs 
to (b) or (c). Usually that decision will depend on the 
reader/bearer's judgement as to the status of the group. Is it a 
social group or is it an abstract classification? (a question about 
type of text and author’s intention), is the classification analytical 
or analogical? (a question about the nature of Sense relations and 
their actual psychological employment). Are we to presume that the 
attribution of some features to an individual in one description 
qualifies that individual for inclusion within a group with similar 
features in another description? (a question about textual realistaion 
of Sense relations, reader interpretation and criteria for classifying 
phenomena). Or if an individual in (d) is compared with a class of 
individuals, does that mean the individual is not unique? (a question 
about the Applicability of the texts in question and .the connections 
between two compared items). In other words even an apparently simple 
discrimination of Sense between "individual" and "group" is dependent 
on attitudinal, conceptual, textual and Referential problems.
The classification of supernatural creatures by grouping is thus 
difficult‘to achieve and in some cases it i,s difficult if not 
impossible to decide whether a writer or speaker is classifying an 
individual with a group of the same kind or mentioning it as an 
individual member of a social group. This does not necessarily mean 
that any particular native speaker has no clear conception either of
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the plurality oi the concept of "fairy" or the word fair*, but for the 
language as a »hole no clear system can be ascertained. "Plurality" or 
"group/individual" thus must be treated as features in a Cluster as
described above to capture the complexity of actual usage.
Having said this one can return to the statement that fairy is 
used with a sense of plurality in many instances. Also one finds many 
occurrences of lexemes encoding GROUP in the corpus. In some cases 
this is clearly a statement by an observer grouping fair* with other 
names for phenomena haphazardly, as with the lists of Scot, Denham and 
Gommei^In others fairy itself seems to be used as a generic word 
covering several different kinds ,of supernatural creatures, the 
generic sense which is expanded to allow Briggs to call hags, dragons
6 ----L in a cnira set of occurrences fairy is used of
social beings (class (a) above), as in the use of nation(3). And a
fourth set consists of texts using fairy to identify individuals as 
(b)(4>. In terms of narrative one could say that characterisation or 
description may involve any of the first three of these typical uses 
without necessarily needing to clatify which is being used, but that 
narratives involving specific actions, interchange or relations with a 
human protagonist require individuation; and that classes (b), (c) 
and (d) above involve increasingly greater degrees of individuation 
according to the specific purposes of the narrative. That is to say 
the folklorists' distinction between trooping and solitary is not a 
distinction between types (races, classes) of beings (phenomena) but
(!) Scot (1584/01/004); Gomme (1890); Hardy (1891-95) A similarsr;.1: e,uivaw
(3) e.g. 1676/01/002.
(4) e.g. 1596/02/017 - captain of 0Ur fairy band
220
between the attitudes involved in folk descriptions such that the 
more general, vague and common a particular phenomenon called fairy, 
the more likely is a text to report it as typical of an individuated 
group, whereas the more specific, particular, unique and local a 
phenomenon the more likely it is to be regarded as the act of an
individual.
The differences of degree, and their correspondences to the four 
classes of statement described above, can be illustrated as follows. A 
statement of type (a) is: The race of fairies is nnt-nr^.,. 
stealing children, a reported generalisation using a group 
typification. A statement of type (b) is: The king of the band of 
fairies,who.lived under that hill once stole a neiehhonr'c „ n u  an 
event closer to the speaker in both place and type but still remote. 
Type (c) can be illustrated by A boggart threshes our c o m . ThiS| in 
the present tense, is immediate and attributed to a creature always 
found alone. Whereas type (d) could be I fve just seen the Cam* t
It frjghtened.me, an experience immediate to the speaker reported of a 
unique phenomenon.
Language is however more flexible than this. There is no
necessary or invariable relation between immediacy of phenomena and 
specificity of grouping. Yet these correspondences typically do exist 
and the reason is probably not difficult to find. The more immediate
an experience, the more intent a speaker is on conveying a precise
* ■ * 
account, in-order that the immediacy can be communicated. 'A remote
event lacks interest and relevance and thus need not be described
precisely (though a speaker is usually perfectly able to make a
precise description). To convey a vague meaning one need rely only on
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a typification of general behaviour - "this is what this 
sort/race/type/class of creatures does". The more precise the 
required statement, the more detailed the Referring expression (the 
definite description) needs to be, and the more individual must its 
Referent seem. As noted above, with regard to supernatural beings at 
least, the greatest degree of individuation can be achieved by use of 
a proper name and it would seem this is the most usual means of 
stating that a being is of type (d), even though the proper name may 
be no more than a definite description which is given special status 
(by the use of intonation or capitalisation).
Thus what seems to be a simple logical distinction between the 
Sense of .grooj, and that of individual is by no means so. Considered 
in the abstract as a dichotomy encoded in the langue it may be so 
seen, but as used in actual texts the dichotomy fails to be as precise 
and indeed may also disappear from criteria of choice when selecting a 
lexeme encoding GROUP or INDIVIDUAL, the logical distinction me, be 
unimportant, since it may be replaced by the more pressing need to
convey the emotional or physical immediacy of the phenomenon Referred 
to.
Thus one might expect what is in fact the case, that the four 
lexemes which in the corpus most frequently encode GROUP and are 
obviously semantically related by virtue of this encoding together 
with the implication of social organisation, are by no means clearly 
differentiated. It seems that although the four lexemes band, train. 
2SSSÎS. and nation are not synonymous their meanings overlap in an 
unsystematic way. There are obvious differences of magnitude between 
band and nation and of specificity between band and train on the one 
hand and H21>le and nation on the other. One could thus characterise
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their Sense relations as: 
Diagram 5.3.2.a
GROUP Large Small
Generic People Band
Specific Nation Train
Once again, however, though this may differentiate these lexemes 
on logical grounds it is neither adequate for their full meaning nor 
sensitive to the range of overlap. For example, the expression A 
people may be virtually synonymous with a nation, yet people may also 
be used of a much smaller group than that implied by nation as, for 
example, in the people of this town. There would appear to be an * 
implication in the choice of band rather than train that the group is 
less coherent, less organised and perhaps less civilised. Train on the 
other hand seems to imply an organised group of followers and would 
seem to be Stylistically related to 122111 NOBLE and 3225 ROYAL 
whereas band would not. Both the lexemes band and company (which are 
subsumed in the group BAND) seem in the corpus to carry implications 
of a loose association of individuals, behaving in no organised manner 
and with no inherent social structure, e.g.:
Leave at once thy realms of air 
TO mingling bands of fairy elves.
1807/04/001
This would see» to imply a more uncontrolled and uncivilised 
group somewhat different from the more elegant and sophisticated train 
which seems closest to the Yeats/Briggs notion of the trooping fsiry.
To some extent the seme difference is carried by NATION end PEOPLE for 
NATION could be interpreted as implying a more coherent society then . 
PEOPLE. One could thus argue that TRAIN and NATION are similar in 
that both suggest a social, organised group and that
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this is often confirmed by other collocations in the cotext of fairy 
(such as 3223 ORDER, 3 II 14 REALM, 2324 SERVE, 246 DANCE). As is 
confirmed in these and other Groups, fairy beings are credited with 
many of the attributes of social man and the groups TRAIN and NATION 
frequently seem to imply such attribution, though often without 
making it explicit. Aside from this implication however there are no 
clear grounds for separating NATION, PEOPLE, GROUP and BAND except for 
the lack of firm criteria for regarding them as synonyms.
As the relations of similarity and difference between these four 
Groups are impossible to specify, so is the full nature of antonymity 
between GROUP and INDIVIDUAL. As will be shown in the following 
chapter individuation of fairy phenomena in texts is probably largely 
a matter of Associative meaning rather than the cognitive structure of 
the language. It is the case, however, that when use is made of 
lexemes encoding GROUP seldom is use made of lexemes encoding 
INDIVIDUAL in the Cotext (although there are exceptions e.g. 
1596/02/017). This would imply that a difference is recognised and a 
choice is being made, either between two types of phenomena (or Rem) 
or between two modes of expression of fairy. In addition certain 
collocations tend to occur according to the choice made such that, for 
example, if GROUP is encoded any member of that group is less powerful 
than an equivalent individual mentioned in the encoding of INDIVIDUAL.
This would also correspond to the grading of individuation discussed 
above, such that for the purposes of a descriptive text, the actions 
of a group and of an individual are equivalent (i.e. they both have 
similar degrees of explanatory adequacy) and thus the individual is 
credited with power and attributes equal to the group. That is to say 
a fairy phenomenon may be regarded as a group of weak beings or an
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individual strong being. It is significant, for example, that 
smallness of size is more often a collective attribute of the fairy 
group than of a specific individual, e . g .  the typical phrasal 
attribution is the .little people rather than a/the little 
(Indeed the latter phrase even seems a little odd).
There are grounds therefore for seeing the corpus as containing a 
functional antonymity between GROUP and INDIVIDUAL but, as 
investigation of the notion of the fairy group (above) and the fairy 
individual (below) shows it is neither a clear cut antonymity nor a 
primary distinction in terms of actual use. It is not possible to say 
whether this is a feature of this antonymity in the language in 
general (or even of all antonyms), but it is possible to argue at 
least that whilst such antonyms may provide the frame of thought for 
conceptualisation of "fairy", it is part of the imaginative richness 
of that conception (or alternatively its illogical, primarily 
Associative nature) that the framework is inevitably broken down.
Discussion of this particular set of Sense relations has thus not 
only elaborated a specific aspect of conceptualisation of fairy but 
also illustrated the difficulty of abstract formalisation of relations 
of antonymity and semantic similarity in the corpus. However it would 
be artificial to suggest that on the one band the formal 
characterisation of entailment and synonymity is complete and a 
primary structure in the corpus whereas on the other antonymity and 
similarity are incapable of formalisation and represent no significant 
structure. Obviously, as has been illustrated, the formal hierarchy 
simplifies and generalises and equally obviously the four relations 
themselves interrelate. If one is to talk of a "semantic field" or 
"network of meaning" of which fair* is part, then all typeg of ^
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relation must interrelate. Accordingly Tables 5.3.2.b and 5.3.2.C 
summarise relations of antonymity and similarity between groups which 
can be seen to exist in the corpus. However these relations cannot be 
afforded the same status as those expressed in the formal hierarchy 
because the former have been determined largely on intuitive grounds 
based, it is hoped, on a sensitive knowledge of the corpus. As aim 
(B) of this study is to provide as objective an account as possible of 
the semantics of the object-word the necessary subjectivity of these 
tables should be borne in mind in what follows. It is to be hoped 
that there would be a high degree of intersubjective agreement as to 
the observations presented in those tables but that is, by definition, 
impossible for this observer to ascertain. It should also be 
remembered that the operative words in the last sentence but one are 
as possible. It may well be that the conclusion of such a study as 
this must be that the semantics of. a supernatural name cannot be made 
with a high degree of objectivity and that richer studies necessarily 
would depend on such subjective (but hopefully intersubjective) 
observations.
It will be seen from Table 5.2.3.b that the majority of 
identified similarities between groups whilst not felt to be 
equivalent to full synonymy have nevertheless been recognised in the 
formal hierarchy in that they have been subsumed under one implied 
group, (as PEOPLE and NATION are subsumed under GROUP) or the 
similarity is actually manifest in entailment (as VEGETATION is 
entailed by WOOD).
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Table 5J.2.b
Plausible relations of similarity through shared semantic 
referential similarity or metonymy. features,
Headword_______Similar groups Total Occurrences
Eat Drink
Evil Mischief
Come Move
Get Hold
Hurt Sicken, Pinch, Hit
Place Country, Realm, Castle
Take Carry
Say Call (Name?)
Beauty Gay
Guide Lead (Follow?)
Sound Sing, Music
People Nation, Band, Train
Royal Prince, Monarch
Earth Stone
Vegetation Wood
Bed Cradle
Dark Shade
27 
30 
303 
66 
91 
534 
117 
303 
93 
51 
128 
103 
360 
80 
110 
27 
24
[The headword is that used to refer to the group of similar 
Bracketed items are doubtful inclusions]. Groups.
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Table 5.3.2.C
Possible antonyms or opposed groups. Total
Birth 14 Death 19 33
Appear 40 Disappear 18 58
Evil 19 Good 62 81
Come 115 Go 84 199
Hide 29 Seek 13 42
(Hill) 49 (Field) 25 74
Parent 30 Child 109 139
Take 79 Bring 35 1 14
Work 20 Play 59 79
Man 1 11 Woman 154 265
Descend 35 Rise 34 69
Dark 13 Light 37 50
Far 18 Near 22 40
Small 68 Great 54 122
Soft 19 Hard 13 32
Lose 13 Find 49 62
Order 17 Wild 17 34
[Bracketed items are doubtful inclusions]
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All the remaining similarities exist between Groups which 
typically fill different sentential roles and might otherwise be 
called equivalent (e.g. the lexemes royal and monarch could be 
regarded as syntactically distinct forms of a single piece of semantic 
information, as for example sing and song could). A liberal 
interpretation of this table might therefore be that it captures 
relations of the same status, nature and value as those summarised in 
the formal hierarchy but which the formal criteria employed were not 
sufficiently sensitive to capture. Less liberal conclusions might be 
that such a table illustrates the inadequacy of a strictly formal 
approach to Sense relations, or that the notion "synonymy" is not^^ 
as formal as supposed in the previous chapter, the test sentences 
being taken as obscuring rather than classifying certain relations^ 
Table 5.2.3.C also contains pairs of Groups entailing other 
single Groups (e.g. APPEAR and DISAPPEAR both entailing APPEARANCE,
MAN and WOMAN both entailing INDIVIDUAL). This exposes one of the 
weaknesses of the formal hierarchy as a full description of the 
semantics of fairy. If this were so, and fairy could be defined as 
such a series of Sense relations, then any text would be regarded as a 
realisation of a selection of those relations. In which case one 
would be able to trace the structure of any such text by tracing 
exclusive branches through the hierarchy (once for each allowed 
sentential function per sentence), making a-choice at each node and,
(1) A discussion of the inadequacy of formal analysis of synonymy can 
be found in Akhmanova (1976) Chapter 2.
(2) E.g. it could be suggested that despite the overt form of the test 
sentence for synonymy, the actual sentence employed was of the form 
"An x is a y on some occasions and a y is an x on some occasions", 
which does not produce perfect congruence of meaning.
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on arrival at a node of suitable specificity realizing a token of a 
lexeme subsumed in one and only one of the groups branching from that 
node. This would be an attractive, because simple, means of 
characterising the Cotext of an occurrence of fairy, it has 
affinities with generative grammar in that sentences are obtained by 
single selections of successive rewrites of earlier nodes. For 
example, to fill the role ACTOR in a sentence one has firstly the 
option of rewriting ACTOR as 11 NAME, 12 BEING or 13 THING. Assuming 
one chooses 12, then (as this is a lexemic Group) a token of a lexeme 
in this Group (either being or creature) could be realized to fill 
this role. However if this lacks specificity, BEING could be 
•rewritten' as 121 GROUP, 122 INDIVIDUAL or 123 BODY. Assuming 121 
GROUP is chosen, this then could be rewritten as one of four options, 
each of which is a final node which would have to be realised by a 
lexeme. This appears to work well, and by tracing the lines of the 
hierarchy in this way one can produce sentences of a range of 
specificity which are acceptable to intuition as typical sentences 
containing fairy, and which conform to a high degree with the texts 
comprising the corpus.
This is, of course, unsurprising, for the hierarchy is intended 
to be a summary of the rules operating in typical fairy sentences as 
indicated by the texts comprising the corpus. However it can only be 
used in this way if the nodal choices are dichotomous and distinct.
It is an obvious feature of the Sense of English that the notional 
group APPEARANCE can be realised by one and only one of the groups 
22U  APPEAR or 2212 DISAPPEAR in one sentence. Otherwise the rules of 
the language are violated and one obtains the deviant or creative 
structure known as a paradox, an abnormal (atypical) use of language.
230
In such a case arrival at the node 221 APPEARANCE results in choice 
amongst mutually exclusive alternatives. Here the relations of 
antonymity and entailment function logically in the language.. However 
arrival at a node such as 12211 NOBLE allows no such dichotomous 
choice. Certainly a choice may be made between 122111 MONARCH, 122112 
LORD, 122113 PRINCE and 122114 KNIGHT as if they were exclusive 
alternatives, but equally one could choose two or more of them to 
fulfil that role. A possible realisation of ACTOR could thus be: The 
monarch,,_lprd_ and prince of all. These lexemes or Groups are not 
antonymous, nor are they synonymous, yet they are related, and all 
entail NOBLE. Furthermore the rule of selection is not of the form 
"select any or all of the Groups if similar OR select one and only one 
if antonyms" (which is in itself rather too clumsy to be particularly 
useful) as a form of selectional restriction also seems to operate 
such that monarch could occur with lord, and knight could occur with 
Lord, but monarch cannot occur with knight . This illustrates 
simultaneously both the usefulness and the inadequacy of an account of 
the meaning of fairy based purely on the Sense relations which 
surround it.
It is useful to formalise such relations to such an extent as it 
enables identification of broad semantic or conceptual areas which are 
being brought into play - for example that the most elaborate encoding 
of ACTOR/GOAL is 12 BEING, which can have any of sixteen realisations, 
suggesting not only that BEING is an important concept in this context 
but also that it is a more developed concept than, for example, 13 
THING. Furthermore it enables a number of generalisations about the 
texts and the normal structure of the meaning which form them to the 
surface without necessitating extensive (and largely superfluous)
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■verbal elaboration. In addition, as has been showi? it enables 
the identification of certain possible channels of thought which might 
underly the structuring of typical texts, e.g. if « fairy moves, then 
it comes or goes; if it carries objects, then it brings or it takes 
them etc. Whilst obvious such demonstrations are useful because (a)
they show (for example) that fair* does not exclusively bring, nor 
only appear, but that it does only have power, not weakness, (b) they 
show that part of the conceptualisation of the supernatural at least 
is logical, (c) they provide a partial model for creation of texts 
encoding "fairy", suggesting perhaps that the rules of choice 
operating at non-dichotomous nodes whilst not logical or based on 
Sense may perhaps be Stylistically or Referentially determined, and 
thereby identifying areas in which examination of these two aspects of 
meaning may be fruitful.
This suggests therefore tbst air, (B) i, not reali6tlCt and
certainly would not he possible within the parameters of formal logic,
for Sense relations at least. It was this judgement achieved at an
early stage in the preliminary analysis which led to the adoption of
the pretbeoretical specification of the object-language a. the only
satisfactory metalanguage. It is possible to make more constructive
observations with regard to the requirements outlined in Chapter I
however. Some aspects of the meaning of fairy have been outlined in
respect of questions (a), (b) and (e), for it has been suggested that
iilii Mans both "group" and "individual", the precise selection of
*
which depends on the attitude of the user in a specific 
situation-of-use, and that within that broad selection a number of 
partial systems operate (partial both insofar as they cannot be fully
(1) See pp.228-9.
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described and they have been transcended in certain texts), one of 
which is that encoded in the Groups NATION, PEOPLE, BAND and TRAIN 
whereby "size" and "orderliness" are focussed upon. It seems probable 
that such focussing depends on the explanatory or descriptive purpose 
of the text in which fairy is used. This observation will be expanded
in Chapter 6.
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5.3.3 Sense Relations of Important Groups
Having identified some areas which seem partially at least to be 
determined by Sense relations, the question of the importance of each 
particular case in the corpus then arises. Each of the Groups 
identified is worthy of its own independent study. Indeed, one might 
argue that such study was necessary before the full ramifications of 
the meaning of fairy could be understood. This may well be true. It is 
one of the problems of any investigation of semantics which employs 
the notion of a field or network of meaning, the problem of 
determining the limits of that network. In the present case however 
the concern is only with typification, i.e. with the discussion of 
those Groups whose Sense relations are particularly prominent in the 
corpus. Prominence can be defined here in two ways, either by a simple 
count of the total number of occurrences of that Group or by 
subjective identification by an observer sensitised to the relevant 
corpus. In view of what has been said about Sense relations 
transcending the formal boxes into which they have been placed, the 
latter is not ignored here. For the former those Groups in the 
hierarchy can be ascribed prominence in relation to. their total number 
of occurrences in the corpus. This total can be found by adding the 
relevant subtotals in Appendix 2. Tables 5.3.2.b and 5.3.2.C tabulate 
total occurrences for the Groups identified across that formal 
description.
It is obviously the case that the more generic the Group, the 
higher its node in the hierarchy, the larger the number of occurrences 
is likely to be. There is no way by which one can decide whether the 
high frequency of a particular Group is due to its generic and 
widespread function in the language as a whole or due to a particular 
importance with respect to fairy, nor can the proportion of these two 
influences be discriminated within any individual total, without at
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least one and preferably several comparable studies of equivalent 
corpora. If, for example, frequency tables were available for the 
general occurrence of lexemes in the language the present task would 
be greatly eased. As it is,.intelligent reading can be the only guide. 
It is to be hoped that the frequencies given here may be of use for 
comparative purposes in future similar studies.
One can however attempt to clarify certain significant features 
which distinguish the Sense relations of the corpus from general use 
on making the assumption that two antonymous Groups or lexemes would 
be of roughly equal distribution in the languag^]^Assuming this 
then one can identify antonyms in the corpus of roughly equal 
distribution, leading to the conclusion that it is the Group that they 
both entail which is the significant choice. Conversely there are 
pairs of antonyms one of which occurs more frequently than the other. 
In these cases one can argue that one of its terms is preferred and 
therefore conceptually weights fairy in that direction. Examples of 
the former are DESCEND/RISE, FAR/NEAR, ORDER/WILD and of the latter, 
PARENT/CHILD, TAKE/BRING, LOSE/FIND, APPEAR/DISAPPEAR.
One could extend the second part of this observation to provide a 
characterisation of fairy which depended on significant dichotomies, 
such that fairies will be characterised as typically associated with 
"child", "taking", "finding" and "appearing". As is well-known some of 
the most familiar motifs of oral narrative concerning fairies are 
those of the taking of children, the finding of unusual objects and 1
(1) The assumption is a large one, unsupported by any evidence I have 
been able to discover. One could argue that the distributions of the 
i-orms democracy and tyranny, or war and peace,,, or teacher and student 
were not equal and that furthermore distribution depends very much on 
what is meant by the phrase in the language.
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the abrupt or unusual appearance of fairy beings^This notion of
characterisation by dichotomy will be taken up at a later stage in
( 2 )this study. '
Related to this is the observation that certain Groups which 
occur frequently in the corpus and have common antonyms in the 
language are not opposed by those antonyms in the corporal 
typification. BEAUTY, OLD, JOY, POWER, LOVE, CLEAN and FRIEND are not 
opposed by occurrences of "UGLINESS", "YOUNG", "SADNESS", "WEAKNESS", 
"HATE", "DIRTY" or "ENEMY" (as common antonyms) sufficient for them to 
survive the exclusive process of analysis. The former Groups could 
thus also be regarded as significant choices in terms of a particular 
dichotomy such that fairj is much more typically associated with one 
or all of these groups rather than any of their antonyms.
In all such cases one can regard fairy as being defined by the 
following process. An area of significance is identified as relevant 
and fair* is characterised as typically one aspect of that area. For 
example, in one sentence the role of ACTION may be located in the area 
"moving items" and the role of SITUATION be located in the area 
"physical appearance", i.e. two sentential roles are to be filled by 
lexical counters from these semantic area&) The first area is 
specified by the Sense relation BRING-TAKE, the second (perhaps) by 
BEAUTY-UGLINESS. If the sentence is simply drawing on the normal 
characterisation of fairy TAKE will be selected in 70% of the cases *3
(I) E.g. Brand (1853) p.477; Bray (1879) p.162; Sternbere (197n
p.101, pp. 110-1, pp. 113-4
(2) See Chapter 8.
(3) This one can regard as the tvnieal i .
relation between syntax and lexical meaning Wh1M,aCC*>Unt °f the
actual psychological process remains to b e ^ e ^ L t r l t e d / 6^ 686^ 8 any.
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and BRING in 30%, whereas BEAUTY will be selected in at least 95% of 
such sentences. One can regard such selection and control as typical 
of fictional or imaginary sentences, i.e. where the putative Referent 
is a function of the language construction^^ rather than the other 
way about, which would be the case in a sentence Referring to an 
actual phenomenon. For in a Referring sentence one presumes that the 
speaker is primarily occupied with describing or Referring to the 
encountered phenomenon, and that this concern will override the 
typification process of the Sense relations inherent in the structure 
of the language.
In other words one can interpret frequency of occurrence of a 
Group as an indication of its likelihood of being used in a typical 
sentence including fairy, its typifying power perhaps an index of the 
pressure on the speaker to structure his meaning in that way; but one 
cannot take that,index (insofar as it is an index of important Sense 
relations) as a determiner of choice or meaning except perhaps in 
sentences which are to be taken as fiction. In the case of fictional 
sentences one could say both that such an index encodes the system 
employed for creation of such a fiction and, because it produces a 
typifying sentence, it also encodes the signals by which a 
reader/hearer will recognise such a sentence as a fiction. The greater 
the degree of conformity between an actual sentence and the 
probability of its elements appearing according to the Sense structure 
surrounding fairy in the lexicon, i.e. in information processing 
terms, the greater the redundancy of the items in that sentence, the 
more likely is a reader/hearer to regard it as a fiction, as a 1
(1) See Lyons (1977a); and section 2.3.3 above.
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creation of the language rather than of the world.
Consequently if Appendix 2 and the formal hierarchy are taken to 
be a list of nodes of Sense and the relations between them, with no 
implication of Reference (or indeed of Stylistic constraint), one 
could accept them as a full description of the semantics of fairy. In 
doing so however, one is implicitly accepting a theory of supernatural 
names which is non-Keferential and recognises no connection between 
the construction of sentences containing a supernatural name and any 
reality outside the logic of the language. Such a theory would fail 
with fairy for the reasons discussed in Chapter 2 and earlier in this 
Chapter. In the. first place it treats probability of occurrence as * 
self-determining, i.e. it is circular. It says: there is a probability 
x that group y will be encoded in a sentence encoding fairy because 
this has been the probability in the past. Probabilities of occurrence 
of semantic units are' not arbitrarily determined however. If they were 
then the notion of "sense" would itself be meaningless for it would be 
reduced to an arbitrary code which encodes nothing.
In fact such probabilities are determined by actual sentences in
past usage, in concrete situations. Sense relations of a particular
synchronic plane of a language record the whole of the past experience
and use of the language, its Reference, Denotation, Stylistic choice,
connotative, Affective and Emotive meaning as a single type of
information. It is true to say that Sense relations encode a large
amount of. logic (as has been demonstrated above), but they also
*
encapsulate many non-logical relations which have the surface 
appearance of logic but are in fact cultural encodings of reality, 
whether physical (as TAKE/BRING), experienced (BIRTR/DEATH) or moral 
(EVIL/GOOD). In no sense is the relation of birth to death a logical
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opposition. It is a structure of experience whose emotional profundity 
has led to it forming a key place in human thought and language. In 
other words the probabilities of encodings of Sense are in large part 
determined not by the language but by what has been done with the 
language in the past.
Secondly, regarding sentences encoding supernatural names as pure 
creations of Sense does not take into account the fact of typical 
collocation. It is a fact of the corpus that DANCE and RING tend to 
occur in the same sentence. Whilst sentences generated by mere 
probabilty could encode both Groups, most of them would encode only 
one, i.e. whilst regarding Sense as a simple indicator of Group 
occurrence might successfully account for the probability of 
occurrence of single items, it would not account for probabilities of 
co-occurrence. The reason for this is plain. A sentence that encoded 
two or more items closely related by Sense would tend to be either 
tautologous or paradoxical. Sense relations are inter-sentential not 
intra-sentential, collocations are primarily intra-sentential.
In other words a theory of construction out of 'pure' Sense 
relations fails because it needs to take account of Applicability and 
of collocation. As will be seen, these two problems are essentially 
problems of Reference and textual 'style'. Sense relations, and the 
associated notion of predictability and 'typifying power' go a long 
way towards accounting for purely fictional creations and thus 
problem (1). They are also indicative of the type of conceptual 
focussing which occurs in use of supernatural names, whereby even a 
supposedly objective description of a supernatural phenomenon tends to 
be specified in terms of the typifying network of Sense. Indeed the 
power of the language may be so great that it constrains the
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interpretation of actual situations. For example, if someone 
encounters a phenomenon which is both ugly and beautiful but which 
they believe to be "fairy" (or of which they would generally use the 
word fairy ) it is quite likely that they would discount, ignore or 
even, perhaps, not see the ugliness as not a feature of the 'meaning' 
of the word, despite it being a feature of the Referent.
These considerations can perhaps best be illustrated by 
examination of some of the Groups particularly prominent in the corpus 
in which Sense relations appear important. The remainder of this 
chapter thus examines in turn a set of Sense relations which can be 
clearly and thoroughly described in formal terms, those of 311] 
Position, but which contains little explanatory power; a set in which 
an apparently simple Sense relation actually disguises a more complex 
relation of Applicability, namely that of 3411/3412 SMALL/GREAT; and a 
set which appears to be determined by Applicabiltiy but which is 
actually strongly determined by Sense relations, namely 33 SENSATION. 
Where possible the significance of these Groups with regard to fairy 
is also discussed.
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5.3.3.1 Example I: 3)11/3112 POSITION/PLACE
The distinction between these two Groups rests largely on that
(1)between Object and Item as defined above. The latter Group, PLACE, 
can be regarded as distinct by virtue of the fact that the lexemes 
forming it Denote areas which have or may be taken to have objective 
existence and identity, whereas the former, POSITION, subsumes all 
lexemes Denoting areas which are relational, i.e. dependent on prior 
or simultaneous recognition of an existing area (and generally one 
Denoted by a lexeme entailing PLACE). One may thus use a member of 
31)2 without having Referred to any other area, but one must so Refer 
before being able to use a member of 3 111.
The positional lexemes are thus predominantly adjectival and 
prepositional. They include three Groups Denoting vertical position - 
31112 DOWN, 31114 HIGH and 31116 OVER - which are thus related to 241 
VERTICAL MOTION, and one Denoting lateral position - 31117 SIDE; two 
imply proximity - 31117 SIDE and 31115 NEAR; one is neutral in all 
these respects - 31111 WAY. The distinctions between these Groups can 
be represented by use of three categories, "vertical upward", 
"vertical downward" and "proximate", thus:
Group Vertical Up Vertical Down Proximate Occurrenc
WAY 0 0 0 21
DOWN - + 0 24
FAR 0 0 •• 18
high ■ + “ 12
NEAR 0 0 + 22
OVER­ + 0 27
SIDE 0 0 + 11135
(1) See pp.22-3.
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A fourth distinction is needed to separate NEAR from SIDE such 
that the latter is marked with respect to lateral orientation whereas 
the former is unmarked. WAY, being unmarked by any of these categories 
is somewhat difficult to specify, its essential meaning in the corpus 
is probably something like "unmarked position", for its use in general 
is in the context of some further positional specification or else 
would seem to be deliberately vague.
Thus one could say that the Group POSITION occurs with a 
significant frequency in the corpus, that the lexemes »hich compose it 
have distinct Senses and are relational^ specifiable, that the 
probabiltiy of occurrence of WAY, DOWN, NEAR or OVER is about twice 
that of FAR, SIDE or HIGH and that this Group is related in Sense to 
the ACTION Group 24! VERTICAL MOTION and to 3112 PLACE. This one can 
regard as a description of a particular network of Sense within which 
choices are made which encode part of the semantics of fairy .
For someone such facts in isolation may be interesting, but they 
are of very little use. In the first place no criteria can be adduced 
from this isolated description for the apparent preference of WAY, 
DOWN, NEAR and OVER above FAR, HIGH and SIDE. In the second place, the 
very fact that these lexemes encode Sense relations (in that they 
encode relations of place rather than places) means that nothing of 
importance can be derived from them without knowing precisely the 
terms (places) they are relating. It is no use knowing that a fairy is 
generally OVER rather at the SIDE unless one knows over or at the side 
of what. Similarly the bald statement this Group is related to the 
ACTION Group 241 VERTICAL MOTION is of little use without 
specification. As it stands it ably brings to the surface a 
fundamental of conception, that notions of position and motion are
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related in English, but this is a truism, available to any 
introspection, and serves little purpose unless particular types of 
relation can be described, which is impossible without returning to 
the texts themselves. Thirdly one mysterious feature of the table, and 
perhaps therefore giving it some value, is that two pairs of Groups 
with identical markings nevertheless differ in that one member of the 
pair occurs twice as frequently as the other. OVER occurs more than 
twice as often as HIGH, NEAR occurs twice as often as SIDE. Surely, 
one concludes, this represents some special features of text or 
situation (Style or Applicability) rather than an intrinsic difference 
of Sense. The conclusion from this example must be that lexemes of 
pure Sense are relatively uninformative. Lexemes such as these could 
perhaps be accorded a classification midway between full and function 
words. Their role is not purely syntactical, but they have virtually 
no Applicability in the abstract.
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5.3.3.2 Example 2: 3411/3412 SMALL/GREAT
A counter example might perhaps be found in analysis of two 
antonymous Groups. The Groups 3411 SMALL and 3412 GREAT are the only 
Groups encoding "size" found frequently in the corpus, SMALL having 
fourteen more occurrences than GREAT. Since this is a difference of 
about 23Z it is probably significant. One can say immediately 
that the lexemes in these Groups are those which are probably used 
most frequently in the language to encode size, namely little, short, 
small, tinff and great although one notices the absence of big (4 
occurrences) and large (4 occurrences) which by virtue of the method 
of exclusion explained in Chapter 3 were not counted. Furthermore
%
they are relational. Size is relative to a standard and judgements of 
smallness or greatness are generally made by an observer, thus 
frequently relative to himself. However if one disallows the 
implication of an observer one may conclude that the purely relational 
information of SMALL and GREAT is of little value, for there is no 
guarantee that small, and great have any constancy of meaning from text 
to text. Notions of "less than x" or "greater than x" depend on an x.
It is impossible to have the notion "greater than" in isolation.
This1reiterates what was said in 5.3.3.1 concerning the uninformative 
nature of relational lexemes in isolation.
Given that impossibility one might argue that therefore part of 
the Sense of SMALL and GREAT is the necessary implication of an 
observer. Given this one has implicit Applicability, and the 
information.contained in the presence of SMALL and GREAT becomes much 
more useful. Firstly it supports the argument that characterisation 
of the supernatural is made relative to a human norm. One could then 
say that many fairies are smaller or greater than the norm.
However of over 2,000 occurrences in the corpus only 122 mention 
size. Even allowing for the statement made elsewhere that 40Z of the
244
corpus is concerned with using fairy as a modifier rather than a 
headword, this means that only one in ten occurrences distinguish 
fairy size as different from the norm. However given that the most 
frequently occurring Group which can be regarded as descriptive has 
only 318 occurrences (MONARCH), then one can say that the notion of 
size has about one third of the importance of that Group, which is 
probably a more realistic interpretation of the figures.
The problem with statistics of this nature is that the absolute 
nature of quantification implies that judgement should be made in 
terms of the absolute total (2,000 occurrences). This takes no 
account of focus or topicalisation. Few texts wish to include 
everything that could be said about fairy . The majority focus on a 
few features which are most relevant to their purpose. Given that 
there are 179 important Groups, and thus at least 179 significant 
things that could be said about fairy , then the average distribution 
of any topic at one topic per text would be roughly twelve texts.
SMALL and GREAT each occur about five times as often as might be 
expected. One can thus say that, in the abstract either of these two 
Groups is between two and five times more important than any of the 
positional Groups discussed in the previous section. How though can 
one establish the reason for this significance?
In terms of Sense relations there is not a great deal can be 
said. The only obvious connection is to the Group POWER, as magnitude 
is often (but not necessarily) linked conceptually to the notion of 
power. This would mean that small fairy creatures were thought of as 
lacking in power (or conversely that a phenomenon called fairy which 
was thought of as weak was called small) and such a creature strong in 
power would be £reat . In some texts this is the case. In others it
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is not. Oberon king of the fairies in'Huon of Bourdeanv (1539/0J) is 
the most powerful creature in the romance, and is only 4' tall. In 
fact the connection between POWER and SIZE seems to be adequate for 
GREAT but not for SMALL. Great is seldom used of human stature, but 
it is frequently used to indicate that many of the features attributed 
to fairy are done so in large amount, including marvels 
(1530/01/022/033), joy (1530/01/041/062), stones (1605/04/009), sums 
of gold (1613/02/004), feasts (1530/01/062; 1613/02/007; 1729/01/003), 
mishaps (1613/02/005), number (1616/005/001; 1530/01/031), amazement 
(1628/01/026), art and labour (1653/01/022), fear (1653/01/031) and 
cleanliness (1826/01/003). One could thus infer that there are few . 
features of "fairy" which cannot be regarded as great in size or 
extent, and this may be taken to confirm the thesis that excess above 
a norm indicates unusualness. In some cases great is used to modify 
fairy_ to signify "important, superior, powerful" directly as in 
1596/01/031,032; 1607/01/034; 1607/03/001; 1627/01/013.
However the reverse is not the case for SMALL. Possible reasons 
for the frequency of SMALL are discussed elsewhere^1). They are 
unrelated to POWER, and'occurrences of SMALL do not couple it with any 
attribute save physical size, and the concomitants of size, of fairy 
beings whereas GREAT is never used in this sense. Indeed there are 
very few examples of large fairies within or outside the corpus.
In other words the apparent dichotomy between SMALL and GREAT
is a false, one. Whilst it is certainly a relation of Sense in the •
*
language, it generally is not within the corpus, i.e. the Sense 
relation proposed here whilst it does tell us something about the
(l) In Chapter 6.
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structure of the language, does not merely fail to be adequate as an 
account of the meaning of fairy but is positively misleading in such 
an account, suggesting that texts encode size as a choice between 
GREAT and SMALL (which is true) but occluding the fact that it depends 
very much on the Object whose size is being described. That is, one 
needs to know the Applicability of the sentence (what is being 
Referred to?) and the attitude to the Referent (Affective or Stylistic 
meaning) in order to describe how this dichotomy functions in the 
corpus. The corpus is not the langue and its semantics are not 
co-extensive with those of the langue .
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5.3.3.3 Example 2: 33 Sensation
Having shown that Sense relations are both inadequate and 
possibly misleading in discussion of the meaning of fairy , it remains 
to demonstrate that they can be useful. As has been noted, this is 
best illustrated at the generic level, as in the partial success of 
the formal hierarchy as a "generative semantics". Surprisingly, in 
view of what has been said above concerning the need for knowledge of 
Reference, Sense relations seem to be of particular relevance in an 
area which one might expect to be totally Referentially determined, 
namely the Group 33 SENSATION. Whilst it is obviously the case that 
discussion of this Group must be made with regard to.putative 
Reference, there are clearly relations manifest within this Group, and 
between this Group and others, which have nothing to do with the 
actual appearance of real Referents.
In the first place one must note that although it might seem 
reasonable to suppose that reality consists of a buzz of assorted 
sensory data compounded in roughly equal proportions of material 
accessible to each physical sense, the sense of smell receives no 
mention in the corpus, taste and touch are each manifest in only one 
lexemic Group, sound has three, but sight has eight. In other words 
the sense of sight (called here 3313 VISUAL) is strongly favoured in 
the corpus. Not only this but of the Groups which form 332 GENERIC 
SENSATION (i.e. lexemes which could not exclusively be associated 
with-one channel of sensation) all would intuitively seem to be 
primarily visual Furthermore the Groups forming 3311 TASTE and 
3312 TANGIBLE, namely 33111 SWEET and 33121 SOFT, although correctly
(l)Tbese are 3321 BEAUTY, 3322 CLEAN, 3323 STRANGE, 3324 SCENE.
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assigned by virtue of their literal meanings are frequently (and in 
the case of sweet, , primarily) used metonymically or generically. In 
other words there is a strong focus in the corpus on the aural and in 
particular visual sensation to the neglect of the others. If one was 
to rely on Referential information as an explanation here, one would 
be inclined to say that fairy was primarily a visual and secondarily 
an aural phenomenon and had few manifestations of the other sense.
This confirms intuition, and is itself confirmed hy the large number 
of texts in which fairy phenomena are recorded as being seen or 
heard. The Sense relation between 25151 SEE and 3314 SOUND are thus 
paramount, and the formal hierarchy obscures their close connection. 
The action of seeing and the encountering of a situation which is 
visual are not simply related in Sense but identical. To report 
seeing x and to report the visual phenomenon x is to report identical 
information in both cases. This is obvious. What is not so obvious 
however is that frequently in the corpus a sentence will encode the 
ACTION of seeing fairy or the SITUATION of a visual fairy , but not 
both. One is thus inclined to say that there is a semantic element 
"sight" which may be manifest in two different sentential roles but 
retains its meaning, so that the true prominence of the encoding of 
"sight" can only be observed in the corpus by adding the number of 
occurrences of 25151 SEE to the number of occurrences of 3313 VISUAL, 
giving a total of 547 occurrences. Clearly the notion of "sight" is 
of massive importance in the corpus. Using the standard proposed in 
the previous section it is 45 times as important as the average 
semantic feature.
If the same exercise is carried out for 215152 HEAR and 3314 
SOUND the resultant total is 166 occurrences, roughly a third of that
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for "sight". However one can again suggest that aural phenomena and 
speech have an identical semantic component. Thus 2512 VERBAL could 
also be added, giving a grand total of 528 occurrences.
The statements deducible from these exercises are necessarily 
statements about putative Reference because they are concerned with 
sensation. But the operative word is putative . for if we are talking 
of fictional reference, as would seem to be the case with supernatural 
names, then the object under discussion is not an actual phenomenon 
but a construction of Sense. The sensations encoded in the corpus 
would not be actual but fictional. In consequence knowledge of the 
frequency and prominence of certain Sense relations is knowledge of 
the psychology of speakers. Thus we can say that the visual channel 
is the most important, and the aural secondmost; that the other three 
channels are almost totally irrelevant comparatively speaking, and 
their meanings tend to be appropriated metonymically and/or 
synaesthetically for the primary two; that the visual channel is 
roughly three times as important as the aural; if one ignores speech, 
but only slightly more important if speech is taken into account; and 
that the visual chainnel has a more varied and generally more specific 
pattern of encoding than the aural.
These statements are all confirmatory of intuitions about the 
corpus, about the nature of the imaginative construction of the 
supernatural (e.g. that supernatural happenings are generally 
'sightings'), about the nature of "fairy" (it is primarily, or 
primarily thought of as, a visual phenomenon, which has also a strong 
aural component, but which is more associated with speech in some form 
than other forms of sound) and about the nature of the psychological 
priorities of sensation in general. These facts are observed, and
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only observed, across texts and styles (i.e. would appear to be 
largely independent of Stylistic meaning) and seem to exist 
independently of Reference. That is, they are psychological facts 
apparent only as Sense relations in the language. Furthermore the 
possibility that sensory modes could achieve such prominence in a 
corpus which might conceivably report no actual sensation (if, for 
example, it consists entirely of works of fiction), that in 2,000 
occurrences there are at least 1,075 mentions of sensation, suggests a 
partial explanation of the mechanism and success of fictional 
reference and supernatural names. A name such as fair* is not coined 
or used in isolation, it tends to be used in conjunction with a report 
of some sensation or other. So used are we to reports of sensation, 
and so deeply are the semantic features "visual" and "aural" buried in 
our language and thought, that such use invariably confirms the 
validity of the name and places it in a pseudo-physical context.
Indeed if one takes into account the prominence of 11 BEING and 3112 
PLACE in the corpus, their total occurrences of 1195 and 951 
respectively added to "sight" and "aural" give 3,221. One could 
conclude that every use of a supernatural name is physically 
contextualised, indeed that the structure of the language is such that 
it is very difficult to do otherwise. The conclusion must therefore 
be that Sense relations themselves encode putative physical detail and 
that in consequence not only must discussion of Sense be made with
regard to Reference, but that discussion of Reference must necessarily 
be made with regard to Sense.
This leads to a further observation with regard to the dictum of 
Ayer which formed one of the starting points of this stud/.1) The
(1) See pp.6-7.
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position reached in the above argument illustrates the vagueness of 
his requirement that "some possible sense-experience should be 
relevant to the determination of [a proposition's] truth or 
falsehood". Clearly it could be argued that in all the texts in this 
corpus such "possible sense-experience" exists yet equally clearly 
fairy is a word which Ayer would call "metaphysical", "literally 
senseless". The fact that the word itself lacks all direct physical 
Applicability does not mean that it cannot be attached to "possible 
sense-experience" by virtue of the Sense-relations it acquires with 
regard to other words in the language.
The third observation derived from an examination of the Sense 
relations of 33 SENSATION has already been touched on to some extent. 
It is clear from the texts that formal separation of the Groups in 33 
according to reasonable literal interpretation of the physical sense 
concerned is artificial. Those Groups called generic include tokens 
used specifically, as beauty for example is sometimes used in the 
corpus to mean physical, visual beauty of appearance shape and forn/1)
Those Groups called specific include tokens used generically or 
metaphorically, the difference being rather difficult to stated 
Any of the lexemes may be used synaesthetically^ Some seem to 
have such strong connotations in metaphorical use that they might 
almost be counted as distinct lexemes, as in the moral or ethical 
symbolism of light and dark . One might wish to argue therefore that 
a formal schématisation of the literal relations is of little value
(1) E.g. 1750/02/001 her stature was tall and ha, . .
(2) E.g. 1653/01/013 t W  lovely, saeet L •
(3) E.g. 1603/03/001 soft music: 1628/0) /nm • i ’ , ,
each shining thread of sound; 1798/02/045 sweet odours^ * 79 * /0 I /01 1
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(although* of course, without such a schema at least implicit in our 
knowledge devices such as syoaesthesia, metonymy and other forms of 
semantic transference could not occur).
However an examination of the relations schematised indicates one 
important fact about the realisation of SENSATION in the corpus 
namely that whilst the fact of sensation is important, as demonstrated 
in the previous section, precision of sensation is not. Indeed it 
would appear that one of the reasons for the frequency of transference 
of meaning across the Groups forming 33 SENSATION is not to achieve 
greater specificity, but vague effect. Whereas a phrase such as soft 
S£3SL can b* related to a specific form of experience, it is more 
difficult to do so for soft music , and even more difficult for soft 
beauty. Use of the devices of transference shifts the burden of 
meaning from the intention of the speaker/writer to the interpretation 
of reader/hearer. Using words literally implies an accuracy and 
faithfulneess of production which would permit the legitimate tests of 
truth value semantics - the writer has a meaning he wishes to convey, 
and he seeks to do so by an accurate choice of the 'correct’ words.
Use of words with transferred meaning prevents truth value tests, 
allows inaccuracy and vagueness and depends on reader interpretation 
to provide appropriate (not ’correct') meaning. The consequence is 
that whilst the entailed notion 33 SENSATION is conveyed by use of the 
Groups it subsumes, such that the necessity of a physical context is 
suggested, It is left to the reader to create or supply that context. 
In a phrase such as 1653/01/013 this lovely, sweet and beauteous
very little is being conveyed to the reader, but a great deal 
is given him to interpret. It has the vagueness of what has been 
called "woman's language", characterised in its ’use of "empty"
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adjectives', 'expressiveness' and 'lack of precision'^ The 
reader is given strong positive connotations to work from, but the 
descriptive meaning of the three adjectives is equivalent - lovely, 
sweet and beauteous have the same meaning unless interpreted 
differently by the reader.
This confirms and links two tendencies previously noted in use of 
fairy. On the one hand we have seen in the etymology and general 
development of the word a tendency to use it vaguely even, I have 
suggested, in a manner deliberately ambiguous to allow the maximum 
range of connotation and interpretation. This, it has been suggested, 
allows for a wide degree of subjective meaning, for a fluid 
development, and for a lack of commitment with respect to the ontology 
of the described Entity. Conversely it has been shown that the 
creation and sustenance of a successful fictional Reference depends 
very much on fitting "fairy" into a credible and consistent physical 
context, making it real by treating it as if it was real.
Now, a real physical context must be specific - a field, a hill,
a wood does not exist in the abstract. However specificity reduces and
perhaps even destroys the functional ambiguity of the supernatural
name fairy , it reduces it to a unique Phenomenon whose existence can
be tested and about which statements made can also be tested as Ayer
would require. This would counteract the usefulness, subjective range
©and credibility of the fiction. Consequently the physical 
description should aim to create as full a physical context as 
possible (-.make the "fairy" as real as possible) whilst remaining as
(1) Parlee (1979).
(2) Credibilty here need not be taken to mean that actual belief by 
either speaker/writer or hearer/reader is in question, though it may 
be. More pertinent is the credibility a bearer is willing to allow and 
a cnoaker needs to give for "suspension of disbelief" or "the benefit of the doubt" to be possible.
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unspecific as possible (= inducing the reader to produce a context 
which is credible and permissible to him/her within the stated 
physical parameters). This also accounts for a lack of specificity 
in much of the typification of fairy . Agreement occurs at the 
generic level (they come, go, are attractive, have a moral sense, are 
like and unlike men, work magic) but does not occur at the specific 
level ” fairy beings are either tall, small or human sized; small may 
be half an inch to four feet; they are coloured, but it is not clear 
whether it is their skin or clothes or both which are coloured, and 
the colours may be green, red, black, white, grey or yellow; they come 
and go magically, but it may be a form of teleportation, instantaneous 
appearance and/or disappearance, or flight with or without an 
instrument, with or without wings, with or without a command word; 
time is the same or different in fairyland, if different it is either 
faster or slower; they eat or do not eat the same or different things 
as men which they produce, buy or steal with or without the use of 
magic; they have a distinctive appearance which is or is not illusory 
and may be beautiful or ugly and if either may really be the other; 
they only appear at Midsummer's Eve, midnight, dusk, Hallowe'en; they 
inhabit an unusual place - a hill (in, under or on), a graveyard, a 
dark wood, an island, a burial mound.
What this list of information amounts to is a general formula,
which can be expressed as follows: '
(L) SUPERNATURAL NAME + PHYSICAL CONTEXT - successful 
fictional Reference *
(2) PHYSICAL CONTEXT is any or all of: GENERIC BEING, GENERIC 
PLACE, GENERIC SENSATION
(3) GENERIC X is made specific by any logical specific 
difference from an implicit normal equivalent; or is that 
equivalent
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(4) GENERIC SENSATION is made specific by reader/hearer 
interpretation
According to this formulation Sense relations enter into the 
imaginative creation of fairy in at least three ways. Firstly they 
enable, by virtue of their encoding the structure of a language's 
reality, putative Reference. Secondly by virtue of the relations 
existing between a lexeme which has normal Denotation (e.g. dress • 
place, move ) and other lexemes they facilitate distortions from the 
norm along axes of Sense towards other lexemes to give a deviant 
Denotation. Thirdly they facilitate by their existence transgressions 
such as metaphor, metonymy and synaesthesia which minimise content and 
maximise interpretation.
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5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter on lexemic meaning several different but related 
aspects of meaning in the corpus have been discussed, centering on the 
sentential roles of fairy and Sense relations between Groups and 
lexemes. It has been shown that whilst sentential roles affect 
topicalisation of the object word and hence may subtly encode or 
control attitudes, the flexibility of syntax prevents any exclusive 
equivalence between role and meaning; that fairy predominantly takes a 
situational role rather than the actor/goal role with which it is more 
readily intuitively associated, and it was suggested that this is a 
function of what has been called its functional ambiguity; that Sense 
relations yielded some fundamental relations concerning fictional 
Reference, hence the semantics of fairy , but could not provide an 
account that was by any means fully adequate; and that considerations 
of Reference and Sense have to be examined in harness. In addition 
certain prominent Groups were explored, including 3111 POSITION, 341 
SIZE and 33 SENSATION. The general conclusions of this chapter are 
thus that formal analysis (a) enables the specification and 
examination of formal relations, including Sense relations; (b) that 
such analysis can obscure or falsify information; (c) that such 
analysis can isolate significant Groups, but that the Groups and their 
interrelations still require interpretation, and (d) that 
interpretation must be carried out in all three areas of Sense 
relations, Associative meaning and Applicability. Thus Chapters 6 and 
7 will in turn examine how these two areas interrelate with naming and 
with Sense relations, as such explanation would appear to be required 
of a full account of textual if not lexemic semantics.
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Diagram 5.4.1
1. IN THE RELEVANT PHYSICAL SITUATION CHOOSE AN IMPORTANT FEATURE.
2. CALL THAT FEATURE X.
3. SELECT A SEMANTIC GROUP T WHICH ENCODES X.
4. LET THE TOPIC OF THE UTTERANCE ENCODE, T.
5. DETERMINE THE APPARENT PHYSICAL RELATIONS OF IMPORTANT ITEMS AND 
OBJECTS IN THE SITUATION.
6. CALL THOSE RELATIONS rl, r2, r3....rn.
7. CALL THE SET OF RELATIONS rl, r2, r3 etc. R.
8. SELECT A SET OF GROUPS CALLED S ENCODING R.
9. DETERMINE THE AFFECTIVE POWER OF THE SITUATION AND CALL IT AP.
10. IF THE TEXT IS FICTIONAL DETERMINE THE INTENDED AFFECTIVE POWER OF 
THE TEXT - AP.
11. SELECT A SUBSET FROM T WHICH HAS THE VALUE AP. CALL THE SUBSET W.
12. SELECT A STYLE OF VALUE AP. CALL THE STYLE Y.
13. SELECT A LEVEL OF CREDIBILITY OF VALUE AP. CALL THE LEVEL Z.
14. ACCORDING TO Y CHOOSE ACCEPTABLE GROUPS FROM S. CALL THIS SET OF
GROUPS SY.
15. ACCORDING TO Z ESTABLISH SYNTACTIC AND SENSE RELATIONS BETWEEN 
LEXEMES IN SY AND A LEXEME FROM T.
15a. CHOOSE LEVELS OF ENTAILMENT WHICH HAVE THE SPECIFICITY 
NECESSARY FOR Z.
15b. ACCORDING TO Y AND R FOREGROUND AT LEAST ONE OF THE AVAILABLE 
SYNONYMS AND ANTONYMOUS PAIRS, BUT NOT A COMPLETE PAIR.
16. ACCORDING TO Y ASSIGN SENTENTIAL ROLES SUCH THAT THE SELECTED 
LEXEME FROM T IS THE TOPIC.
16a. IF THE STYLE IS LITERARY THERE IS A 65% LIKELIHOOD THAT FAIRY 
WILL TAKE THE ROLE OF SITUATION OTHERWISE THERE IS A 30% 
LIKELIHOOD.
17. REALISE TOKENS OF THE LEXEMES CHOSEN FROM SY AND T ACCORDING TO 
THE RELATIONS CHOSEN IN 15 AND THE ROLE RELATIONS CHOSEN IN 16.
18. COMPLETE UTTERANCE.
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At this stage however it is possible to expand the diagram of 
semantic relations proposed at the end of section 5 . 2 ^  to 
incorporate the major modifications of the input of Sense noted above, 
as outlined in Diagram 5.4.1.
This diagram is a flowchart summarising the major relations 
outlined in the chapter which are relevant to the determination of the 
meaning of fairy both as the way users determine choice of the lexeme 
and its context, and as the options which require description for an 
adequate account of that meaning in a period or set of texts. It is 
thus a model of a partial answer to question (i), "bow does fairy 
mean?" and is integrated with additional models in the final chapter. 
It may be read by following the choices from any box. The two starting 
points are here "physical situation" and "affective power", bpth being 
major influences on Sense and Style, but it can best be understood by 
reading back from the terminal boxes "actor/goal", "action" and 
"situation", as this was the procedure adopted above. The two primary 
influences on the encoding of the meaning of fairy in sentential roles 
are those of Sense relations, particularly entailment, synonymity, 
ahtonymity and similarity; and Style, particularly in the choice 
betweeen literary and oral varieties. A third major influence is that 
of topicalisation which itself is determined by the physical situation 
both of use and of Applicability and by Affective power, both directly 
(through emotive force) and indirectly through the need to make 
credible statements. The need for credibility involves the realisation 
of a particular set of logical relations inherent in the language as
(I) Tables 5.2.3 and 5.2.4.
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outlined on page 243 above, and this set of relations is realised in 
conjunction with the relations manifest in the physical situation. It 
is this complex of a credible logic and an actual situation which 
determines which of the relations of Sense will be encoded in which 
role, though Stylistic choice may also constrain Sense relations 
directly. These will form part of the discussion of the next chapter.
It should be clear from the above that Sense relations play an 
important part in structuring the semantics of fairy., Although many 
of the relations evident in this corpus can be said to be 
representative simply of structures embedded in the language certain 
choices concerning which relation to realise and which aspects of that 
relation to focus on or topicalise are crucial in that structure. 
However it should equally be clear that aim (B) cannot be attainable 
if discussion is confined simply to intralinguistic relations for, 
whilst this chapter goes some way to supporting the hypothesis that a 
lexeme with fictional Reference acquires meaning by virtue of the 
Sense relations obtaining around it in actual usage, neither strict 
formal classification of those relations nor rather fuzzier accounts 
of those relations provides an adequate model unless more is said on 
inputs from, in Diagram 5.4.1, "Physical situation", "Style" and 
"Affective power". These form the topics of the following two 
chapters.
